overbreadth doctrine in Minnesota

2017The State’s argument is no more persuasive here than it was in State v. Machholz, a case in which we considered an overbreadth challenge to the felony-harassment statute. 574 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 1998).

2009Overbreadth “A statute is overbroad on its face if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited without offending constitutional rights.” Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 419 . “[Bjecause the overbreadth doctrine has the potential to void an entire statute, it should be applied ‘only as a last resort’ and only if the degree of overbreadth is substantial and the statute is not subject to a limiting construction.” Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 603 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)).

2019Therefore, A.J.B. may bring an overbreadth challenge to the two statutes at issue here regardless of whether his own expression falls outside of First Amendment protection. "[T]he first step in an overbreadth challenge is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers." Stevens , 559 U.S. at 474 , 130 S.Ct. 1577 (quoting United States v. Williams , 553 U.S. 285 , 293, 128 S.Ct. 1830 , 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) ).

2019Therefore, A.J.B. may bring an overbreadth challenge to the two statutes at issue here regardless of whether his own expression falls outside of First Amendment protection. "[T]he first step in an overbreadth challenge is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers." Stevens , 559 U.S. at 474 , 130 S.Ct. 1577 (quoting United States v. Williams , 553 U.S. 285 , 293, 128 S.Ct. 1830 , 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) ).

2007The supreme court rejected an overbreadth challenge to that language, construing it narrowly as “directed solely at physical acts.” State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875, 877 (Minn.1988).

1999The supreme court in a 1988 case rejected an overbreadth challenge to the statute, construing it narrowly as “directed solely at physical acts.” Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d at 877 .

2017The requirement that the overbreadth be substantial “stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself—the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.” Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 , 122 S.Ct. 1389 , 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected spe

2017The requirement that the overbreadth be substantial “stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself—the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.” Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 , 122 S.Ct. 1389 , 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected spe

2017Courts apply the overbreadth doctrine “only as a last resort.” Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 565 (quotation omitted).

2009In Dunham v. Roer, this court considered the harassment-restraining-order statute and we cited with approval a decision from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals evaluating a federal harassment law. 708 N.W.2d 552, 565 (Minn.App.2006) (citing Gormley v. Dir., Conn. State Dep’t. of Prob., 632 F.2d 938 (2nd Cir.1980)).

2016State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 2014).8 The first step in an overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute.

2016State v, Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn.2014). 8 The first step in an overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute.

2016See Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (“The ‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’ ” (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984))); see also State v. Theriault, 949 A.2d 678, 680-81 (N.H. 2008) (holding that a promotion-of-prostitution statute was “not substantially overbroad, because the possibility that it might be applied in some unconstitutional 14 manner is exceedingly slight”).

2016See Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 , 128 S.Ct. 1830 (“The ‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’” (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984))); see also State v. Theriault, 157 N.H. 215 , 949 A.2d 678, 680-81 (2008) (holding that a promotion-of-prostitution statute was “not substantially overbroad, because the possibility that it might be applied in some unconstitutional manner is exceedingly slight”).

2006See In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn.1978) (“Although the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines are conceptually distinct, in the First Amendment context they tend to overlap, since statutes are often overly broad because their language is vague as to what behavior is proscribed.”); see also State v. Castellano, 506 N.W.2d 641, 648-49 (Minn.App.1993) (considering a facial vagueness claim along with a facial overbreadth claim).

2001An ordinance “should only be overturned as facially overbroad when the [ordinance’s] overbreadth is substantial.” Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 419 (citation omitted); see also Castellano, 506 N.W.2d at 645 . [B]ecause the overbreadth doctrine has the potential to void an entire statute, it should be applied “only as a last resort” and only if the degree of overbreadth is substantial and the statute is not subject to a limiting construction.

2016Rather, such a restriction dictates that we reach the second step in an overbreadth analysis, which requires that we determine whether the restriction is substantially overbroad “in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 .

2012The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the overbreadth doctrine as “strong medicine” that has been employed “sparingly.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 , 98 S.Ct. 2908 .

2012“Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face,” the Supreme Court has employed the overbreadth doctrine “with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’ ” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 ).

2012“Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face,” the Supreme Court has employed the overbreadth doctrine “with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’ ” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 ).

