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86 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1912–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2012We note at the outset of our analysis that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has now held in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. 2012We note at the outset of our analysis that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has now held in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. | 35 | 36 |
Dinkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. 2009See Dinkins v. State , 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd.green2 sentences2024See Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 509, 524 (Kan. 2019) (noting chief justice did not participate in decision); id. at 525, 527 (Stegall, J., concurring) (“As set forth in the majority opinion, [Kansas Statutes section 60 19a02] violates section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.”); id. at 531, 543 (Luckert, J., joined by Biles, J., dissenting); see also KAN. 2024See Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 509, 524 (Kan. 2019) (noting chief justice did not participate in decision); id. at 525, 527 (Stegall, J., concurring) (“As set forth in the majority opinion, [Kansas Statutes section 60 19a02] violates section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.”); id. at 531, 543 (Luckert, J., joined by Biles, J., dissenting); see also KAN. | 3 | 3 |
Martinez v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Martinez v. State, 131 S.W.3d 22, 35 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (Due process may be violated by the admission of a confession that was not voluntarily given.). 2011See Martinez v. State, 131 S.W.3d 22, 35 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (Due process may be violated by the admission of a confession that was not voluntarily given.). | 2 | 2 |
Fulp v. Millergreen2 sentences2010See Fulp v. Miller, 286 S.W.3d 501, 510 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (concluding that “the Legislature intended for claimants to comply with rule 21a . . . to fulfill the requirements of section 74.351(a)”); Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. 2010See Fulp v. Miller, 286 S.W.3d 501, 510 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (concluding that “the Legislature intended for claimants to comply with rule 21a ... *109 to fulfill the requirements of section 74.351(a)”); Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. | 2 | 2 |
Adams v. First National Bank of Bells/Savoygreen2 sentences2010Analysis A. Appellants' Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims and Challenges to the Trial Court's Summary Judgment At the outset of our analysis, we note that appellants admit in their appellate brief that they "do not seek review of the summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees Tone Johnson, M.D., P.A., Bay Area Care Center, Inc., Medifast Weight Reduction Center, Corpus Christi Regional Center for Addictions, Inc., Corpus Christi Bay Management Group, Inc., and Coastal Cities, Inc." Therefore, we affirm summary judgment as to those defendants. (6) See Adams v. First Nat 2010ANALYSIS A. Appellants’ Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims and Challenges to the Trial Court’s Summary Judgment At the outset of our analysis, we note that appellants admit in their appellate brief that they “do not seek review of the summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees Tone Johnson, M.D., P.A., Bay Area Care Center, Inc., Medifast Weight Reduction Center, Corpus Christi Regional Center for Addictions, Inc., Corpus Christi Bay Management Group, Inc., and Coastal Cities, Inc.” Therefore, we affirm summary judgment as to those defendants.6 See Adams v. First Nat’l | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Tiltongreen2 sentences2010Analysis A. Appellants' Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims and Challenges to the Trial Court's Summary Judgment At the outset of our analysis, we note that appellants admit in their appellate brief that they "do not seek review of the summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees Tone Johnson, M.D., P.A., Bay Area Care Center, Inc., Medifast Weight Reduction Center, Corpus Christi Regional Center for Addictions, Inc., Corpus Christi Bay Management Group, Inc., and Coastal Cities, Inc." Therefore, we affirm summary judgment as to those defendants. (6) See Adams v. First Nat 2010ANALYSIS A. Appellants’ Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims and Challenges to the Trial Court’s Summary Judgment At the outset of our analysis, we note that appellants admit in their appellate brief that they “do not seek review of the summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees Tone Johnson, M.D., P.A., Bay Area Care Center, Inc., Medifast Weight Reduction Center, Corpus Christi Regional Center for Addictions, Inc., Corpus Christi Bay Management Group, Inc., and Coastal Cities, Inc.” Therefore, we affirm summary judgment as to those defendants.6 See Adams v. First Nat’l | 2 | 2 |
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.green2 sentences2009See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. , 467 U.S. 752, 761-762 (1984) (noting that, in order to recover under subsection 15.05(a), a plaintiff must assert concerted action between two or more entities). 2009See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 761-762 (1984) (noting that, in order to recover under subsection 15.05(a), a plaintiff must assert concerted action between two or more entities). | 2 | 2 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2005See Jones , 8 S.W.3d at 638 . 2005See Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re JOCgreen2 sentences2004See In re J.O.C., 47 S.W.3d 108, 115 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) At the outset of our analysis, we note that many of the trial court’s findings remain unchallenged. 2004See In re J.O.C. , 47 S.W.3d 108, 115 (Tex. App.--Waco 2001, no pet.) At the outset of our analysis, we note that many of the trial court's findings remain unchallenged. | 2 | 2 |
