outset analysis in California

2019The important right to counsel of one's choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.' " ( Ra , at p. 1124, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 ; see Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807 , 818, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 171 P.3d 1092 [" '[a]n attorney has an obligation not only to protect his client's interests but also to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice' "].) Recognizing, as had the trial court, that Richie had never acted as counsel for O'Gara Coach and, t

2019The important right to counsel of one's choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.' " ( Ra , at p. 1124, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 ; see Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807 , 818, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 171 P.3d 1092 [" '[a]n attorney has an obligation not only to protect his client's interests but also to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice' "].) Recognizing, as had the trial court, that Richie had never acted as counsel for O'Gara Coach and, t

2019The important right to counsel of one's choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.' " ( Ra , at p. 1124, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 ; see Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807 , 818, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 171 P.3d 1092 [" '[a]n attorney has an obligation not only to protect his client's interests but also to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice' "].) Recognizing, as had the trial court, that Richie had never acted as counsel for O'Gara Coach and, t

2019The important right to counsel of one's choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.' " ( Ra , at p. 1124, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 ; see Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807 , 818, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 171 P.3d 1092 [" '[a]n attorney has an obligation not only to protect his client's interests but also to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice' "].) Recognizing, as had the trial court, that Richie had never acted as counsel for O'Gara Coach and, t

2025(Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1345 (Petricka).) At the outset of the hearing, Cox informed the hearing officer he received the documents and objection that had been produced by the Sheriff’s Department and forwarded to him by the DMV.

2025(Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1345 (Petricka).) At the outset of the hearing, Cox informed the hearing officer he received the documents and objection that had been produced by the Sheriff’s Department and forwarded to him by the DMV.

2016As the Brown court acknowledged at the outset of its analysis, “Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the first instance, a matter of legislative 29 intent.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 319 ; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 [“To ascertain whether a statute should be applied retroactively, legislative intent is the ‘paramount’ consideration.”]; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206 [“Because the question whether a statute is to apply retroactively or prospectively is, in the first instance, a policy question for the le

2016As the Brown court acknowledged at the outset of its analysis, ‘“Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the first instance, a matter of legislative intent.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 319; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 ] [‘“To ascertain whether a statute should be applied retroactively, legislative intent is the ‘paramount’ consideration.”]; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [‘“Because the question whether a statute is to apply retroactivel

2016As the Brown court acknowledged at the outset of its analysis, “Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the first instance, a matter of legislative 29 intent.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 319 ; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 [“To ascertain whether a statute should be applied retroactively, legislative intent is the ‘paramount’ consideration.”]; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206 [“Because the question whether a statute is to apply retroactively or prospectively is, in the first instance, a policy question for the le

2016As the Brown court acknowledged at the outset of its analysis, ‘“Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the first instance, a matter of legislative intent.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 319; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 ] [‘“To ascertain whether a statute should be applied retroactively, legislative intent is the ‘paramount’ consideration.”]; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [‘“Because the question whether a statute is to apply retroactivel

1983We are faced at the outset of this inquiry with the fact that the statutes themselves do not lend themselves to “flexible” interpretation, described so aptly in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 761 , 502 P.2d 1049 ] as follows: “As we stated nearly a half century ago in In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605, 613 [ 234 P. 883 ]: ‘ “The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other

1983We are faced at the outset of this inquiry with the fact that the statutes themselves do not lend themselves to “flexible” interpretation, described so aptly in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 761 , 502 P.2d 1049 ] as follows: “As we stated nearly a half century ago in In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605, 613 [ 234 P. 883 ]: ‘ “The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other

1983We are faced at the outset of this inquiry with the fact that the statutes themselves do not lend themselves to “flexible” interpretation, described so aptly in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 761 , 502 P.2d 1049 ] as follows: “As we stated nearly a half century ago in In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605, 613 [ 234 P. 883 ]: ‘ “The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other

1983We are faced at the outset of this inquiry with the fact that the statutes themselves do not lend themselves to “flexible” interpretation, described so aptly in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 761 , 502 P.2d 1049 ] as follows: “As we stated nearly a half century ago in In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605, 613 [ 234 P. 883 ]: ‘ “The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other

1973(See, e.g., People v. Cagle, 21 Cal.App.3d 57, 61 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 348 ]; People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1013 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 193 ]; People v. Wolder, 4 Cal.App.3d 984, 996 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 788 ]; People v. Superior Court (Pierson) 274 Cal.App.2d 228, 232 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 830 ]; Thompson v. Superior Court, 262 Cal.App.2d 98, 102-103 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 530 ].) We notice at the outset that the requirement of a written notice of motion, the necessity for a statement of grounds, and the practicalities of appellate review are interlocking matters.

