16 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Landes v. Capital City Bankgreen2 sentences1992Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). 1991See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Landes v. Capital *1112 City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). | 2 | 2 |
Gray v. Scottgreen2 sentences2025At the outset of its analysis, the Gray court framed the issue on appeal as whether “there were sufficient facts in the record to submit to the jury the issue of whether [the] defendants had violated their duty to anticipate that another fight or shooting would be committed on the premises.” Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 2025The plaintiff argued that the defendants “should have investigated” a shooting in the alley near their premises and “should have taken precautionary steps to guard against the potential hazard posed by” third-party “belligerents.” Id. at 78 . | 1 | 1 |
Filimon Castillo Perez v. George E. Sullivan, Warden, and Attorney General, State of New Mexicogreen1 sentence2025See Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (“We note at the outset that the factors set forth in Barker are guidelines, not rigid tests.”). ¶91 Among other things, some Barker factors may be particularly probative in one case but not in another. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Krisergreen1 sentence2020See supra ¶ 16 (citing Anderson, 2011 UT 66, ¶ 22 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gambrellgreen2 sentences2010Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 228 (holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporter's qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict); Vance, 671 P.2d at 1831 & n. 6 (noting that the appellant did not object to the qualifications of a member of the committee which recommended revocation of his medical lic 2010Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice *766 court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 223 (holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporter's qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict); Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 6 (noting that the appellant did not object to the qualifications of a member of the committee which recommended revocation of his medical | 1 | 1 |
State v. Menziesgreen2 sentences2010Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 228 (holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporter's qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict); Vance, 671 P.2d at 1831 & n. 6 (noting that the appellant did not object to the qualifications of a member of the committee which recommended revocation of his medical lic 2010Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice *766 court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 223 (holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporter's qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict); Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 6 (noting that the appellant did not object to the qualifications of a member of the committee which recommended revocation of his medical | 1 | 1 |
In Re Thompson's Estategreen2 sentences2010Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 228 (holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporter's qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict); Vance, 671 P.2d at 1831 & n. 6 (noting that the appellant did not object to the qualifications of a member of the committee which recommended revocation of his medical lic 2010Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice *766 court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 223 (holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporter's qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict); Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 6 (noting that the appellant did not object to the qualifications of a member of the committee which recommended revocation of his medical | 1 | 1 |
Salt Lake City v. Ohmsgreen2 sentences2010See generally Ohms, 881 P.2d at 854 (citing In re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. at 128 , favorably for the proposition that a district court judge had de facto authority to sit with the supreme court where "(1) the district judge had authority in other instances to sit with the court, and (2) the parties had knowledge of and did not object to the district judge's participation"). 2010See generally Ohms, 881 P.2d at 854 (citing In re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. at 128 , favorably for the proposition that a district court judge had de facto authority to sit with the supreme court where "(1) the district judge had authority in other instances to sit with the court, and (2) the parties had knowledge of and did not object to the district judge's participation"). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Neiheiselgreen1 sentence2009Miller Co. v. Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380 , 325 P.2d 908, 909-10 (1958); see also In re Netheisel, 32 B.R. 146, 167-68 (Bankr.D.Utah 1983) ("When a Utah statute grants an exemption, the Utah Supreme *1003 Court has consistently applied a liberal construction in favor of debtors to protect debtors and their families from hardship."). | 1 | 1 |
Russell M. Miller Company v. Givangreen2 sentences2009Miller Co. v. Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380 , 325 P.2d 908, 909-10 (1958); see also In re Netheisel, 32 B.R. 146, 167-68 (Bankr.D.Utah 1983) ("When a Utah statute grants an exemption, the Utah Supreme *1003 Court has consistently applied a liberal construction in favor of debtors to protect debtors and their families from hardship."). 2009Miller Co. v. Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380 , 325 P.2d 908, 909-10 (1958); see also In re Netheisel, 32 B.R. 146, 167-68 (Bankr.D.Utah 1983) ("When a Utah statute grants an exemption, the Utah Supreme *1003 Court has consistently applied a liberal construction in favor of debtors to protect debtors and their families from hardship."). | 1 | 1 |