The State Bar of Texas v. Gomezgreen1 sentence2024See Gomez, 891 S.W.2d at 245–46 (claims against State Bar of Texas, seeking to compel free legal services, lacked justiciability from the outset because the state bar lacked power to implement a mandatory pro bono program for Texas lawyers). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Packergreen1 sentence2022See id. §§ 53.06, 53.07(a), 54.02(k) (providing that a summons for a hearing on a petition 15 At the outset of our analysis, we observe that the parties and the juvenile court appear to have discussed a multitude of elements which are not applicable in a case of this type. | 1 | 1 |
In re Turneygreen1 sentence2022Id. at 844 ; see In re Turney, 525 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding) (citations omitted) (“The court reviews the pleadings to determine whether the requested medical records are relevant to a medical or mental condition at issue in the case.”). | 1 | 1 |
In re Lipskygreen1 sentence2020Laws at 687.4 4 While we cite to the current version of the statute throughout this opinion, we provide the session law cites at the outset of our analysis showing the prior 7 The TCPA “protects citizens who petition or speak on matters of public concern from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. Stategreen1 sentence2014At the outset, even with its assumption that this precedent was correctly decided, the Jones majority recognized that calling this particular right a “right to counsel” is a “misnomer” because the right to ask proper questions of the venire would apply even if the accused was representing himself.27 But more importantly, Plair’s interpretation of Texas Constitution Article I, § 10’s “right to be heard” language imprecisely defines an accused’s right to counsel by implicitly holding that the use of peremptory challenges is so integral to 22 Id. at 731. 23 See, e.g., Jones, 223 S.W.3d at 382 ; H | 1 | 1 |
Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Caldwellgreen1 sentence2014At the outset of this hearing, Looper Reed contended that Boardwalk had failed to request a pretrial hearing or obtain a ruling on their alleged discovery abuse, and had therefore waived any claim based on that conduct, citing Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 850 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex.1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Bone v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Dallas v. Jenningsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walgreen Co. v. Hiegergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gonzalezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napiergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Paredes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stephenville Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Gantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beedy v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grigsby v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Madden v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richardson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2011App. 2010), that there is ―no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia1 legal-sufficiency standard and the 1 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 2 Clewis2 factual-sufficiency standard‖; that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the ―only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt‖; and that ―[a]ll other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are overruled.‖ Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895, 902, 912 (footnotes added). 2011App. 2010), that there is “no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia1 legal-sufficiency standard and the Clewis2 factual-sufficiency 1 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 2 Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 2011–2011 |
Goodspeed v. State
green
2 sentences2019Discussion At the outset of our analysis of Hodges’s second and third issues, we note that the record is silent as to trial counsel’s strategy; as such, we examine the challenged conduct to determine if it is “‘so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 533 (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ). 2017“Law of Parties” Testimony At the outset of our analysis of all of Durgin’s complaints, we note that the record is silent as to trial counsel’s trial strategy; as such, we examine the challenged conduct to determine if it is “‘so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 533 (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ). | 2 | 2017–2019 |
Roberts v. State
green
2 sentences2019Discussion At the outset of our analysis of Hodges’s second and third issues, we note that the record is silent as to trial counsel’s strategy; as such, we examine the challenged conduct to determine if it is “‘so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 533 (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ). 2017“Law of Parties” Testimony At the outset of our analysis of all of Durgin’s complaints, we note that the record is silent as to trial counsel’s trial strategy; as such, we examine the challenged conduct to determine if it is “‘so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 533 (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ). | 2 | 2017–2019 |
Stephenson v. State
green
