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20 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Virginia v. Hicksgreen2 sentences2026Indeed, the overbreadth doctrine provides an “exception” to normal facial challenge rules because “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003). ¶171 Thus, a plaintiff asserting a Speak Freely Clause facial challenge need only show that a “substantial number of [the law’s] applications are unconstitutional.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615 (2021); AZ Petition Partners, 255 Ariz. at 259 ¶ 18. 2026This “expansive remedy” exists “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also AZ Petition Partners, 255 Ariz. at 258 ¶ 18. ¶20 Our courts have not yet addressed the overbreadth doctrine in challenges brought solely under the Speak Freely Clause of the Arizona Constitution. | 4 | 4 |
Broadrick v. Oklahomared2 sentences2004But that exception to the standing requirement applies only if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both “real” and “substantial.” Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶6 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶6 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 842 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at ___ , 123 S. Ct. at 2197 , 156 L. Ed. 2d at ___ (also noting that whether state court should entertain an overbreadth challenge “is entirely a matter of state law”). ¶19 We conclude that Brown does not have standing to raise either his vagueness or overbreadth challeng 2004But that exception to the standing requirement applies only if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both “real” and “substantial.” Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶6 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶6 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 842 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at ___ , 123 S. Ct. at 2197 , 156 L. Ed. 2d at ___ (also noting that whether state court should entertain an overbreadth challenge “is entirely a matter of state law”). ¶19 We conclude that Brown does not have standing to raise either his vagueness or overbreadth challeng | 2 | 5 |
Cacavas v. Bowengreen2 sentences2005In response to an identical argument made in Cacavas v. Bowen, 168 Ariz. 114 , 811 P.2d 366 (App.1991), we held that, because the petitioners’ challenge to the DUI statute did not implicate First Amendment rights, they were without standing to challenge the statute as unconstitutional when applied to parties who were not before the court. 2005In response to an identical argument made in Cacavas v. Bowen, 168 Ariz. 114 , 811 P.2d 366 (App.1991), we held that, because the petitioners’ challenge to the DUI statute did not implicate First Amendment rights, they were without standing to challenge the statute as unconstitutional when applied to parties who were not before the court. | 2 | 4 |
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bontagreen2 sentences2026Indeed, the overbreadth doctrine provides an “exception” to normal facial challenge rules because “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003). ¶171 Thus, a plaintiff asserting a Speak Freely Clause facial challenge need only show that a “substantial number of [the law’s] applications are unconstitutional.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615 (2021); AZ Petition Partners, 255 Ariz. at 259 ¶ 18. 2023See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 , 118-19 (2003) (noting the overbreadth doctrine provides an “exception” to normal facial challenge rules because “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.”); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2022) (holding that under such circumstances a plaintiff needs only to show that a “substantial number of [the law’s] applications are unconstitutional” (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 )). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Steigergreen2 sentences1996Thus, -to prevail on an overbreadth claim, “[tjhere must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly jeopardize recognized first amendment protections of individuals not before the court.” Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144 , 781 P.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (emphasis original); see State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169 , 812 P.2d 987 (1991) (ordinance prohibiting striptease performances substantially overbroad because prohibited broad range of legitimate artistic expression); State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564 , 898 P.2d 513 (App.1995) (theft-by-extortion statute substantially overbroad becau 1996Thus, -to prevail on an overbreadth claim, “[tjhere must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly jeopardize recognized first amendment protections of individuals not before the court.” Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144 , 781 P.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (emphasis original); see State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169 , 812 P.2d 987 (1991) (ordinance prohibiting striptease performances substantially overbroad because prohibited broad range of legitimate artistic expression); State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564 , 898 P.2d 513 (App.1995) (theft-by-extortion statute substantially overbroad becau | 2 | 2 |
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commissiongreen2 sentences1984"The overbreadth doctrine derives from the recognition that unconstitutional restriction of expression may deter protected speech by parties not before the court and thereby escape judicial review." Id. 1984See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557 , 565 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 2351 n. 8, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Salernogreen2 sentences2026As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he fact that the [Act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. ¶19 When First Amendment interests are implicated, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized another type of facial challenge: one under the overbreadth doctrine. 2018Additionally, while I do not join in Justice Bolick's dissenting opinion to the extent he applies the overbreadth analysis used in Simpson II , I do join in his analysis and conclusion that the bond provision at issue here is facially constitutional. ¶ 54 As it did in Simpson II , the majority abandons the facial standard set forth in Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , substituting the overbreadth standard used by the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d 772 . | 1 | 3 |
