89 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Broadrick v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2021Typically, the overbreadth doctrine is applied “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Id. at 613 . 2021Typically, the overbreadth doctrine is applied “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Id. at 613 . | 11 | 32 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2004The overbreadth doctrine is “designed to protect first amendment freedom of expression from laws written so broadly that the fear of punishment might discourage people from taking advantage of that freedom.” People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 26 , 591 N.E.2d 461, 466 (1992), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 , 37 L. 2004The overbreadth doctrine is “designed to protect first amendment freedom of expression from laws written so broadly that the fear of punishment might discourage people from taking advantage of that freedom.” People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 26 , 591 N.E.2d 461, 466 (1992), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 , 37 L. | 8 | 11 |
cluster 2144green2 sentences2019See Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 48 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2010)). ¶ 38 We review subsection (a)(2) under the overbreadth doctrine, which provides that a law may be invalidated if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. 2018The overbreadth doctrine is a facial challenge under the first amendment, where a law may be invalidated if a considerable number of its applications are unconstitutional in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. *561 *25 United States v. Stevens , 559 U.S. 460 , 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577 , 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010). | 6 | 8 |
United States v. Salernogreen2 sentences2016See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 2015See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 | 5 | 11 |
Virginia v. Hicksgreen2 sentences2020Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). 2019Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). | 5 | 9 |
People v. Grecogreen2 sentences2016See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 2015See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 | 5 | 7 |
United States v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024Under the overbreadth doctrine of the first amendment, “ ‘a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.’ ” Id. ¶ 90 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)). 2020Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). | 5 | 6 |
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincentgreen2 sentences2020“The ‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’ ” Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (quoting Members of City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). 2019The “mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Members of the City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984). | 5 | 5 |
People v. Baileygreen2 sentences2010The doctrine of overbreadth “is designed to protect first amendment freedom of expression from laws written so broadly that the fear of punishment might discourage people from taking advantage of the freedom.” People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 226 (1995). 2010The doctrine of overbreadth “is designed to protect first amendment freedom of expression from laws written so broadly that the fear of punishment might discourage people from taking advantage of the freedom.” People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 226 (1995). | 4 | 6 |
People v. Garvingreen2 sentences2016See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 2015See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 | 4 | 5 |
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Projectgreen2 sentences2021See Holder, 561 U.S. at 18-20 . 2020See Holder, 561 U.S. at 18-20 . | 4 | 4 |
People v. Relerfordgreen2 sentences2020Under the overbreadth doctrine, a party may challenge a statute as facially unconstitutional, “even if that party’s conduct would not fall within the amendment’s protection.” Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 . 2020Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). | 3 | 11 |
In Re CEgreen2 sentences2008"Moreover, that the statute might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, as we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the first amendment." Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 407 , 274 Ill.Dec. 73 , 790 N.E.2d 846 , citing In re C.E., 161 Ill.2d 200, 211 , 204 Ill.Dec. 121 , 641 N.E.2d 345 (1994), quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. at 2100 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 707 . 2008"Moreover, that the statute might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, as we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the first amendment." Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 407 , 274 Ill.Dec. 73 , 790 N.E.2d 846 , citing In re C.E., 161 Ill.2d 200, 211 , 204 Ill.Dec. 121 , 641 N.E.2d 345 (1994), quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. at 2100 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 707 . | 3 | 6 |
People v. Garrisongreen2 sentences2016See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 2015See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 | 3 | 6 |
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2016See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 2015See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (recognizing that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the context of the first amendment); People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, ¶ 11 (same); In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (2008) (same); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442-43 (2006 | 3 | 4 |
Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.green2 sentences2014The requirement that the overbreadth be substantial arose from the Supreme Court’s recognition that application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine and that there must be a realistic danger that the statute “ ‘will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.’ ” Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984)). ¶ 12 Initially, the State argues that defendant has forfeited his overbreadth argument by failing to present that argu 2014The -3- requirement that the overbreadth be substantial arose from the Supreme Court’s recognition that application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine and that there must be a realistic danger that the statute “ ‘will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.’ ” Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews For Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984)). ¶ 12 Initially, the State argues that defendant has forfeited his overbreadth argument by failing to present that | 3 | 4 |
People v. Minnisgreen2 sentences2021In order to survive intermediate scrutiny, a content-neutral regulation of protected speech—such as that at issue here— “(1) must serve or advance a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech and (2) must not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further that interest—or in other words, it must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest without unnecessarily interfering with first amendment freedoms.” Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 36 . ¶ 23 The overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge a statute as a facial violation of the first amendment, 2020Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). | 2 | 12 |
United States v. Allied Oil Corp.green2 sentences2011Isserles, supra, at 387. ¶ 88 When the doctrine is viewed in this way, it becomes evident that when the United States Supreme Court spoke in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), of a statute being unconstitutional on its face when no set of circumstances exists under which it would be valid, it was not prescribing an application-specific method of determining the law's validity, an approach which would be entirely appropriate in an overbreadth challenge. 2008"Moreover, that the statute might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, as we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the first amendment." Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 407 , 274 Ill.Dec. 73 , 790 N.E.2d 846 , citing In re C.E., 161 Ill.2d 200, 211 , 204 Ill.Dec. 121 , 641 N.E.2d 345 (1994), quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. at 2100 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 707 . | 2 | 6 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen2 sentences2020Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). 2019Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Bishopgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Gonzales v. Carhartgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Einodergreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Terrellgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Haywoodgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Lakisha M.green | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Izzogreen | 2 | 2 |
| In Re RCgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Davis v. Browngreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Ryangreen | 2 | 2 |
| City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Jamessongreen | 2 | 2 |
| City of Harvard v. Gautgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Roosevelt Fuller, by His Parents, Gretta Fuller and Roosevelt Harris v. Decatur Public School Board of Education School District 61green | 2 | 2 |
| Woodstock Hunt Club v. Hindigreen | 2 | 2 |
New York v. Ferbergreen2 sentences2022The Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized that where a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only ‘real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771 (“The premise that a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications is hardly novel.”); Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 44 . ¶ 40 Se 2004Ed. 2d 1113 , 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982), the United States Supreme Court employed the substantial overbreadth test to uphold a child pornography statute. | 1 | 4 |
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalitiongreen2 sentences2022“The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.” Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255 . 2022The case law emphasizes that the potential to chill protected speech is much greater when constitutional protection is a fact that a defendant must prove than when the lack of such protection is an element of an offense or a cause of action that the prosecutor or a civil petitioner must prove. ¶ 39 In Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 at 255 , the government argued that an anti child- pornography statute that had the potential to chill protected speech should survive an overbreadth challenge, because it allowed defendants to raise an affirmative defense that required proof, in essence, that | 1 | 3 |
| City of Chicago v. Powellgreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Edward Bishopgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rollinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Murdock v. Pennsylvaniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party
green
2 sentences2019Therefore, “a law may be invalidated as overbroad only if ‘a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 , 449 n.6 (2008)). ¶ 34 The first step in an overbreadth analysis is to interpret the challenged statute, because “it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). 2016The overbreadth doctrine allows a challenger to prove a law is facially unconstitutional even if it is valid in some circumstances if he can show that “ ‘a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.6). | 5 | 2015–2019 |
Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation
green
2 sentences2003Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d at 519-20 . 2003Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation, 171 Ill.2d at 519-20 , 216 Ill.Dec. 789 , 665 N.E.2d 1346 . | 4 | 2001–2003 |
