outset hearing in Georgia

2014Hall v. Nelson, 282 Ga. 441, 442 (2) ( 651 SE2d 72 ) (2007).

2014Hall v. Nelson, 282 Ga. 441, 442 (2) ( 651 SE2d 72 ) (2007).

2026Drug Centers, Inc., 322 Ga. App. 873, 876 (1) ( 746 SE2d 631 ) (2013) (explaining that one requirement for res judicata is that “the party against whom it is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues presented in the other action”). 18 opposing counsel or can be addressed with the [j]udge at the hearing.”30 And indeed, the transcript of the hearing describes the proceeding as a “Counterclaim Bench Trial.” At the outset of the hearing, the trial court advised the parties that “[t]he plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal of the complaint,” and this dismissal “was

2026Drug Centers, Inc., 322 Ga. App. 873, 876 (1) ( 746 SE2d 631 ) (2013) (explaining that one requirement for res judicata is that “the party against whom it is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues presented in the other action”). 18 opposing counsel or can be addressed with the [j]udge at the hearing.”30 And indeed, the transcript of the hearing describes the proceeding as a “Counterclaim Bench Trial.” At the outset of the hearing, the trial court advised the parties that “[t]he plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal of the complaint,” and this dismissal “was

2023We note at the outset of this analysis that “courts must exercise extreme caution in declaring a contract void as against public policy and may do so only where the case is free from doubt and an injury to the public clearly appears.”7 “When the contingency justifying a fee has not yet occurred, the discharged attorney has no basis for collecting a fee connected to that contingency.”8 “To allow a discharged attorney to collect an equal share of a contingency fee as if the attorney were still involved in a case would render the discharge meaningless.”9 “The existence of [a fee-sharing agreement

2023We note at the outset of this analysis that “courts must exercise extreme caution in declaring a contract void as against public policy and may do so only where the case is free from doubt and an injury to the public clearly appears.”7 “When the contingency justifying a fee has not yet occurred, the discharged attorney has no basis for collecting a fee connected to that contingency.”8 “To allow a discharged attorney to collect an equal share of a contingency fee as if the attorney were still involved in a case would render the discharge meaningless.”9 “The existence of [a fee-sharing agreement

2023We note at the outset of this analysis that “courts must exercise extreme caution in declaring a contract void as against public policy and may do so only where the case is free from doubt and an injury to the public clearly appears.”7 “When the contingency justifying a fee has not yet occurred, the discharged attorney has no basis for collecting a fee connected to that contingency.”8 “To allow a discharged attorney to collect an equal share of a contingency fee as if the attorney were still involved in a case would render the discharge meaningless.”9 “The existence of [a fee-sharing agreement

2023We note at the outset of this analysis that “courts must exercise extreme caution in declaring a contract void as against public policy and may do so only where the case is free from doubt and an injury to the public clearly appears.”7 “When the contingency justifying a fee has not yet occurred, the discharged attorney has no basis for collecting a fee connected to that contingency.”8 “To allow a discharged attorney to collect an equal share of a contingency fee as if the attorney were still involved in a case would render the discharge meaningless.”9 “The existence of [a fee-sharing agreement

2023We note at the outset of this analysis that “courts must exercise extreme caution in declaring a contract void as against public policy and may do so only where the case is free from doubt and an injury to the public clearly appears.”7 “When the contingency justifying a fee has not yet occurred, the discharged attorney has no basis for collecting a fee connected to that contingency.”8 “To allow a discharged attorney to collect an equal share of a contingency fee as if the attorney were still involved in a case would render the discharge meaningless.”9 “The existence of [a fee-sharing agreement

2023We note at the outset of this analysis that “courts must exercise extreme caution in declaring a contract void as against public policy and may do so only where the case is free from doubt and an injury to the public clearly appears.”7 “When the contingency justifying a fee has not yet occurred, the discharged attorney has no basis for collecting a fee connected to that contingency.”8 “To allow a discharged attorney to collect an equal share of a contingency fee as if the attorney were still involved in a case would render the discharge meaningless.”9 “The existence of [a fee-sharing agreement

2018Our Supreme Court's holding in White had the express purpose of assisting criminal defendants in retaining the "guiding hand of counsel" at points including a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 302 Ga. at 318 (2), 806 S.E.2d 489 .