Az Petition Partners LLC v. Hon. thompson/stategreen2 sentences2026Indeed, the overbreadth doctrine provides an “exception” to normal facial challenge rules because “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003). ¶171 Thus, a plaintiff asserting a Speak Freely Clause facial challenge need only show that a “substantial number of [the law’s] applications are unconstitutional.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615 (2021); AZ Petition Partners, 255 Ariz. at 259 ¶ 18. 2026This “expansive remedy” exists “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also AZ Petition Partners, 255 Ariz. at 258 ¶ 18. ¶20 Our courts have not yet addressed the overbreadth doctrine in challenges brought solely under the Speak Freely Clause of the Arizona Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Jerry Charles Hollegreen1 sentence2020See 240 Ariz. 300 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Raymond Lee Scottgreen1 sentence2018See United States v. Scott , 450 F.3d 863 , 874 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Neither Salerno nor any other case authorizes detaining someone in jail while awaiting trial, or the imposition of special bail conditions, based merely on the fact of arrest for a particular crime."). ¶ 22 The dissent seemingly equates every facial challenge with an overbreadth challenge, which misapprehends those distinct doctrines. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Westerngreen2 sentences1996Thus, -to prevail on an overbreadth claim, “[tjhere must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly jeopardize recognized first amendment protections of individuals not before the court.” Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144 , 781 P.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (emphasis original); see State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169 , 812 P.2d 987 (1991) (ordinance prohibiting striptease performances substantially overbroad because prohibited broad range of legitimate artistic expression); State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564 , 898 P.2d 513 (App.1995) (theft-by-extortion statute substantially overbroad becau 1996Thus, -to prevail on an overbreadth claim, “[tjhere must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly jeopardize recognized first amendment protections of individuals not before the court.” Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144 , 781 P.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (emphasis original); see State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169 , 812 P.2d 987 (1991) (ordinance prohibiting striptease performances substantially overbroad because prohibited broad range of legitimate artistic expression); State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564 , 898 P.2d 513 (App.1995) (theft-by-extortion statute substantially overbroad becau | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carruthgreen2 sentences1992See Caca-vas v. Bowen, 168 Ariz. at 117-18 , 811 P.2d at 369-70 ; State v. Carruth, 132 Ariz. 368, 370 , 645 P.2d 1282, 1284 (App.1982). 1992See Caca-vas v. Bowen, 168 Ariz. at 117-18 , 811 P.2d at 369-70 ; State v. Carruth, 132 Ariz. 368, 370 , 645 P.2d 1282, 1284 (App.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Martin
green
2 sentences2005As the state correctly observes, however, Poshka lacks standing to bring an overbreadth claim here because she has not alleged that § 28-1381(A)(2) “substantially infringes upon protected First Amendment freedoms or that [s]he is a member of a class of ‘innocent defendants.’” Martin, 174 Ariz. at 123 , 847 P.2d at 624 ; see Brown. 2005As the state correctly observes, however, Poshka lacks standing to bring an overbreadth claim here because she has not alleged that § 28-1381(A)(2) “substantially infringes upon protected First Amendment freedoms or that [s]he is a member of a class of ‘innocent defendants.’” Martin, 174 Ariz. at 123 , 847 P.2d at 624 ; see Brown. | 3 | 1994–2005 |
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
green
2 sentences1999Id. at 615 , 93 S.Ct. at 2918 . “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 799 , 104 S.Ct. at 2126 . 1999Id. at 615 , 93 S.Ct. at 2918 . “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 799 , 104 S.Ct. at 2126 . | 3 | 1996–1999 |
Angel Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa
green
2 sentences2018Rather, it abandons the facial standard set forth in Salerno , substituting the overbreadth standard used in Simpson II and by the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio , 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014). 2018Additionally, while I do not join in Justice Bolick's dissenting opinion to the extent he applies the overbreadth analysis used in Simpson II , I do join in his analysis and conclusion that the bond provision at issue here is facially constitutional. ¶ 54 As it did in Simpson II , the majority abandons the facial standard set forth in Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , substituting the overbreadth standard used by the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d 772 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Musser
green
2 sentences2004But that exception to the standing requirement applies only if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both “real” and “substantial.” Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶6 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶6 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 842 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at ___ , 123 S. Ct. at 2197 , 156 L. Ed. 2d at ___ (also noting that whether state court should entertain an overbreadth challenge “is entirely a matter of state law”). ¶19 We conclude that Brown does not have standing to raise either his vagueness or overbreadth challeng 2004But that exception to the standing requirement applies only if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both “real” and “substantial.” Musser, 194 Ariz. 31, ¶6 , 977 P.2d 131, ¶6 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 842 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at ___ , 123 S. Ct. at 2197 , 156 L. Ed. 2d at ___ (also noting that whether state court should entertain an overbreadth challenge “is entirely a matter of state law”). ¶19 We conclude that Brown does not have standing to raise either his vagueness or overbreadth challeng | 2 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.
