overbreadth doctrine in New Jersey

2016When addressing a dual overbroad and vagueness challenge, "a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct," and if it does not, "then the overbreadth challenge must fail." Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.

2016When addressing a dual overbroad and vagueness challenge, "a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct," and if it does not, "then the overbreadth challenge must fail." Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.

1985Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 2351 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 350 . [Town Tobacconist v. Kimmehman, 94 N.J. 85, 125-26 (1983).] Accordingly, it has been held that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech, id., and, as such, Arrow’s claim must fail.

1985Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 2351 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 350 . [Town Tobacconist v. Kimmehman, 94 N.J. 85, 125-26 (1983).] Accordingly, it has been held that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech, id., and, as such, Arrow’s claim must fail.

2024Because the overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine,” it is to be used “only as a last resort.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).

1999Consequently, as the Broadrick Court recognized: Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction— cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. [8] [ Id. at 615 , 93 S.Ct. at 2917-18 , 37 L.Ed. 2d at 842 .] Thus, as a form of facial challenge, the overbreadth doctrine stands for the proposition that ordinarily courts will not examine the constitutiona

2010Historically, the overbreadth doctrine has been invoked when an enactment impinges upon first amendment rights, as it "emanate[d] from the notion that `[f]irst amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive....'" State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 165 , 475 A. 2d 31 (1984) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 , 83 *444 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed. 2d 405, 418 (1963)).

2010Historically, the overbreadth doctrine has been invoked when an enactment impinges upon first amendment rights, as it "emanate[d] from the notion that `[f]irst amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive....'" State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 165 , 475 A. 2d 31 (1984) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 , 83 *444 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed. 2d 405, 418 (1963)).

2024However, because the doctrine is aimed at protecting the “marketplace of ideas,” an overbreadth challenge will “[r]arely, if ever . . . succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating).” Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124 .

2024The First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine provides “breathing room for free expression” because overbroad laws “‘may deter or “chill” constitutionally protected speech,’ and if would-be speakers remain silent, society will lose their contributions to ‘the marketplace of ideas.’” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 769 -70 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).

2024Courts may find that a law is facially invalid on overbreadth grounds “[i]f the challenger demonstrates that the statute ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); accord Hill, 256 N.J. at 283; United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010). 14 When a court holds a law facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine, all enforcement of the law is suspended.

2024The First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine provides “breathing room for free expression” because overbroad laws “‘may deter or “chill” constitutionally protected speech,’ and if would-be speakers remain silent, society will lose their contributions to ‘the marketplace of ideas.’” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 769 -70 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).

2024In any event, “[t]he ‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge’” because they “would not establish that the statute is substantially overbroad.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). 25 allege that any of those witness tampering prosecutions clearly involved protected speech -- i.e., speech that was not integral to criminal conduct -- and we have found none.

2009Moreover, "the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge." Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2126 , 80 L.Ed. 2d, 772, 783 (1984).

2010See Jones, supra, 346 N.J.Super. at 407 , 788 A. 2d 303 (overbreadth challenge to N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4 rejected because its impact upon the constitutionally protected parent-child relationship was limited).

2010See Jones, supra, 346 N.J.Super. at 407 , 788 A. 2d 303 (overbreadth challenge to N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4 rejected because its impact upon the constitutionally protected parent-child relationship was limited).

2010Historically, the overbreadth doctrine has been invoked when an enactment impinges upon first amendment rights, as it "emanate[d] from the notion that `[f]irst amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive....'" State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 165 , 475 A. 2d 31 (1984) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 , 83 *444 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed. 2d 405, 418 (1963)).

2010Historically, the overbreadth doctrine has been invoked when an enactment impinges upon first amendment rights, as it "emanate[d] from the notion that `[f]irst amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive....'" State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 165 , 475 A. 2d 31 (1984) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 , 83 *444 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed. 2d 405, 418 (1963)).

2026If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.'" State v. B.A., 458 N.J. Super. 391, 407 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 1997)).

2026If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.'" State v. B.A., 458 N.J. Super. 391, 407 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 1997)).

