overbreadth doctrine in Nevada

2024“The overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 612 , 262 P.38d 1123, 1125 (2011) (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)).

2024"The overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 612 , 262 P.3d 1123, 1125 (2011) (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)).

2016Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (referring to overbreadth as "[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth," which remedies "the threat of enforcement of an overbroad SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) I947A law [that] may deter or 'chill' constitutionally protected speech"); Scott v. First Judicial Dist.

2016See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. „ 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) ("The fact that [a law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an `overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (referring to overbreadth as "[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth," which remedies "the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [that] may deter o

2016Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (referring to the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine" that is to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort"); see Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547 (concluding that the familial right of association is derived from the substantive due process right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a Fourteenth Amendment balancing of interests for alleged violations); Hvamstctd v. Suhler, 727 F. Supp. 511, 517 (D.

2016Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (referring to the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine" that is to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort"); see Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547 (concluding that the familial right of association is derived from the substantive due process right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a Fourteenth Amendment balancing of interests for alleged violations); Hvamstad v. Suhler, 727 F. Supp. 511, 517 (D.

2024"The overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 612 , 262 P.3d 1123, 1125 (2011) (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)).

2024"The overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 612 , 262 P.3d 1123, 1125 (2011) (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)).

2016Fleming also challenges the lives-with clause as unconstitutionally vague, but his argument is procedurally defective as Fleming never alleges that his hypothetical violations applied to him and vagueness challenges may not be raised by "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies." Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 495 n.7 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 512 , 217 P.3d 546, 553 (2009).

2011See Johnson, 324 N.W.2d at 450 (rejecting similar overbreadth challenge to a pandering law on this basis). 7 Finally, a panderer recruits a person for employment as a prostitute, and employment proposals are a species of commercial speech. “[I]t is irrelevant whether [NRS 201.300(l)(a)] has an overbroad scope encompassing protected commercial speech of other persons, because the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982) (emphasis added).

2016Fleming also challenges the lives-with clause as unconstitutionally vague, but his argument is procedurally defective as Fleming never alleges that his hypothetical violations applied to him and vagueness challenges may not be raised by "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies." Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 495 n.7 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 512 , 217 P.3d 546, 553 (2009).

2011The vagueness doctrine holds that “[a] conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so stan-dardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).

2016See Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536, 548 , 50 P.3d 1116, 1123-24 (2002) ("An overbreadth challenge may only be made if a statute infringes upon constitutionally protected conduct[, and] [a]bsent such infringement, an overbreadth challenge must fail.").

2016See Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536, 548 , 50 P.3d 1116, 1123-24 (2002) ("An overbreadth challenge may only be made if a statute infringes upon constitutionally protected conduct[, and] [a]bsent such infringement, an overbreadth challenge must fail.").

2016Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (referring to the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine" that is to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort"); see Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547 (concluding that the familial right of association is derived from the substantive due process right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a Fourteenth Amendment balancing of interests for alleged violations); Hvamstctd v. Suhler, 727 F. Supp. 511, 517 (D.

2016Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (referring to the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine" that is to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort"); see Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547 (concluding that the familial right of association is derived from the substantive due process right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a Fourteenth Amendment balancing of interests for alleged violations); Hvamstad v. Suhler, 727 F. Supp. 511, 517 (D.

2016City of Nat'l City, 277 Cal. Rptr. 427, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that challenged rule regulates intimate, not expressive, association, and concluding that intimate association is outside the purview of the First Amendment and rather invokes liberty interests, rendering the overbreadth doctrine inapplicable); City of Bremerton v. Widell, 51 P.3d 733, 740 (Wash. 2002) ("The right of expressive association stems from the First Amendment, guarding those activities protected by that amendment: speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.

