7 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Jesse M.green2 sentences2009In re Jesse M., 217 Ariz. 74, 76, ¶ 8 , 170 P.3d 683, 685 (App.2007). [4] We note Patient's counsel introduced her by name at the outset of the hearing, thereby confirming her presence in the courtroom. 2009In re Jesse M., 217 Ariz. 74, 76, ¶ 8 , 170 P.3d 683, 685 (App.2007). [4] We note Patient's counsel introduced her by name at the outset of the hearing, thereby confirming her presence in the courtroom. | 2 | 2 |
Armstrong v. Manzogreen1 sentence2019See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); In re Kory L., 194 Ariz. 215 , 219–20, ¶¶ 13–16 (App. 1999) (court denied mother of convicted juvenile the right to a “meaningful hearing” when it announced at the outset of hearing that, for vicarious restitution liability, mother was bound by juvenile’s stipulation on restitution amount); Lewus, 170 Ariz. at 414 (court violated defendant’s due-process rights by | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lewusgreen1 sentence2019See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); In re Kory L., 194 Ariz. 215 , 219–20, ¶¶ 13–16 (App. 1999) (court denied mother of convicted juvenile the right to a “meaningful hearing” when it announced at the outset of hearing that, for vicarious restitution liability, mother was bound by juvenile’s stipulation on restitution amount); Lewus, 170 Ariz. at 414 (court violated defendant’s due-process rights by | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen1 sentence2019See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); In re Kory L., 194 Ariz. 215 , 219–20, ¶¶ 13–16 (App. 1999) (court denied mother of convicted juvenile the right to a “meaningful hearing” when it announced at the outset of hearing that, for vicarious restitution liability, mother was bound by juvenile’s stipulation on restitution amount); Lewus, 170 Ariz. at 414 (court violated defendant’s due-process rights by | 1 | 1 |
Volk v. Bramegreen2 sentences2015Volk, 235 Ariz. at 466, ¶ 11 , 333 P.3d at 793 . 6 SHACKNAI v. SHACKNAI Decision of the Court the parties it would make a decision based on the documents submitted. 2015Volk, 235 Ariz. at 466, ¶ 11 , 333 P.3d at 793 . 6 SHACKNAI v. SHACKNAI Decision of the Court the parties it would make a decision based on the documents submitted. | 1 | 1 |
Long v. Olengreen1 sentence2014See In re Estate of Long, 229 Ariz. 458, ¶ 22 , 276 P.3d 527, 533 (App.2012); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 217 Ariz. 103, ¶ 9 , 170 P.3d 712, 716 (App.2007) (“Whether the superior court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its discretionary conclusion is a matter of law that we review de novo.”). ¶ 13 At the outset of the hearing on Peña’s motion, the trial court stated its purpose was “to determine whether [the state could] establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the sought items are subject to forfeiture.” As noted above, however, the state requested that the hearing proceed “o | 1 | 1 |
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doegreen2 sentences2014See In re Estate of Long, 229 Ariz. 458, ¶ 22 , 276 P.3d 527, 533 (App.2012); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 217 Ariz. 103, ¶ 9 , 170 P.3d 712, 716 (App.2007) (“Whether the superior court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its discretionary conclusion is a matter of law that we review de novo.”). ¶ 13 At the outset of the hearing on Peña’s motion, the trial court stated its purpose was “to determine whether [the state could] establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the sought items are subject to forfeiture.” As noted above, however, the state requested that the hearing proceed “o 2014See In re Estate of Long, 229 Ariz. 458, ¶ 22 , 276 P.3d 527, 533 (App.2012); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 217 Ariz. 103, ¶ 9 , 170 P.3d 712, 716 (App.2007) (“Whether the superior court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its discretionary conclusion is a matter of law that we review de novo.”). ¶ 13 At the outset of the hearing on Peña’s motion, the trial court stated its purpose was “to determine whether [the state could] establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the sought items are subject to forfeiture.” As noted above, however, the state requested that the hearing proceed “o | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Longgreen1 sentence2014See In re Estate of Long, 229 Ariz. 458, ¶ 22 , 276 P.3d 527, 533 (App.2012); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 217 Ariz. 103, ¶ 9 , 170 P.3d 712, 716 (App.2007) (“Whether the superior court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its discretionary conclusion is a matter of law that we review de novo.”). ¶ 13 At the outset of the hearing on Peña’s motion, the trial court stated its purpose was “to determine whether [the state could] establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the sought items are subject to forfeiture.” As noted above, however, the state requested that the hearing proceed “o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Kory L.
green
1 sentence2019See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); In re Kory L., 194 Ariz. 215 , 219–20, ¶¶ 13–16 (App. 1999) (court denied mother of convicted juvenile the right to a “meaningful hearing” when it announced at the outset of hearing that, for vicarious restitution liability, mother was bound by juvenile’s stipulation on restitution amount); Lewus, 170 Ariz. at 414 (court violated defendant’s due-process rights by | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Bishop
green
2 sentences2007If, as here, the patient is not present, third parties may be examined about the facts of the patient’s apparent decision to waive her right to appear, about their understanding of that decision and about whether it was made voluntarily. 7 ¶30 Although we are bound not to upset the superior court’s finding of a voluntary waiver absent an abuse of discretion, see Bishop, 139 Ariz. at 569 , 679 P.2d at 1056 , we must remand this matter because of the absence of any evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion that Appellant voluntarily chose to waive her right to be present at the in 2007If, as here, the patient is not present, third parties may be examined about the facts of the patient’s apparent decision to waive her right to appear, about their understanding of that decision and about whether it was made voluntarily. 7 ¶30 Although we are bound not to upset the superior court’s finding of a voluntary waiver absent an abuse of discretion, see Bishop, 139 Ariz. at 569 , 679 P.2d at 1056 , we must remand this matter because of the absence of any evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion that Appellant voluntarily chose to waive her right to be present at the in | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Devine
green
2 sentences1981State v. Devine, 114 Ariz. 574 , 562 P.2d 1072 (1977); State v. Henry, 114 Ariz. 494 , 562 P.2d 374 (1977). 1981State v. Devine, 114 Ariz. 574 , 562 P.2d 1072 (1977); State v. Henry, 114 Ariz. 494 , 562 P.2d 374 (1977). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Henry
green
2 sentences1981State v. Devine, 114 Ariz. 574 , 562 P.2d 1072 (1977); State v. Henry, 114 Ariz. 494 , 562 P.2d 374 (1977). 1981State v. Devine, 114 Ariz. 574 , 562 P.2d 1072 (1977); State v. Henry, 114 Ariz. 494 , 562 P.2d 374 (1977). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.