outset analysis in Illinois

2025This is the case because “[i]t is the judgment and not what else may have been said by the lower court that is on appeal to a court of review.” Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Comm'n of Kane Cnty., 218 Ill. 2d 342, 357 (2006) (quoting Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1983)).

2006See Rodriguez v. Sheriff’s Merit Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d at 357 ; Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1983).

2025This is the case because “[i]t is the judgment and not what else may have been said by the lower court that is on appeal to a court of review.” Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Comm'n of Kane Cnty., 218 Ill. 2d 342, 357 (2006) (quoting Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1983)).

2006See Rodriguez v. Sheriff’s Merit Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d at 357 ; Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1983).

2021As we noted at the outset of this analysis, a sentencing court “is not obligated to recite and assign value to each factor it relies upon, nor does it need to place greater weight on defendant’s rehabilitative potential than on the seriousness of the offense or the need to protect the public.” People v. Mayoral, 299 Ill.

2020People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 34 , 703 N.E.2d 49, 65 (1998). ¶ 42 Defendant further contends the trial court “failed to consider that [defendant] did not cause physical harm, or contemplate that harm would be caused, to another person.” As we noted at the outset of this analysis, a sentencing court “is not obligated to recite and assign value to each factor it relies upon, nor does it need to place greater weight on defendant’s rehabilitative potential than on the seriousness of the offense or the need to protect the public.” People v. Mayoral, 299 Ill.

2015Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (1993); Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111, 121 (2008) (as modified on denial of rehearing).

2015Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (1993); Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111, 121 (2008) (as modified on denial of rehearing).

2015See Miner, 87 Ill. 2d at 14 (purpose of a class action suit is to allow a representative party to pursue the claims of a large number of persons with like claims).

2015See Miner, 87 Ill. 2d at 14 (purpose of a class action suit is to allow a representative party to pursue the claims of a large number of persons with like claims).

2015Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (1993); Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111, 121 (2008) (as modified on denial of rehearing).

2015Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (1993); Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111, 121 (2008) (as modified on denial of rehearing).

2007As defendant acknowledges, in our prior opinion, we stated that a manifest weight standard applied, relying upon People v. Coleman, 155 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1993).

2007As defendant acknowledges, in our prior opinion, we stated that a manifest weight standard applied, relying upon People v. Coleman, 155 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1993).

2003The State approaches respondent’s argument from the outset as a challenge to the constitutionality of the SDPA and, citing our opinion in People v. Malchow , 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000), observes that “the standard of review of the constitutionality of a statute is de novo .” We agree that de novo review is appropriate.

2003The State approaches respondent’s argument from the outset as a challenge to the constitutionality of the SDPA and, citing our opinion in People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000), observes that “the standard of review of the constitutionality of a statute is de novo.” We agree that de novo review is appropriate.

1998Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 127 Ill. 2d 453, 467-68 (1989); League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria, 121 Ill. 2d 236, 242-43 (1987).

1998Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board , 127 Ill. 2d 453, 467-68 (1989); League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria , 121 Ill. 2d 236, 242-43 (1987).

1998Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 127 Ill. 2d 453, 467-68 (1989); League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria, 121 Ill. 2d 236, 242-43 (1987).

1998Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board , 127 Ill. 2d 453, 467-68 (1989); League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria , 121 Ill. 2d 236, 242-43 (1987).

1997In support of this broad inquiry, the State cited People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394, 414-15 (1995), in which this court noted that the record in that case left a number of questions unanswered: "We cannot reliably ascertain from the record when defendant began to take Thorazine, the amount prescribed, the medical reasons it was prescribed for him, or in what manner the drug might have influenced defendant’s mental functioning, mood, and demeanor in the courtroom.” Although our order remanding the cause to the trial court might not have fully anticipated the range of testimony introduced at th

1997In support of this broad inquiry, the State cited People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill.2d 394, 414-15 , 214 Ill.Dec. 145 , 660 N.E.2d 852 (1995), in which this court noted that the record in that case left a number of questions unanswered: "We cannot reliably ascertain from the record when defendant began to take Thorazine, the amount prescribed, the medical reasons it was prescribed for him, or in what manner the drug might have influenced defendant's mental functioning, mood, and demeanor in the courtroom." Although our order remanding the cause to the trial court might not have fully anticipated the

2012At the outset of its analysis, this court acknowledged that the question of "admissibility" necessarily involved a constitutional question when the court quoted, with added emphasis, this tentative assessment from Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968): "`[T]here may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable * * *.'" (Emphasis in original.) Horton, 65 Ill.2d at 416 , 3 Ill.Dec. 436

2012At the outset of its analysis, this court acknowledged that the question of "admissibility" necessarily involved a constitutional question when the court quoted, with added emphasis, this tentative assessment from Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968): "`[T]here may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable * * *.'" (Emphasis in original.) Horton, 65 Ill.2d at 416 , 3 Ill.Dec. 436

2011Correspondingly, the order terminating Ralph's parental rights must be vacated and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. ¶ 92 Because we are remanding the cause and because of the numerous errors which have plagued this proceeding to date, we think it appropriate to reiterate what we said at the outset of our analysis in In re E.B., 231 Ill.2d 459, 463-64 , 326 Ill.Dec. 1 , 899 N.E.2d 218 (2008): "[A] proceeding to involuntarily terminate a parent's rights is a `drastic measure.' [Citation.] In Illinois, the authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is pur

2011Correspondingly, the order terminating Ralph's parental rights must be vacated and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. ¶ 92 Because we are remanding the cause and because of the numerous errors which have plagued this proceeding to date, we think it appropriate to reiterate what we said at the outset of our analysis in In re E.B., 231 Ill.2d 459, 463-64 , 326 Ill.Dec. 1 , 899 N.E.2d 218 (2008): "[A] proceeding to involuntarily terminate a parent's rights is a `drastic measure.' [Citation.] In Illinois, the authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is pur

1974(People v. Crowell, 53 Ill.2d 447, 451, 452 , 292 N.E.2d 721 .) At the outset of the hearing, the trial judge stated that he would go beyond tire legally required “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

1974(People v. Crowell, 53 Ill.2d 447, 451, 452 , 292 N.E.2d 721 .) At the outset of the hearing, the trial judge stated that he would go beyond tire legally required “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

2023Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 55 (“A defendant is not permitted to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim in a piecemeal fashion in successive postconviction petitions ***.”). ¶ 109 3.

2022Yet he did not object to their inclusion in the PSI or provide detailed argument to show that the court should not rely on them.” Defendant further contends that “trial counsel should have addressed his contentions regarding the disciplinary records at the outset of the hearing” to address hearsay, double hearsay, and “other misconduct in the school records” that “did not constitute relevant and reliable evidence.” To summarize, defendant is claiming that trial counsel should have objected to the school records because they were hearsay and require the State to present witnesses who could prov

2022Yet he did not object to their inclusion in the PSI or provide detailed argument to show that the court should not rely on them.” Defendant further contends that “trial counsel should have addressed his contentions regarding the disciplinary records at the outset of the hearing” to address hearsay, double hearsay, and “other misconduct in the school records” that “did not constitute relevant and reliable evidence.” To summarize, defendant is claiming that trial counsel should have objected to the school records because they were hearsay and require the State to present witnesses who could prov