1973(See, e.g., People v. Cagle, 21 Cal.App.3d 57, 61 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 348 ]; People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1013 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 193 ]; People v. Wolder, 4 Cal.App.3d 984, 996 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 788 ]; People v. Superior Court (Pierson) 274 Cal.App.2d 228, 232 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 830 ]; Thompson v. Superior Court, 262 Cal.App.2d 98, 102-103 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 530 ].) We notice at the outset that the requirement of a written notice of motion, the necessity for a statement of grounds, and the practicalities of appellate review are interlocking matters.

1970In Lemle v. Barry (1919) 181 Cal. 1, 5 [ 183 P. 150 ] (concurring opinion), it is stated: “When a contract is rescinded, it ceases to exist.

1970In Lemle v. Barry (1919) 181 Cal. 1, 5 [ 183 P. 150 ] (concurring opinion), it is stated: “When a contract is rescinded, it ceases to exist.

2014At the outset of its analysis, Klejfman noted there was no dispute the domain names used in the challenged e-mails “actually exist and are technically accurate, literally correct, and fully traceable to Vonage’s marketing agents,” 5 and the e-mails therefore “neither contained nor were accompanied by falsified . . . or forged header information’ within the meaning of section 17529.5(a)(2).” (Kleffman, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 340 , italics added.) The parties agreed the issue was whether the e-mails contained or were accompanied by “ ‘misrepresented . . . header information’ ” within the meanin

2014At the outset of its analysis, Kleffman noted there was no dispute the domain names used in the challenged emails “actually exist and are technically accurate, literally 4 Kleffman observed, “California statutes do not define either the word ‘header’ or the phrase ‘header information.’ [However,] the federal CAN–SPAM Act, which makes it unlawful to initiate transmission of a commercial e-mail message that contains or is accompanied by ‘header information that is materially false or materially misleading’ ( 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (a)(1)), defines ‘header information’ as “the source, destination, and

2016As the Brown court acknowledged at the outset of its analysis, “Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the first instance, a matter of legislative 29 intent.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 319 ; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 [“To ascertain whether a statute should be applied retroactively, legislative intent is the ‘paramount’ consideration.”]; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206 [“Because the question whether a statute is to apply retroactively or prospectively is, in the first instance, a policy question for the le

2016As the Brown court acknowledged at the outset of its analysis, ‘“Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the first instance, a matter of legislative intent.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 319; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 ] [‘“To ascertain whether a statute should be applied retroactively, legislative intent is the ‘paramount’ consideration.”]; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [‘“Because the question whether a statute is to apply retroactivel

1927As said in Dearborn v. Industrial Acc. Com., 187 Cal. 591 [ 203 Pac. 112 ], “At the outset of this inquiry we may repeat what was said by the present chief justice in Southern Pacific Co. *483 v. Industrial Acc. Com., 177 Cal. 378, 380 [ 170 Pac. 822 ]: ‘This court, in reviewing awards of the commission, is not acting as a court of appeal.

1927As said in Dearborn v. Industrial Acc. Com., 187 Cal. 591 [ 203 Pac. 112 ], “At the outset of this inquiry we may repeat what was said by the present chief justice in Southern Pacific Co. *483 v. Industrial Acc. Com., 177 Cal. 378, 380 [ 170 Pac. 822 ]: ‘This court, in reviewing awards of the commission, is not acting as a court of appeal.

2025Despite our admonishment at the outset of our analysis that Buenzli, as a propria persona litigant, “ ‘ “is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney” ’ ” (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 958, fn. 1 ), we decline to pursue the issuance of sanctions, for now.

2023(See Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 58, citing People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292 , 299–300; see also People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 192 , 196–197 [“Proposition 47 reclassified certain drug- and theft-related offenses as misdemeanors, except where the defendant has one or more disqualifying prior convictions . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Proposition 47 also added section 1170.18, which permits a person who is currently ‘serving a sentence’ for a conviction of a reclassified offense to request to be resentenced to a misdemeanor.”].) The Basler court further noted its “conclusion