outset analysis in Connecticut

2008Typically, if a defendant fails to preserve a claim for appellate review, we will not review the claim unless the defendant is entitled to review under the plain error doctrine or the rule set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). ...

2008Typically, if a defendant fails to preserve a claim for appellate review, we will not review the claim unless the defendant is entitled to review under the plain error doctrine or the rule set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). ...

2002We have consistently held that every statute is presumed to be constitutional . . . .” Faraci v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 211 Conn. 166, 168 , 558 A.2d 234 (1989).

2002We have consistently held that every statute is presumed to be constitutional . . . .” Faraci v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 211 Conn. 166, 168 , 558 A.2d 234 (1989).

1999We have consistently held that every statute is presumed to be constitutional and have required that invalidity be established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Faraci v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 211 Conn. 166, 168 , 558 A.2d 234 (1989); Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 64 , 491 A.2d 1043 (1985).

1999We have consistently held that every statute is presumed to be constitutional and have required that invalidity be established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Faraci v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 211 Conn. 166, 168 , 558 A.2d 234 (1989); Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 64 , 491 A.2d 1043 (1985).

2025I want to be clear I’m not hearing the merits of the underlying complaint. . . . [T]here is an objection to the motion for temporary injunction based on mootness which implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendants’ counsel represented that the construc- tion of the pool had been completed,7 and, therefore, See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 91 Conn. App. 788 , 791–92, 882 A.2d 682 (numer- 6 ous cases have recognized that motion is to be decided on basis of substance of relief sought rather than on form or label affixed to motion), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 928 ,

2025I want to be clear I’m not hearing the merits of the underlying complaint. . . . [T]here is an objection to the motion for temporary injunction based on mootness which implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendants’ counsel represented that the construc- tion of the pool had been completed,7 and, therefore, See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 91 Conn. App. 788 , 791–92, 882 A.2d 682 (numer- 6 ous cases have recognized that motion is to be decided on basis of substance of relief sought rather than on form or label affixed to motion), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 928 ,

2025I want to be clear I’m not hearing the merits of the underlying complaint. . . . [T]here is an objection to the motion for temporary injunction based on mootness which implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendants’ counsel represented that the construc- tion of the pool had been completed,7 and, therefore, See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 91 Conn. App. 788 , 791–92, 882 A.2d 682 (numer- 6 ous cases have recognized that motion is to be decided on basis of substance of relief sought rather than on form or label affixed to motion), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 928 ,

2025See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, National Assn. v. Doreus, 218 Conn. App. 77 , 82 n.5, 290 A.3d 921 (‘‘[r]es judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses that may be waived if not prop- erly pleaded’’), cert. denied, 347 Conn. 904 , 297 A.3d 198 (2023); Elder v. Kauffman, 204 Conn. App. 818, 824 , 254 A.3d 1001 (2021) (‘‘res judicata properly is raised by means of a special defense and . . . generally is not raised by a motion to dismiss’’).

2025I want to be clear I’m not hearing the merits of the underlying complaint. . . . [T]here is an objection to the motion for temporary injunction based on mootness which implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendants’ counsel represented that the construc- tion of the pool had been completed,7 and, therefore, See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 91 Conn. App. 788 , 791–92, 882 A.2d 682 (numer- 6 ous cases have recognized that motion is to be decided on basis of substance of relief sought rather than on form or label affixed to motion), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 928 ,

2024Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 364 State v. Bryan The following legal principles and standard of review are applicable to the defendant’s claims. ‘‘The determi- nation of whether a claim may be brought via a motion to correct an illegal sentence presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 213 Conn. App. 848, 853 , 279 A.3d 303 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 963 , 285 A.3d 387 (2022). ‘‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 constitutes a narrow exception to the general rule tha

2024Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 364 State v. Bryan The following legal principles and standard of review are applicable to the defendant’s claims. ‘‘The determi- nation of whether a claim may be brought via a motion to correct an illegal sentence presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 213 Conn. App. 848, 853 , 279 A.3d 303 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 963 , 285 A.3d 387 (2022). ‘‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 constitutes a narrow exception to the general rule tha