2016The freedom of intimate association is a substantive due process right, as is its subset, the familial right of association."); IDK, Inc. v. Cty. of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185 , 1192 (9th Cir. 1988) ("In protecting 'certain kinds of highly personal relationships,' the Supreme Court has most often identified the source of the protection as the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, not the first amendment's freedom to assemble." (citation omitted) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 )); Bailey ix City of Nat'l City, 277 Cal. Rptr. 427, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that challenged rule regulates

2016See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. „ 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) ("The fact that [a law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an `overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (referring to overbreadth as "[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth," which remedies "the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [that] may deter o

2016See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. „ 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) ("The fact that [a law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an `overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (referring to overbreadth as "[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth," which remedies "the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [that] may deter o

2016Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (referring to the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine" that is to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort"); see Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547 (concluding that the familial right of association is derived from the substantive due process right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a Fourteenth Amendment balancing of interests for alleged violations); Hvamstctd v. Suhler, 727 F. Supp. 511, 517 (D.

2016Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (referring to the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine" that is to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort"); see Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547 (concluding that the familial right of association is derived from the substantive due process right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a Fourteenth Amendment balancing of interests for alleged violations); Hvamstad v. Suhler, 727 F. Supp. 511, 517 (D.

2016City of Nat'l City, 277 Cal. Rptr. 427, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that challenged rule regulates intimate, not expressive, association, and concluding that intimate association is outside the purview of the First Amendment and rather invokes liberty interests, rendering the overbreadth doctrine inapplicable); City of Bremerton v. Widell, 51 P.3d 733, 740 (Wash. 2002) ("The right of expressive association stems from the First Amendment, guarding those activities protected by that amendment: speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.

2016The freedom of intimate association is a substantive due process right, as is its subset, the familial right of association."); IDK, Inc. v. Cty. of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185 , 1192 (9th Cir. 1988) ("In protecting 'certain kinds of highly personal relationships,' the Supreme Court has most often identified the source of the protection as the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, not the first amendment's freedom to assemble." (citation omitted) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 )); Bailey ix City of Nat'l City, 277 Cal. Rptr. 427, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that challenged rule regulates

2015We have held that "[e]ven minor intrusions on First Amendment rights will trigger the overbreadth doctrine." Id. at 297-98 , 129 P.3d at 688 .

2015We have held that "[e]ven minor intrusions on First Amendment rights will trigger the overbreadth doctrine." Id. at 297-98 , 129 P.3d at 688 .

1991Id.

1989State v. Glusman, *229 98 Nev. 412, 422 , 651 P.2d 639, 646 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192 , 103 S.Ct. 1170 , 75 L.Ed.2d 423 (1983).

2016See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. „ 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) ("The fact that [a law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an `overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (referring to overbreadth as "[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth," which remedies "the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [that] may deter o

2016See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. „ 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) ("The fact that [a law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an `overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (referring to overbreadth as "[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth," which remedies "the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [that] may deter o

2016Fleming also challenges the lives-with clause as unconstitutionally vague, but his argument is procedurally defective as Fleming never alleges that his hypothetical violations applied to him and vagueness challenges may not be raised by "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies." Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 495 n.7 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 512 , 217 P.3d 546, 553 (2009).

2016Fleming also challenges the lives-with clause as unconstitutionally vague, but his argument is procedurally defective as Fleming never alleges that his hypothetical violations applied to him and vagueness challenges may not be raised by "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies." Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 495 n.7 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 512 , 217 P.3d 546, 553 (2009).

2011See Johnson, 324 N.W.2d at 450 (rejecting similar overbreadth challenge to a pandering law on this basis). 7 Finally, a panderer recruits a person for employment as a prostitute, and employment proposals are a species of commercial speech. “[I]t is irrelevant whether [NRS 201.300(l)(a)] has an overbroad scope encompassing protected commercial speech of other persons, because the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982) (emphasis added).

2002Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). [15] See Morales, 527 U.S. at 56-59 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 . [16] U.S. Const. amend XIV; Nev.

2002Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). [15] See Morales, 527 U.S. at 56-59 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 . [16] U.S. Const. amend XIV; Nev.

1989See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).