outset analysis in Oregon

2019Cf. Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev, 356 Or 282, 297-98 , 337 P3d 768 (2014) (determining at the outset of its analysis that phrase “data transmission services” has no familiar or common meaning; rejecting as “futile” an approach that would require the court to “cobble together definitions of the individual words to make collective sense of the phrase as a whole”); Tharp v. PSRB, 338 Or 413, 423 , 110 P3d 103 (2005) (analyzing meanings of “mental disease or defect” and “personality disorder” as complete phrases “although they consist of common individual words”).

2019Cf. Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev, 356 Or 282, 297-98 , 337 P3d 768 (2014) (determining at the outset of its analysis that phrase “data transmission services” has no familiar or common meaning; rejecting as “futile” an approach that would require the court to “cobble together definitions of the individual words to make collective sense of the phrase as a whole”); Tharp v. PSRB, 338 Or 413, 423 , 110 P3d 103 (2005) (analyzing meanings of “mental disease or defect” and “personality disorder” as complete phrases “although they consist of common individual words”).

2022The court explained at the outset of its analysis that the “determination of the legal sufficiency of Neumann’s defamation claim hinges on whether Liles’s statements are protected under the First Amendment[.]” 358 Or at 711 .

2022After reviewing state common law and some of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment deci- sions concerning defamation actions, especially Milkovich, the court stated that, “to determine whether a defamatory statement is protected under the First Amendment, the first question is whether the statement involves a matter of public concern.” Id. at 718 .

2020Instead, we apply that definition here Cite as 302 Or App 325 (2020) 335 only insofar as it informs our understanding of the ways in which the word “arrest” is used in the field of criminal law as a whole and whether, in turn, that understanding sup- ports the plausibility of DHS’s interpretation.

2013The record must provide information about the training that the dog and handler underwent, and the standards they had to meet to achieve certification.” Id.

2007At trial, the insured requested a jury instruction that would have told the jury that “the purpose of the notice condition in the insurance policy is to acquaint the insurance company with the occurrence of an accident so that it may make a proper investigation in order that it can determine whether a claim is likely to be made against the insured.” 272 Or at 596 . *497 At the outset of its analysis, the court first stated its “conclusions on the proper means of interpreting the notice of accident provision and then relate [d] these conclusions to [its] previous decisions.” Id. at 597 .

2007At trial, the insured requested a jury instruction that would have told the jury that “the purpose of the notice condition in the insurance policy is to acquaint the insurance company with the occurrence of an accident so that it may make a proper investigation in order that it can determine whether a claim is likely to be made against the insured.” 272 Or at 596 . *497 At the outset of its analysis, the court first stated its “conclusions on the proper means of interpreting the notice of accident provision and then relate [d] these conclusions to [its] previous decisions.” Id. at 597 .

2001Hiatt v. Congoleum Industries, 279 Or 569, 579 , 569 P2d 567 (1977).

2001Hiatt v. Congoleum Industries, 279 Or 569, 579 , 569 P2d 567 (1977).

1987To support that assertion, it cites EBI Companies v. Thomas, 66 Or App 105 , 672 P2d 1241 (1983), in which we held that an issue designated as “failure to meet requirements of ORS 656.307” did not raise the issue of whether penalties or attorney fees should be allowed for a late denial under ORS 656.262(9). 4 In her request for hearing, claimant here raised, inter alia, the issues of compensability, responsibility under ORS 656.307 and penalties and attorney fees.

1987To support that assertion, it cites EBI Companies v. Thomas, 66 Or App 105 , 672 P2d 1241 (1983), in which we held that an issue designated as “failure to meet requirements of ORS 656.307” did not raise the issue of whether penalties or attorney fees should be allowed for a late denial under ORS 656.262(9). 4 In her request for hearing, claimant here raised, inter alia, the issues of compensability, responsibility under ORS 656.307 and penalties and attorney fees.

1978In Tuite v. Union Pacific Stages et al, 204 Or 565, 583-584 , 284 P2d 333 (1955), we stated: "It is firmly established in this state that the propriety of admitting opinion evidence and determining the qualifications of expert witnesses rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its determination of either question will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. * * *” The standards for judging the trial court’s exercise of discretion in qualifying a witness as an expert are given in Sandow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 252 Or 377, 380 , 449 P2d 426 (19

1978In Tuite v. Union Pacific Stages et al, 204 Or 565, 583-584 , 284 P2d 333 (1955), we stated: "It is firmly established in this state that the propriety of admitting opinion evidence and determining the qualifications of expert witnesses rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its determination of either question will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. * * *” The standards for judging the trial court’s exercise of discretion in qualifying a witness as an expert are given in Sandow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 252 Or 377, 380 , 449 P2d 426 (19

1978In Tuite v. Union Pacific Stages et al, 204 Or 565, 583-584 , 284 P2d 333 (1955), we stated: "It is firmly established in this state that the propriety of admitting opinion evidence and determining the qualifications of expert witnesses rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its determination of either question will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. * * *” The standards for judging the trial court’s exercise of discretion in qualifying a witness as an expert are given in Sandow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 252 Or 377, 380 , 449 P2d 426 (19

1978In Tuite v. Union Pacific Stages et al, 204 Or 565, 583-584 , 284 P2d 333 (1955), we stated: "It is firmly established in this state that the propriety of admitting opinion evidence and determining the qualifications of expert witnesses rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its determination of either question will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. * * *” The standards for judging the trial court’s exercise of discretion in qualifying a witness as an expert are given in Sandow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 252 Or 377, 380 , 449 P2d 426 (19

1939In short, where a minor is concerned, ordinary risks are, for evidential purposes, always treated at the outset of the inquiry as extraordinary and the burden of establishing the servant’s comprehension of a particular risk is cast upon the employer.” In the next section Labatt, in stating the principle applicable to extraordinary risks, declares: “It is equally well settled that the inference of a minor’s assumption of such risks may be drawn by the court where the evidence is reasonably susceptible of no other construction than that the servant, notwithstanding his youth, has full intelligen

1939In short, where a minor is concerned, ordinary risks are, for evidential purposes, always treated at the outset of the inquiry as extraordinary and the burden of establishing the servant’s comprehension of a particular risk is cast upon the employer.” In the next section Labatt, in stating the principle applicable to extraordinary risks, declares: “It is equally well settled that the inference of a minor’s assumption of such risks may be drawn by the court where the evidence is reasonably susceptible of no other construction than that the servant, notwithstanding his youth, has full intelligen