2024Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 364 State v. Bryan The following legal principles and standard of review are applicable to the defendant’s claims. ‘‘The determi- nation of whether a claim may be brought via a motion to correct an illegal sentence presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 213 Conn. App. 848, 853 , 279 A.3d 303 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 963 , 285 A.3d 387 (2022). ‘‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 constitutes a narrow exception to the general rule tha

2024Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 364 State v. Bryan The following legal principles and standard of review are applicable to the defendant’s claims. ‘‘The determi- nation of whether a claim may be brought via a motion to correct an illegal sentence presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 213 Conn. App. 848, 853 , 279 A.3d 303 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 963 , 285 A.3d 387 (2022). ‘‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 constitutes a narrow exception to the general rule tha

2024Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 364 State v. Bryan The following legal principles and standard of review are applicable to the defendant’s claims. ‘‘The determi- nation of whether a claim may be brought via a motion to correct an illegal sentence presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 213 Conn. App. 848, 853 , 279 A.3d 303 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 963 , 285 A.3d 387 (2022). ‘‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 constitutes a narrow exception to the general rule tha

2024Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 364 State v. Bryan The following legal principles and standard of review are applicable to the defendant’s claims. ‘‘The determi- nation of whether a claim may be brought via a motion to correct an illegal sentence presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 213 Conn. App. 848, 853 , 279 A.3d 303 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 963 , 285 A.3d 387 (2022). ‘‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 constitutes a narrow exception to the general rule tha

2024At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court of Hawaii noted that, ‘‘[a]lthough the torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution are well established, the malicious defense tort is unfamiliar, if known at all.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 416 .

2023To resolve this question and to determine the appro- priate level of scrutiny to apply—strict scrutiny or the Pike balancing test—the court in Allco applied the three part framework established by the United States Supreme Court in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 , 117 S. Ct. 811 , 136 L.

2023To resolve this question and to determine the appro- priate level of scrutiny to apply—strict scrutiny or the Pike balancing test—the court in Allco applied the three part framework established by the United States Supreme Court in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 , 117 S. Ct. 811 , 136 L.

2022For ease of discussion, we use the phrase ‘‘tender years exception’’ to refer collectively to both the statutory and evidentiary code provisions. 15 At the outset of the hearing, the state indicated that it would argue that N’s bath time statements were also admissible pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2022For ease of discussion, we use the phrase ‘‘tender years exception’’ to refer collectively to both the statutory and evidentiary code provisions. 15 At the outset of the hearing, the state indicated that it would argue that N’s bath time statements were also admissible pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2022At the outset of its analysis, our Supreme Court noted that, even though the plaintiff statutorily was entitled to attorney’s fees, ‘‘it was incumbent upon [the plaintiff] to prove the amount of fees to which it was entitled . . . .’’ Id., 471 .

2022For ease of discussion, we use the phrase ‘‘tender years exception’’ to refer collectively to both the statutory and evidentiary code provisions. 15 At the outset of the hearing, the state indicated that it would argue that N’s bath time statements were also admissible pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2022For ease of discussion, we use the phrase ‘‘tender years exception’’ to refer collectively to both the statutory and evidentiary code provisions. 15 At the outset of the hearing, the state indicated that it would argue that N’s bath time statements were also admissible pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2022For ease of discussion, we use the phrase ‘‘tender years exception’’ to refer collectively to both the statutory and evidentiary code provisions. 15 At the outset of the hearing, the state indicated that it would argue that N’s bath time statements were also admissible pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2021At the outset of its analysis relating to the motion for reconsideration of the 2012 motions to dismiss, the court recognized that, at the time of the 2012 decision denying the motions to dismiss, ‘‘the sole relevant appellate authority was Votre v. County Obstet- rics & Gynecology Group, P.C., [supra, 113 Conn. App. 585 ], which contained language—disputed as to whether it was dictum or controlling—relating to the propriety of a belated filing of an already-existing opin- ion letter, and it was the significance of that language that was subject to disagreement by trial courts.’’ The court not