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc.green2 sentences1994See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). 1994See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Madsen v. Borthickgreen1 sentence1989See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988), wherein the court wrote, "[w]e note at the outset that a challenge to a summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual disputes." 5 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carrollgreen1 sentence1983State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 471-72 (1871). [6] Even if appellant had a viable objection that a member of the Committee was unqualified or should be disqualified, that objection had to be raised in timely fashion, at the outset of the hearing, as the district court held. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. James
green
1 sentence2026At the outset of that hearing, the court indicated that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report and the “victim impact statement,” as well as “dozens of letters sent in from family members and friends, both in support of [Ashley] and also in support of [James].” When it was his turn to address the court, Counsel acknowledged that the presumptive sentence was “15 to life” on each count, but he pointed out that the court was “well aware” that it wasn’t “bound by that.” In particular, Counsel noted that the court could suspend any prison sentence and “grant probation,” and that the c | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Duke Capital v. Proctor
green
1 sentence2023At the outset of the hearing, the court explained that its purpose 20210581-CA 2 2023 UT App 59 Duke Capital v. Proctor in holding the hearing was to “ask if [the] [c]ourt had jurisdiction” in light of the Arbitration Provision. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Griffin v. Snow Christensen and Martineau
green
1 sentence2023At the outset of the hearing, the court and the 20210494-CA 4 2023 UT App 88 Griffin v. Snow Christensen parties agreed that this question turned on whether Chapman was a managing or general agent of Snow Christensen within the meaning of rule 4(d)(1)(E). ¶13 Appearing pro se, Griffin called himself as his first witness. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Kitzmiller
green
1 sentence2021This harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test applied in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (quotation simplified)). ¶21 At the outset of our analysis, we note that in the final jury instructions, given just before deliberations, the district court gave a general unanimity instruction, explaining, “Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must agree with the verdict before the defendant can be found guilty or not guilty.” The court also instructed the jury that it must consider each charge separately and further clarified, “Your verdict on one charge | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Vance v. Fordham
green
2 sentences2010Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 228 (holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporter's qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict); Vance, 671 P.2d at 1831 & n. 6 (noting that the appellant did not object to the qualifications of a member of the committee which recommended revocation of his medical lic 2010Nevertheless, Mr. Pett argues that he did not personally acquiesce to Judge Marx's appointment and instead "objected to [Judge] Marx's authority to act as a justice *766 court judge in this case as soon as [Judge] Marx was appointed." Cf. Menzies, 845 P.2d at 223 (holding that a court reporter had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the reporter's qualifications was first made after the jury rendered its verdict); Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 6 (noting that the appellant did not object to the qualifications of a member of the committee which recommended revocation of his medical | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sabri v. United States
green
2 sentences2004We share that Court’s concern that Ansari and Lagana’s facial challenge “carries too much promise of premature interpretatio[n] of [the] statute[] on the basis of [a] factually bare-bones record[ ].” — U.S.-,-, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1948 , 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (quotation and citation omitted). 2004We share that Court’s concern that Ansari and Lagana’s facial challenge “carries too much promise of premature interpretatio[n] of [the] statute[] on the basis of [a] factually bare-bones record[ ].” — U.S.-,-, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1948 , 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (quotation and citation omitted). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Provo City Corp. v. Willden
green
1 sentence2004Deciding the issue now would have no conceivable concrete benefit to anyone.” Id. ¶ 37 In turning now to the facial Commerce Clause challenge made by Ansari and Lagaña, we note at the outset that their challenge triggers many of the concerns addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Sabri v. United States. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission
green
2 sentences2002SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION {11 We note at the outset of our analysis that "parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 14 , 34 P.3d 180 (internal quotations omitted). 2002SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION {11 We note at the outset of our analysis that "parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 14 , 34 P.3d 180 (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
BOARD OF MED. REGIS. AND EXAM. v. Armington
green
2 sentences1983Bd. of Medical Registration and Examination v. Armington, 242 Ind. 436 , 178 N.E.2d 741 (1961); Olathe Hosp. 1983Bd. of Medical Registration and Examination v. Armington, 242 Ind. 436 , 178 N.E.2d 741 (1961); Olathe Hosp. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.