given instruction in California

2025A. Forfeiture “Generally, a party may not complain on appeal about a given instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence unless the party made an appropriate objection. [Citation.] But we may review any instruction which affects the defendant’s ‘substantial rights,’ with or without a trial objection. [Citation.] ‘Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it

2025“Generally, a party may not complain on appeal about a given instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence unless the party made an appropriate objection.” 7 (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087 .) Under section 1259, however, there is no forfeiture of an instructional error claim on appeal when the substantial rights of the defendant have been affected.

2023(People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 525–526.) We review a challenged jury instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. [Citation.]” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 .) In that context, we must determine if it is reasonably likely the jurors understood the instruction as appellant suggests.

2023(People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495 , 525–526.) The challenged instruction is viewed “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 .) “It is well settled that expert testimony concerning CSAAS only may be used to disabuse the jury of commonly held misconceptions regarding the behavior of abuse victims, and may not be used to corroborate the victim’s claims of abuse.” (People v. Housely (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 94

2023(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ; accord, People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210 .) We must ascertain the relevant law and determine whether the given instruction correctly stated it.

2022(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210 .) We must ascertain the relevant law and determine whether the given instruction correctly stated it.

2025(People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476 ; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 .) Defendant points to the following sentence in the firecracker instruction: “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with a goal of arriving at a verdict on the charges if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment.” He argues the word “violence” in that sentence “set[] an extreme standard that any lesser capitulation is deemed acceptable” and led jurors to believe they must surrender their individual judgment unless the extreme standard of violence was met.

2022(People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1015 .) Where the defendant asserts that a given instruction was legally incorrect, an objection is not required and the issue may be addressed on appeal.

2025(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1036.) In reviewing a claim that the trial judge’s supplemental instructions coerced a verdict, we determine “ ‘whether the instructions tend[ed] to impose such pressure on jurors to reach a verdict that we are uncertain of the accuracy and integrity of the jury’s stated conclusion’ ” by assessing “ ‘the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 461 .) An instruction is coerciv

2025(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1036.) In reviewing a claim that the trial judge’s supplemental instructions coerced a verdict, we determine “ ‘whether the instructions tend[ed] to impose such pressure on jurors to reach a verdict that we are uncertain of the accuracy and integrity of the jury’s stated conclusion’ ” by assessing “ ‘the potential effect of a given instruction on the fact finding process, rather than as an attempted inquiry into the actual volitional quality of a particular jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 461 .) An instruction is coerciv

2026(People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 , disapproved in part on another ground in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 163 ; see also United States v. Berger (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1080, 1089 [applying de novo review to the question whether a trial court’s further instructions to a potentially deadlocked jury improperly coerced a verdict].) “This determination of whether the instructions ‘operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency’ [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potent

2026(People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850 , disapproved in part on another ground in Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 163 ; see also United States v. Berger (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1080, 1089 [applying de novo review to the question whether a trial court’s further instructions to a potentially deadlocked jury improperly coerced a verdict].) “This determination of whether the instructions ‘operate to displace the independent judgment of the jury in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency’ [citation] is perhaps best characterized as requiring a generalized assessment of the potent

2025If the improper theory ‘is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it’ [citation], reversal is not required if ‘a valid ground for the verdict remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground’ [citation].” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 207.) “By contrast, a legally inadequate theory is not merely incorrect because it is factually wanting but ‘because it is contrary to law.’ [Citation.] When a given instruction misstates the law, the more demanding standard of 44 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,

2023(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) 32 PEOPLE v. MUMIN Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. factually wanting but “because it is contrary to law.” (Aledamat, at p. 7.) When a given instruction misstates the law, the more demanding standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , applies, requiring reversal unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘[L]egal error requires a more stringent standard for prejudice . . . [because] jurors are presumed to be less able to identify and ignore an incorrect statement of law due to their lack of formal legal training.

2022(People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581 .) Here, the trial court instructed the jury that: “In evaluating a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony.” (Italics added.) Among the factors enumerated in the given instruction, the jury was told they may consider the witness’s “character for truthfulness,” if any, in evaluating her credibility.

2022(People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581 .) Here, the trial court instructed the jury that: “In evaluating a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony.” (Italics added.) Among the factors enumerated in the given instruction, the jury was told they may consider the witness’s “character for truthfulness,” if any, in evaluating her credibility.