2018Our Supreme Court's holding in White had the express purpose of assisting criminal defendants in retaining the "guiding hand of counsel" at points including a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 302 Ga. at 318 (2), 806 S.E.2d 489 .

2014Co., 293 Ga. 9, 10 ( 743 SE2d 373 ) (2013). 14 favorable to the nonmovant.21 With these guiding principles in mind, we will now address the Board’s arguments in support of this enumeration of error. (a) To begin with, we agree with the Board that the 2012 Employment Agreement is void because it (as previously constituted) did not comply with OCGA § 20-2-101 (d), which provides that, [a]t any time during the 12 months immediately preceding the expiration of an appointed school superintendent’s contract or term of office, or when a vacancy in the office of school superintendent occurs, the local

2014Co., 293 Ga. 9, 10 ( 743 SE2d 373 ) (2013). 14 favorable to the nonmovant.21 With these guiding principles in mind, we will now address the Board’s arguments in support of this enumeration of error. (a) To begin with, we agree with the Board that the 2012 Employment Agreement is void because it (as previously constituted) did not comply with OCGA § 20-2-101 (d), which provides that, [a]t any time during the 12 months immediately preceding the expiration of an appointed school superintendent’s contract or term of office, or when a vacancy in the office of school superintendent occurs, the local

2014Co., 293 Ga. 9, 10 ( 743 SE2d 373 ) (2013). 14 favorable to the nonmovant.21 With these guiding principles in mind, we will now address the Board’s arguments in support of this enumeration of error. (a) To begin with, we agree with the Board that the 2012 Employment Agreement is void because it (as previously constituted) did not comply with OCGA § 20-2-101 (d), which provides that, [a]t any time during the 12 months immediately preceding the expiration of an appointed school superintendent’s contract or term of office, or when a vacancy in the office of school superintendent occurs, the local

2014Co., 293 Ga. 9, 10 ( 743 SE2d 373 ) (2013). 14 favorable to the nonmovant.21 With these guiding principles in mind, we will now address the Board’s arguments in support of this enumeration of error. (a) To begin with, we agree with the Board that the 2012 Employment Agreement is void because it (as previously constituted) did not comply with OCGA § 20-2-101 (d), which provides that, [a]t any time during the 12 months immediately preceding the expiration of an appointed school superintendent’s contract or term of office, or when a vacancy in the office of school superintendent occurs, the local

2014At the outset of our analysis, we note that summary judgment is only warranted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”19 We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo,20 and we view the evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most 18 See Mixon v. Georgia Bank & Trust Co., 154 Ga. App. 32, 32 ( 267 SE2d 483 ) (1980) (noting that in

2014At the outset of our analysis, we note that summary judgment is only warranted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”19 We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo,20 and we view the evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most 18 See Mixon v. Georgia Bank & Trust Co., 154 Ga. App. 32, 32 ( 267 SE2d 483 ) (1980) (noting that in

2013We agree. (a) The Leasing Commission Agreement provides, in pertinent part, for payment of commissions equal to “five percent (5%) of the monthly rental paid by Tenant under this Lease.” The trial court concluded that DTAE was the “Tenant” identified by the Leasing Commission Agreement and, therefore, because the current tenant was the Building Authority, rather than DTAE, Clairmont was not required to pay Bowers five percent of the rentals paid to Clairmont by the Building Authority. 6 At the outset of our analysis, we note that, as an initial matter, the construction of a contract is a matte