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
green
2 sentences1995DISCUSSION I The overbreadth doctrine "allows a defendant to challenge the validity of a statute on its face when the mere existence of the statute may inhibit the exercise of expressive or associational rights protected by the first amendment, even though those rights do not protect the activities of the defendant.” (People v. Garrison (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 444, 449 , 412 N.E.2d 483, 486 , citing Bates v. State Bar (1977), 433 U.S. 350 , 380, 53 L. 1995DISCUSSION I The overbreadth doctrine "allows a defendant to challenge the validity of a statute on its face when the mere existence of the statute may inhibit the exercise of expressive or associational rights protected by the first amendment, even though those rights do not protect the activities of the defendant.” (People v. Garrison (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 444, 449 , 412 N.E.2d 483, 486 , citing Bates v. State Bar (1977), 433 U.S. 350 , 380, 53 L. | 3 | 1980–1995 |
Osborne v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2022The Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized that where a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only ‘real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771 (“The premise that a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications is hardly novel.”); Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 44 . ¶ 40 Se 2009Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 , 109 L. | 2 | 2009–2022 |
Virginia v. Black
green
2 sentences2020Further, “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” Id. ¶ 58 Under the overbreadth doctrine, a statute is considered overbroad “if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” City of Chicago v. Alexander, 2015 IL App (1st) 122858-B, ¶ 30 . 2019Further, “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” Id. ¶ 58 Under the overbreadth doctrine, a statute is considered overbroad “if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” City of Chicago v. Alexander, 2015 IL App (1st) 122858-B, ¶ 30 . | 2 | 2019–2020 |
People v. Melongo
green
2 sentences2020Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). 2019Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 24 ; People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852 , ¶ 24. ¶ 90 Under the first amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 50 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). | 2 | 2019–2020 |
People v. SUCIC
green
2 sentences2020Sucic, 401 Ill. 2019Sucic, 401 Ill. | 2 | 2019–2020 |
State v. MacHholz
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 817-18 (N.C. 2016); People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014); State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998). ¶ 48 Because the speech restrictions imposed by subsection (a) do not fit within any of the “historic and traditional” categories of unprotected speech, we review defendant’s argument - 10 - under the overbreadth doctrine. 2017See State v. Bishop , 368 N.C. 869 , 787 S.E.2d 814 , 817-18 (N.C. 2016) ; People v. Marquan M. , 24 N.Y.3d 1 , 994 N.Y.S.2d 554 , 19 N.E.3d 480 (2014) ; State v. Machholz , 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998). ¶ 48 Because the speech restrictions imposed by subsection (a) do not fit within any of the "historic and traditional" categories of unprotected speech, we review defendant's argument under the overbreadth doctrine. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
The People v. Marquan M. / County of Albany
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 817-18 (N.C. 2016); People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014); State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998). ¶ 48 Because the speech restrictions imposed by subsection (a) do not fit within any of the “historic and traditional” categories of unprotected speech, we review defendant’s argument - 10 - under the overbreadth doctrine. 2017See State v. Bishop , 368 N.C. 869 , 787 S.E.2d 814 , 817-18 (N.C. 2016) ; People v. Marquan M. , 24 N.Y.3d 1 , 994 N.Y.S.2d 554 , 19 N.E.3d 480 (2014) ; State v. Machholz , 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998). ¶ 48 Because the speech restrictions imposed by subsection (a) do not fit within any of the "historic and traditional" categories of unprotected speech, we review defendant's argument under the overbreadth doctrine. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
| People v. Hollins green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Board of Trustees of State Univ. of NY v. Fox green | 2 | 1996–2003 |
| People v. Garrison neutral | 2 | 1995–2002 |
| Wisconsin v. Mitchell green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. green | 2 | 1987–1991 |
| Gooding v. Wilson green | 2 | 1982–1983 |
| People v. Reiner green | 2 | 1980–1980 |
| Attwood v. Purcell green | 2 | 1980–1980 |
| Bay Sound Transportation Co. v. United States green | 2 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Taher green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Maillet green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Rhonda Ezell v. City of Chicago green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| City of Chicago v. Alexander neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Cletus Robert Anderson v. Barry J. Nidorf, Chief Probation Officer Attorney General of the State of California green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| City of Houston v. Hill green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Holder green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Holder green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Talsky v. Department of Registration & Education green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Lawrence v. City of Chicago neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| McGowan v. Maryland green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Burch v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Bombacino green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| The City of Chicago v. Lawrence green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.