given error in Rhode Island

2003In determining whether a given error has been harmless, the focus is on the effect, if any, of the error or misconduct on the grand jury's decision to indict: dismissal is appropriate "`if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is `grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations." Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256 (quoting U.S. v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 , 75 (1988)); Franco, 750 A.2d at 419 (explaining that dismissal should be reserved "to situations in which there has

2003In determining whether a given error has been harmless, the focus is on the effect, if any, of the error or misconduct on the grand jury's decision to indict: dismissal is appropriate "`if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is `grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations." Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256 (quoting U.S. v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 , 75 (1988)); Franco, 750 A.2d at 419 (explaining that dismissal should be reserved "to situations in which there has

2003In determining whether a given error has been harmless, the focus is on the effect, if any, of the error or misconduct on the grand jury's decision to indict: dismissal is appropriate "`if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is `grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations." Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256 (quoting U.S. v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 , 75 (1988)); Franco, 750 A.2d at 419 (explaining that dismissal should be reserved "to situations in which there has

2003In determining whether a given error has been harmless, the focus is on the effect, if any, of the error or misconduct on the grand jury's decision to indict: dismissal is appropriate "`if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is `grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations." Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256 (quoting U.S. v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 , 75 (1988)); Franco, 750 A.2d at 419 (explaining that dismissal should be reserved "to situations in which there has

2012In so doing, he relied upon a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cir.1998), wherein the court held that “before we permit the drawing of an adverse inference, we require some showing indicating that the destroyed evidence would have been relevant to the contested issue.” See also id. at 128 (“We do not suggest that the destruction of evidence, standing alone, is enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence — or utterly inadequate evidence — in support of a given claim to survive summary judgment on

2012In so doing, he relied upon a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cir.1998), wherein the court held that “before we permit the drawing of an adverse inference, we require some showing indicating that the destroyed evidence would have been relevant to the contested issue.” See also id. at 128 (“We do not suggest that the destruction of evidence, standing alone, is enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence — or utterly inadequate evidence — in support of a given claim to survive summary judgment on

2012The trial justice also referenced a number of Rhode Island cases — including Mead v. Papa Razzi, 899 A.2d 437, 440 (R.I.2006), Kurczy v. St.

2007See McBurney Law Servs. v. Apex, Inc. , 771 A.2d 911 , 911-912 (R.I. 2001) ("An aggrieved party challenging the ruling of the trial justice. . . bears the burden of *Page 80 establishing that the excluded evidence was material and that its exclusion had an improper prejudicial influence on the factfinder") (citing Graff v. Motta , 748 A.2d 249 , 252 (R.I. 2000) (emphasis added).

2007See McBurney Law Servs. v. Apex, Inc. , 771 A.2d 911 , 911-912 (R.I. 2001) ("An aggrieved party challenging the ruling of the trial justice. . . bears the burden of *Page 80 establishing that the excluded evidence was material and that its exclusion had an improper prejudicial influence on the factfinder") (citing Graff v. Motta , 748 A.2d 249 , 252 (R.I. 2000) (emphasis added).

2001“In determining the correctness of a jury charge, ‘we determine how a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent persons listening to that instruction at the close of trial would have [interpreted] the instructions as a whole.’ ” Parkhurst, 706 A.2d at 418 (quoting State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1262 (R.I.1981)).

2001See also United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960 , 104 S.Ct. 2174 , 80 L.Ed.2d 557 (1984) (stating that “[t]he refusal to give a particular requested instruction * * * is reversible error only if ‘the instruction (1) is substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to effectively present a given defense’ ”).

2001See also United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960 , 104 S.Ct. 2174 , 80 L.Ed.2d 557 (1984) (stating that “[t]he refusal to give a particular requested instruction * * * is reversible error only if ‘the instruction (1) is substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to effectively present a given defense’ ”).

2001See also United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960 , 104 S.Ct. 2174 , 80 L.Ed.2d 557 (1984) (stating that “[t]he refusal to give a particular requested instruction * * * is reversible error only if ‘the instruction (1) is substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to effectively present a given defense’ ”).

2001See also United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960 , 104 S.Ct. 2174 , 80 L.Ed.2d 557 (1984) (stating that “[t]he refusal to give a particular requested instruction * * * is reversible error only if ‘the instruction (1) is substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to effectively present a given defense’ ”).

1998Co. v. Rhode Island, Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 675 A.2d 417, 418 (R.I.1996) (mem.), we determined that “the date an insurer becomes insolvent [is] the pivotal date in determining whether the July 1988 act applies to a given claim.” We further declared that “the [1988] version of the [a]et applies to claims involving an insurer that became insolvent on or after July 1,1988.” Id.

1998Co. v. Rhode Island, Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 675 A.2d 417, 418 (R.I.1996) (mem.), we determined that “the date an insurer becomes insolvent [is] the pivotal date in determining whether the July 1988 act applies to a given claim.” We further declared that “the [1988] version of the [a]et applies to claims involving an insurer that became insolvent on or after July 1,1988.” Id.

1996When instructing the jury, the trial justice “should reasonably set forth all of the *997 salient and essential propositions of law that relate to material issues of fact which the evidence tends to support.” State v. Conway, 463 A.2d 1319, 1322 (R.I.1983) (citing State v. Manning, 447 A.2d 393, 394 (R.I.1982)).

1996When instructing the jury, the trial justice “should reasonably set forth all of the *997 salient and essential propositions of law that relate to material issues of fact which the evidence tends to support.” State v. Conway, 463 A.2d 1319, 1322 (R.I.1983) (citing State v. Manning, 447 A.2d 393, 394 (R.I.1982)).