2020If counsel did not believe that the argument was improper at the time, it is difficult for this court, on review, to reach a contrary conclusion.’’ Id., 121–22. ‘‘We empha- size the responsibility of defense counsel, at the very least, to object to perceived prosecutorial improprieties as they occur at trial, and we continue to adhere to the well established maxim that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that it was unfair in light of the record of the case at the time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitt

2020If counsel did not believe that the argument was improper at the time, it is difficult for this court, on review, to reach a contrary conclusion.’’ Id., 121–22. ‘‘We empha- size the responsibility of defense counsel, at the very least, to object to perceived prosecutorial improprieties as they occur at trial, and we continue to adhere to the well established maxim that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that it was unfair in light of the record of the case at the time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitt

2019Id., at 563 , 569 A.2d 518 .

2017At the outset of the analysis in that case, we stated: ‘‘As established by the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S. Ct. 1709 , 23 L.

2017At the outset of the analysis in that case, we stated: ‘‘As established by the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S. Ct. 1709 , 23 L.

2016At the outset of our analysis, we note that the defendant argues that the court, by admitting the video recording of the victim's forensic interview with Montelli, violated her sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against her pursuant to Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), because the statements made by the victim during that interview were testimonial in nature.

2016At the outset of our analysis, we note that the defendant argues that the court, by admitting the video recording of the victim's forensic interview with Montelli, violated her sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against her pursuant to Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), because the statements made by the victim during that interview were testimonial in nature.

2015At the outset of its analysis, it noted that ‘‘[t]he reason for requiring timely objections in judicial proceedings is to enable the judge and opposing counsel to correct possible errors . . . .’’ Id., 431 .

2015At the outset of hearing, the court raised, sua sponte, the question of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims presented in the motion and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing that question.13 On January 17, 2013, after the parties had submitted their supplemental briefs on the court’s jurisdiction, but without convening another hearing for evidence or argument on that or any other issue raised by the motion, the court issued a written memorandum of decision, in which it dismissed the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the basis of it

2012I further disagree with the majority's characterization of the comprehensive discussion of this issue in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors, which constituted one of the two grounds on which the court in that case concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as "nothing more than dicta." The court declared at the outset of its analysis that "the plaintiffs did not establish that the general contractor members of the association had met either part of this test." (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. at 186 , 740 A.2d 8

2012I further disagree with the majority's characterization of the comprehensive discussion of this issue in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors, which constituted one of the two grounds on which the court in that case concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as "nothing more than dicta." The court declared at the outset of its analysis that "the plaintiffs did not establish that the general contractor members of the association had met either part of this test." (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. at 186 , 740 A.2d 8

2012The two prongs of our test in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors are both threshold jurisdictional requirements that must be met for a plaintiff to have standing to pursue a hearing on the merits, and the trial court in the present case plainly held that neither was satisfied. [5] Sensible jurisprudence and weighty authority strongly support the proposition, consistent with this court's past practice, [6] that "when two independent reasons are given to support a judgment, the ruling on neither is obiter [dictum], but each is the judgment of the court and of equal validity with the o

2012The two prongs of our test in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors are both threshold jurisdictional requirements that must be met for a plaintiff to have standing to pursue a hearing on the merits, and the trial court in the present case plainly held that neither was satisfied. [5] Sensible jurisprudence and weighty authority strongly support the proposition, consistent with this court's past practice, [6] that "when two independent reasons are given to support a judgment, the ruling on neither is obiter [dictum], but each is the judgment of the court and of equal validity with the o

2011“We note at the outset that our analysis of whether the court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Breen v. Judge, 124 Conn. App. 147, 158 , 4 A.3d 326 (2010).

2011“We note at the outset that our analysis of whether the court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Breen v. Judge, 124 Conn. App. 147, 158 , 4 A.3d 326 (2010).