outset rule in North Carolina

1940Daniel v. Bass , 193 N.C. 294 , 136 S.E. 733 ; Wallace v. Wallace , 181 N.C. 158 , 106 S.E. 657 ; May v. Lewis, supra .

1940Daniel v. Bass, 193 N. C., 294 , 136 S. E., 733 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 , 106 S. E., 657 ; May v. Lewis, supra. The language of the devise does not present a case which would require the application of that rule of ancient origin and continuing vitality which Justice Douglas in Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C., 251 , wittily dubbed “the Don Quixote of the law.” If the testator had used the words “to Henry Singler Williamson and his bodily heirs,” and no more, undoubtedly a fee simple would have been conveyed.

1940Daniel v. Bass, 193 N. C., 294 , 136 S. E., 733 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 , 106 S. E., 657 ; May v. Lewis, supra. The language of the devise does not present a case which would require the application of that rule of ancient origin and continuing vitality which Justice Douglas in Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C., 251 , wittily dubbed “the Don Quixote of the law.” If the testator had used the words “to Henry Singler Williamson and his bodily heirs,” and no more, undoubtedly a fee simple would have been conveyed.

1940Daniel v. Bass, 193 N. C., 294 , 136 S. E., 733 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 , 106 S. E., 657 ; May v. Lewis, supra. The language of the devise does not present a case which would require the application of that rule of ancient origin and continuing vitality which Justice Douglas in Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C., 251 , wittily dubbed “the Don Quixote of the law.” If the testator had used the words “to Henry Singler Williamson and his bodily heirs,” and no more, undoubtedly a fee simple would have been conveyed.

1940Daniel v. Bass , 193 N.C. 294 , 136 S.E. 733 ; Wallace v. Wallace , 181 N.C. 158 , 106 S.E. 657 ; May v. Lewis, supra .

1940Daniel v. Bass, 193 N. C., 294 , 136 S. E., 733 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 , 106 S. E., 657 ; May v. Lewis, supra. The language of the devise does not present a case which would require the application of that rule of ancient origin and continuing vitality which Justice Douglas in Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C., 251 , wittily dubbed “the Don Quixote of the law.” If the testator had used the words “to Henry Singler Williamson and his bodily heirs,” and no more, undoubtedly a fee simple would have been conveyed.

2023While evidence offered by the defendant is to be “viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant,” State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119 , 144–45 (1995), the trial court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.

2022The trial court concluded otherwise, determining that Defendant had standing based on United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1023 , 155 L.

2022The trial court concluded otherwise, determining that Defendant had standing based on United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1023 , 155 L.

2018As the First Circuit has noted, legal developments in the decades since White [ v. Pearlman , 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930),] cast some doubt on the current validity of the doctrine." (citation omitted) ).

2015At essence, respondent-mother contends that the trial judge violated her duty of impartiality in her comments at the outset of the hearing. "[A] party has a right to be tried before a judge whose impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned." State v. Fie, 320 N.C. 626 , 627, 359 S.E.2d 774 , 775 (1987).

2015At essence, respondent-mother contends that the trial judge violated her duty of impartiality in her comments at the outset of the hearing. "[A] party has a right to be tried before a judge whose impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned." State v. Fie, 320 N.C. 626 , 627, 359 S.E.2d 774 , 775 (1987).

2013At the outset of its instruction on charges of robbery with a firearm and felonious conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm, the trial court stated that “[t]he instructions are identical for both defendants.” Following this, the trial court’s instruction referenced an individual defendant: “If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant, acting either by himself or acting together with another person....” We are aware of defendants’ argument that these instructions were erroneous as the trial court failed to give a separate mandate a

2013App. at 716 , 230 S.E.2d at 568 .

1940Daniel v. Bass, 193 N. C., 294 , 136 S. E., 733 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 , 106 S. E., 657 ; May v. Lewis, supra. The language of the devise does not present a case which would require the application of that rule of ancient origin and continuing vitality which Justice Douglas in Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C., 251 , wittily dubbed “the Don Quixote of the law.” If the testator had used the words “to Henry Singler Williamson and his bodily heirs,” and no more, undoubtedly a fee simple would have been conveyed.