1 sentence2024As a consequence, we may not consider either the medical records or Garcia’s affidavit. 5 See Stephenson v. State, 494 S.W.2d 900 , 909–10 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mutter v. Wood
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 842–43 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).7 At the outset of the inquiry, relevance alone is not enough: “[I]nformation communicated to a doctor or psychotherapist may be relevant to the merits of an action, but in order to fall within the litigation exception to the privilege, the condition itself must be of legal consequence to a party’s claim or defense.” Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d at 843 . 7 The determination whether the exception to the privilege applies is measured against the pleadings of the party who is argued to have relied on a party’s physical, mental, or emotional condition as a p | 1 | 2022–2022 |
R.K. v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 842–43 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).7 At the outset of the inquiry, relevance alone is not enough: “[I]nformation communicated to a doctor or psychotherapist may be relevant to the merits of an action, but in order to fall within the litigation exception to the privilege, the condition itself must be of legal consequence to a party’s claim or defense.” Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d at 843 . 7 The determination whether the exception to the privilege applies is measured against the pleadings of the party who is argued to have relied on a party’s physical, mental, or emotional condition as a p 2022Id. at 844 ; see In re Turney, 525 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding) (citations omitted) (“The court reviews the pleadings to determine whether the requested medical records are relevant to a medical or mental condition at issue in the case.”). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
City of Waco v. Kirwan
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 622 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Poly-America, L.P.
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 358 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ex Parte Tarver
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ex Parte Briseno
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 4-5 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Jennifer Banner Wolfe v. State
green
1 sentence2017At the outset of its analysis, the court of appeals determined that the arguments presented in appellant’s brief were limited to challenging “only the reliability of the State’s medical expert testimony regarding a diagnosis of abusive head trauma—in general—on the basis of the ‘triad’ of subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging, and brain swelling, without evidence of external injuries.” Id. at 211 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Jones v. State
green
1 sentence2014At the outset, even with its assumption that this precedent was correctly decided, the Jones majority recognized that calling this particular right a “right to counsel” is a “misnomer” because the right to ask proper questions of the venire would apply even if the accused was representing himself.27 But more importantly, Plair’s interpretation of Texas Constitution Article I, § 10’s “right to be heard” language imprecisely defines an accused’s right to counsel by implicitly holding that the use of peremptory challenges is so integral to 22 Id. at 731. 23 See, e.g., Jones, 223 S.W.3d at 382 ; H | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Drake v. Andrews
green
1 sentence2013In response, Amir-Sharif argued, in part, that Quick Trip and Ca-dieux “have only shown that they had previous cases,” “they haven’t shown th[e] [trial court] anything that shows where [he] can’t prove [his] claim,” and “they haven’t — the two criterias [sic] haven’t been met here for th[e] [trial court] — for *920 them to — for their motion to be granted.” Amir-Sharif also cited this Court’s opinion of Drake v. Andrews, 294 S.W.3d 370 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Tuffiash v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ex Parte Adams
green
1 sentence2012In concluding that “it is not clear whether appellant would be able to obtain post-conviction habeas corpus relief if the allegations contained within his motion were proven true,” the Tuffiash court relied on Ex parte Binder, a case which has since been Roberts v. State Page 3 overruled, and acknowledged that “[w]hen knowledge of perjurious testimony can be imputed to the prosecution, however, perjury may form the basis of post-conviction habeas corpus relief.” Id. (citing Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Karnes City v. Kendall green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Salais v. Texas Department of Aging & Disability Services green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Clewis v. State red | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In Re Tls, II neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| In Re JJ green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Farr v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Phillips v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Francis v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Public Utility Commission green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| DeParias v. United States green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Lewis v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Sloan v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Greenville Oil & Cotton Co. v. Harkey neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Brick neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Producers Oil Company v. Barnes neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.