2017See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 , 123 S.Ct. 2191 , 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine arises “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions”); State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. 2007) (discussing the “chilling effect” associated with criminal statutes that require only negligence).

2017See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 , 123 S.Ct. 2191 , 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine arises “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions”); State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. 2007) (discussing the “chilling effect” associated with criminal statutes that require only negligence).

2016State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 , 108 S.Ct. 2225, 2234 , 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). • We conclude that Minn.Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), “suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to. receive and to address to one another.” Am.

2016State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 , 108 S.Ct. 2225, 2234 , 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). • We conclude that Minn.Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), “suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to. receive and to address to one another.” Am.

1991See id. at 494-95 , 102 S.Ct. at 1191 .

1991See id. at 494-95 , 102 S.Ct. at 1191 .

2016In this respect, Hen-sel relies on S.L.J., in which the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed an overbreadth challenge to a provision of the disorderly conduct statute that criminalized “‘engaging] in offensive, obscene, or abusive language.’” 263 N.W.2d at 415 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3)).

2006See In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn.1978) (“Although the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines are conceptually distinct, in the First Amendment context they tend to overlap, since statutes are often overly broad because their language is vague as to what behavior is proscribed.”); see also State v. Castellano, 506 N.W.2d 641, 648-49 (Minn.App.1993) (considering a facial vagueness claim along with a facial overbreadth claim).

1986Id.

1985City of Mankato v. Fetchenhier, 363 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.Ct.App.1985) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)).

2019See, e.g. , Petrovic , 701 F.3d at 856 (discussing the paired "malicious intent" and "substantial harm" elements of the federal stalking statute and noting that because both are required "[i]t is difficult to imagine what constitutionally-protected ... speech would fall under these statutory prohibitions" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).

2019See, e.g. , Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim , 452 U.S. 61 , 66, 101 S.Ct. 2176 , 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981) (holding that appellants had standing to raise an overbreadth claim against a zoning ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment, and noting without deciding-in the context of a fine imposed on a business that provided live nude dance shows to its clientele-that nude dancing is entitled to some First Amendment protections).

2019See, e.g. , Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim , 452 U.S. 61 , 66, 101 S.Ct. 2176 , 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981) (holding that appellants had standing to raise an overbreadth claim against a zoning ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment, and noting without deciding-in the context of a fine imposed on a business that provided live nude dance shows to its clientele-that nude dancing is entitled to some First Amendment protections).

2018If a statute implicates the First Amendment, this court must decide "whether it prohibits constitutionally protected activity in a substantial number of its applications." Hall , 887 N.W.2d at 852 . "[B]ecause the overbreadth doctrine has the potential to void an entire statute, it should be applied only as a last resort." Stockwell , 770 N.W.2d at 538 (quotations omitted).

2017See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 , 123 S.Ct. 2191 , 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine arises “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions”); State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. 2007) (discussing the “chilling effect” associated with criminal statutes that require only negligence).

2017See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 , 123 S.Ct. 2191 , 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine arises “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions”); State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. 2007) (discussing the “chilling effect” associated with criminal statutes that require only negligence).

2017In Schmitt , our supreme court considered a predecessor statute of section 211B.02 that similarly prohibited a candidate from making a false claim of endorsement or support from a political party or sub-unit of a political party. 275 N.W.2d at 590 . 2 The supreme court observed the statute was narrowly tailored to defeat an overbreadth challenge because it was “directed specifically at false claims of endorsement or support.” Id. at 590-91 (emphasis added).

2017In Schmitt , our supreme court considered a predecessor statute of section 211B.02 that similarly prohibited a candidate from making a false claim of endorsement or support from a political party or sub-unit of a political party. 275 N.W.2d at 590 . 2 The supreme court observed the statute was narrowly tailored to defeat an overbreadth challenge because it was “directed specifically at false claims of endorsement or support.” Id. at 590-91 (emphasis added).

2017Moreover, the-statute’s specific-intent requirement—that false claims be knowingly made—ensures that “the statute does not target broad categories of speech.” State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 928 (Minn. 2017).

2017The requirement that the overbreadth be substantial “stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself—the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.” Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 , 122 S.Ct. 1389 , 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected spe

2017The requirement that the overbreadth be substantial “stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself—the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.” Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 , 122 S.Ct. 1389 , 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected spe