2024Courts may find that a law is facially invalid on overbreadth grounds “[i]f the challenger demonstrates that the statute ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); accord Hill, 256 N.J. at 283; United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010). 14 When a court holds a law facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine, all enforcement of the law is suspended.

2024In any event, “[t]he ‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge’” because they “would not establish that the statute is substantially overbroad.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). 25 allege that any of those witness tampering prosecutions clearly involved protected speech -- i.e., speech that was not integral to criminal conduct -- and we have found none.

1985Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 2351 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 350 . [Town Tobacconist v. Kimmehman, 94 N.J. 85, 125-26 (1983).] Accordingly, it has been held that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech, id., and, as such, Arrow’s claim must fail.

1985Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 2351 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 350 . [Town Tobacconist v. Kimmehman, 94 N.J. 85, 125-26 (1983).] Accordingly, it has been held that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech, id., and, as such, Arrow’s claim must fail.

2016A statute may be found to be overly broad when it permits "police and other officials to wield unlimited discretionary powers in its enforcement." Ibid. (citation omitted).

2016In an overbreadth challenge, the "primary issue is not notice or adequate standards, although these issues may be involved." State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 16 (1979).

1998Similarly, the court rejected the overbreadth challenge because “facial invalidation by application of the overbreadth doctrine is inappropriate if the provision in question applies to a ‘substantial number of situations to which it might be validly applied.’” Id. at 1294 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 , 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2563 , 41 L.Ed.2d 439, 460 (1974)).

1998Similarly, the court rejected the overbreadth challenge because “facial invalidation by application of the overbreadth doctrine is inappropriate if the provision in question applies to a ‘substantial number of situations to which it might be validly applied.’” Id. at 1294 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 , 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2563 , 41 L.Ed.2d 439, 460 (1974)).

1983In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed. 2d 810 (1977), the Supreme Court refused to apply the overbreadth doctrine to professional advertising, stating: In the usual case involving a restraint on speech, a showing that the challenged rule served unconstitutionally to suppress speech would end our analysis.

1983In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed. 2d 810 (1977), the Supreme Court refused to apply the overbreadth doctrine to professional advertising, stating: In the usual case involving a restraint on speech, a showing that the challenged rule served unconstitutionally to suppress speech would end our analysis.

2026If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.'" State v. B.A., 458 N.J. Super. 391, 407 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 1997)).

2026If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.'" State v. B.A., 458 N.J. Super. 391, 407 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 1997)).

2024Courts may find that a law is facially invalid on overbreadth grounds “[i]f the challenger demonstrates that the statute ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); accord Hill, 256 N.J. at 283; United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010). 14 When a court holds a law facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine, all enforcement of the law is suspended.

2024The Court found that the statute challenged in that case created an offense “of alarming breadth” because, although it purported to criminalize animal cruelty, the statute did not actually require “that the depicted conduct be cruel,” such that hunting periodicals could run afoul of the law. 559 U.S. 460, 474-76 (2010).

2024Courts may find that a law is facially invalid on overbreadth grounds “[i]f the challenger demonstrates that the statute ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); accord Hill, 256 N.J. at 283; United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010). 14 When a court holds a law facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine, all enforcement of the law is suspended.

2024As this Court recently observed, “[o]verbreadth is unlike a typical facial challenge.” Hill, 256 N.J. at 283. “[I]t does not require a challenger to ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [a statute] would be valid.’” Ibid. (quoting Hansen, 599 U.S. at 769 ).

2024The overbreadth doctrine thus considers the extent of a law’s “deterrent effect on legitimate expression.” State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 582 (1997) (internal quotation omitted).

2024Otherwise it is a crime of the third degree. [N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a).] As earlier noted, the Appellate Division rejected an overbreadth challenge to a previous version of the witness tampering statute in Crescenzi, holding that “[w]hen the public interest in discovering the truth in official proceedings is balanced against a party’s right to speak to a particular witness with the intent of tampering, that party’s right is ‘minuscule.’” 224 N.J.

2024For example, defendant cites State v. Mancine, in which the defendant told a witness “[d]on’t say anything [to police], just keep your mouth shut and tell them you don’t know nothing about it.” 124 N.J. 232, 241 (1991).

2016Ed. 2d 362, 369 (1982); see also Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 98 (1983); State v. Badr, 415 N.J.