2013We agree. (a) The Leasing Commission Agreement provides, in pertinent part, for payment of commissions equal to “five percent (5%) of the monthly rental paid by Tenant under this Lease.” The trial court concluded that DTAE was the “Tenant” identified by the Leasing Commission Agreement and, therefore, because the current tenant was the Building Authority, rather than DTAE, Clairmont was not required to pay Bowers five percent of the rentals paid to Clairmont by the Building Authority. 6 At the outset of our analysis, we note that, as an initial matter, the construction of a contract is a matte

2013Group, 237 Ga. App. 656, 660 (2) ( 516 SE2d 371 ) (1999). 9 See Monitronics Int’l Inc. v. Veasley, __ Ga. App. __ ( 746 SE2d 793, 801 ) (2013) (physical precedent only); Goody Products, Inc. v. Dev.

2013Group, 237 Ga. App. 656, 660 (2) ( 516 SE2d 371 ) (1999). 9 See Monitronics Int’l Inc. v. Veasley, __ Ga. App. __ ( 746 SE2d 793, 801 ) (2013) (physical precedent only); Goody Products, Inc. v. Dev.

1992Compare Singleton v. State, 176 Ga. App. 733 ( 337 SE2d 350 ), in which that defendant was advised on at least three occasions that he had a right to be represented by a lawyer and he waived his right to counsel on the record.

1992Compare Singleton v. State, 176 Ga. App. 733 ( 337 SE2d 350 ), in which that defendant was advised on at least three occasions that he had a right to be represented by a lawyer and he waived his right to counsel on the record.

1992Accordingly, the mere fact that [appellant] assumed the burden of producing evidence at the outset of the hearing does not mean that the trial court shifted the burden of persuasion to [him].” Pope v. State, 134 Ga. App. 455, 456 (1) ( 214 SE2d 686 ) (1975).

1992Accordingly, the mere fact that [appellant] assumed the burden of producing evidence at the outset of the hearing does not mean that the trial court shifted the burden of persuasion to [him].” Pope v. State, 134 Ga. App. 455, 456 (1) ( 214 SE2d 686 ) (1975).

1989Accordingly, suppression would be appropriate in this case only if the officer’s supporting affidavit was “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render [his] official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ [Cits.]” United States v. Leon, supra at 923 (III C).

1989Accordingly, suppression would be appropriate in this case only if the officer's supporting affidavit was "`so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render [his] official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' [Cits.]" United States v. Leon, supra at 923 (III C).

1982We note at the outset that the test regarding effective assistance of counsel in this State is “ ‘not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel... rendering reasonably effective assistance.’ ” Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 329 ( 240 SE2d 833 ) (1977); Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638 ( 203 SE2d 515 ) (1974). “ ‘When inadequate representation is alleged [one] critical factual inquiry [may] relate to . . . whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choices of trial tactics and strategy.’ ” Hawes, sup

1982We note at the outset that the test regarding effective assistance of counsel in this State is “ ‘not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel... rendering reasonably effective assistance.’ ” Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 329 ( 240 SE2d 833 ) (1977); Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638 ( 203 SE2d 515 ) (1974). “ ‘When inadequate representation is alleged [one] critical factual inquiry [may] relate to . . . whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choices of trial tactics and strategy.’ ” Hawes, sup

1982The decision of “what trial motions should be made, and all other strategies and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client.” Reid v. State, 235 Ga. 378, 379 ( 219 SE2d 740 ) (1975); ABA Standards relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice (1974), the Defense Function, § 5.2 (b); Hawes, supra, at 330 .

1982The decision of “what trial motions should be made, and all other strategies and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client.” Reid v. State, 235 Ga. 378, 379 ( 219 SE2d 740 ) (1975); ABA Standards relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice (1974), the Defense Function, § 5.2 (b); Hawes, supra, at 330 .

1981See, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 , supra, and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (95 SC 1881, 44 LE2d 508) (1974).

1981See, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 , supra, and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (95 SC 1881, 44 LE2d 508) (1974).