2018But this case is not akin to Saelzler , where plaintiff could not prove that additional security guards in a 300-unit, 28-building complex would have prevented a criminal assault ( Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 777 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 23 P.3d 1143 ), or Merrill , where plaintiff provided no evidence either "direct or circumstantial" that the promotion and marketing of a firearm by a manufacturer bore any causal relation to the purchase and use of that firearm by an individual to kill various victims. ( Merrill, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 489 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 28 P.3d 116 .) Defendan

2018But this case is not akin to Saelzler , where plaintiff could not prove that additional security guards in a 300-unit, 28-building complex would have prevented a criminal assault ( Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 777 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 23 P.3d 1143 ), or Merrill , where plaintiff provided no evidence either "direct or circumstantial" that the promotion and marketing of a firearm by a manufacturer bore any causal relation to the purchase and use of that firearm by an individual to kill various victims. ( Merrill, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 489 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 28 P.3d 116 .) Defendan

2025“Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim.” (People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 .) We will therefore consider the merits of Hernandez’s contention despite the lack of objection.

2022Analysis “Generally, a party may not complain on appeal about a given instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence unless the party made an appropriate objection. [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087 ; see People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012 ; People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 .) Here, defendant did not object on the basis that the jury may convict him out of a desire to punish him for the prior crime.

2025(People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476 ; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 .) Defendant points to the following sentence in the firecracker instruction: “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with a goal of arriving at a verdict on the charges if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment.” He argues the word “violence” in that sentence “set[] an extreme standard that any lesser capitulation is deemed acceptable” and led jurors to believe they must surrender their individual judgment unless the extreme standard of violence was met.

2025(People v. Santiago (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476 ; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 .) Defendant points to the following sentence in the firecracker instruction: “It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with a goal of arriving at a verdict on the charges if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment.” He argues the word “violence” in that sentence “set[] an extreme standard that any lesser capitulation is deemed acceptable” and led jurors to believe they must surrender their individual judgment unless the extreme standard of violence was met.

2023(People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558 , 569–570; People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 358 .) We must ascertain the relevant law and determine whether the given instruction correctly stated it.

2021(People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558 , 569–570; People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 358 .) We must ascertain the relevant law and determine whether the given instruction correctly stated it.

2023(People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 525–526.) We review a challenged jury instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. [Citation.]” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 .) In that context, we must determine if it is reasonably likely the jurors understood the instruction as appellant suggests.

2023(People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495 , 525–526.) The challenged instruction is viewed “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 .) “It is well settled that expert testimony concerning CSAAS only may be used to disabuse the jury of commonly held misconceptions regarding the behavior of abuse victims, and may not be used to corroborate the victim’s claims of abuse.” (People v. Housely (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 94

2023(People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558 , 569–570; People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 358 .) We must ascertain the relevant law and determine whether the given instruction correctly stated it.

2021(People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558 , 569–570; People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 358 .) We must ascertain the relevant law and determine whether the given instruction correctly stated it.

2022(People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495 , 525–526; People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 .) “Trial courts have the duty to screen out invalid theories of conviction, either by appropriate instruction or by not presenting them to the jury in the first place.” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1131 .) Therefore, a trial court should only give a requested jury instruction if it is supported by substantial evidence.

2022(People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495 , 525–526; People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 .) “Trial courts have the duty to screen out invalid theories of conviction, either by appropriate instruction or by not presenting them to the jury in the first place.” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1131 .) Therefore, a trial court should only give a requested jury instruction if it is supported by substantial evidence.

2018(See Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist . [ , supra, ] 210 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 58 [ 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 119 ] [correctly recognizing Kibler addressed only whether hospital peer review proceedings can be ' "official proceedings," ' and courts resolving anti-SLAPP motions must still separately determine whether a given claim arises from any protected activity].) "Applying our decision in Kibler , the Court of Appeal in Nesson v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist . (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 65 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 446 ] concluded an anti-SLAPP motion against the claims of a doctor who alleged discrim

2017(See Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 35 , 58, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 119 [correctly recognizing Kibler addressed only whether hospital peer review proceedings can be " 'official proceedings,' " and courts resolving anti-SLAPP motions must still separately determine whether a given claim arises from any protected activity].) Applying our decision in Kibler , the Court of Appeal in Nesson v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 65 , 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 446 concluded an anti-SLAPP motion against the claims of a doctor who alleged discriminatory and retal

2018The Nesson court reasoned that under Kibler , a hospital's peer review proceedings are official proceedings, and thus every aspect of those proceedings, including the decision to impose discipline, is protected activity for anti-SLAPP purposes. ( Nesson , at pp. 78-79, 82-84 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 446 ].) Similarly, in *221 DeCambre [ , supra, ] 235 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 888 ], the Court of Appeal concluded Kibler dictated finding the allegedly discriminatory decision not to renew a doctor's contract to be protected activity.

2018The Nesson court reasoned that under Kibler , a hospital's peer review proceedings are official proceedings, and thus every aspect of those proceedings, including the decision to impose discipline, is protected activity for anti-SLAPP purposes. ( Nesson , at pp. 78-79, 82-84 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 446 ].) Similarly, in *221 DeCambre [ , supra, ] 235 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 888 ], the Court of Appeal concluded Kibler dictated finding the allegedly discriminatory decision not to renew a doctor's contract to be protected activity.