green
1 sentence2023See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 , 118-19 (2003) (noting the overbreadth doctrine provides an “exception” to normal facial challenge rules because “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.”); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2022) (holding that under such circumstances a plaintiff needs only to show that a “substantial number of [the law’s] applications are unconstitutional” (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 )). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
New York v. Ferber
green
2 sentences1999A statute is not subject to an overbreadth challenge if the “legitimate reach [of the statute] dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 , 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3363 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). 1999A statute is not subject to an overbreadth challenge if the “legitimate reach [of the statute] dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 , 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3363 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
City of Houston v. Hill
green
2 sentences1996The defendant relies on Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 , 107 S.Ct. 2502 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987), and Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974), to support his claim that the ordinance is over-broad. 1996The defendant relies on Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 , 107 S.Ct. 2502 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987), and Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974), to support his claim that the ordinance is over-broad. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lewis v. City of New Orleans
green
2 sentences1996The defendant relies on Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 , 107 S.Ct. 2502 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987), and Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974), to support his claim that the ordinance is over-broad. 1996The defendant relies on Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 , 107 S.Ct. 2502 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987), and Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 94 S.Ct. 970 , 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974), to support his claim that the ordinance is over-broad. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Weinstein
green
2 sentences1996Thus, -to prevail on an overbreadth claim, “[tjhere must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly jeopardize recognized first amendment protections of individuals not before the court.” Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144 , 781 P.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (emphasis original); see State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169 , 812 P.2d 987 (1991) (ordinance prohibiting striptease performances substantially overbroad because prohibited broad range of legitimate artistic expression); State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564 , 898 P.2d 513 (App.1995) (theft-by-extortion statute substantially overbroad becau 1996Thus, -to prevail on an overbreadth claim, “[tjhere must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly jeopardize recognized first amendment protections of individuals not before the court.” Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144 , 781 P.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (emphasis original); see State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169 , 812 P.2d 987 (1991) (ordinance prohibiting striptease performances substantially overbroad because prohibited broad range of legitimate artistic expression); State v. Weinstein, 182 Ariz. 564 , 898 P.2d 513 (App.1995) (theft-by-extortion statute substantially overbroad becau | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963
green
2 sentences1995Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-5209 and No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. at 183 , 692 P.2d at 1032 . 1995Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-5209 and No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. at 183 , 692 P.2d at 1032 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Grayned v. City of Rockford
green
2 sentences1991As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 , [ 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ], ... (1972): “Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish [defendant’s] standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.” Doran, 422 U.S. at 933 , 95 S.Ct. at 2568-69 ; see also Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144-45 , 781 P.2d at 622-23 ; L. 1991As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 , [ 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ], ... (1972): “Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish [defendant’s] standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.” Doran, 422 U.S. at 933 , 95 S.Ct. at 2568-69 ; see also Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144-45 , 781 P.2d at 622-23 ; L. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 , [ 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ], ... (1972): “Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish [defendant’s] standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.” Doran, 422 U.S. at 933 , 95 S.Ct. at 2568-69 ; see also Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144-45 , 781 P.2d at 622-23 ; L. 1991As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 , [ 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ], ... (1972): “Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish [defendant’s] standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.” Doran, 422 U.S. at 933 , 95 S.Ct. at 2568-69 ; see also Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144-45 , 781 P.2d at 622-23 ; L. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.
green
2 sentences1990Munson, 467 U.S. at 956-59 , 104 S.Ct. at 2847-48 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 795-97 ; see also Nimmer, Freedom of Speech § 4-11[E]2 (1984). [3] Petitioner does not assert the rights of others but asserts only his own. 1990Munson, 467 U.S. at 956-59 , 104 S.Ct. at 2847-48 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 795-97 ; see also Nimmer, Freedom of Speech § 4-11[E]2 (1984). [3] Petitioner does not assert the rights of others but asserts only his own. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Duran
green
2 sentences1982State v. Duran, 118 Ariz. 239 , 575 P.2d 1265 (App.1978). 1982State v. Duran, 118 Ariz. 239 , 575 P.2d 1265 (App.1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.