overbreadth doctrine in Ohio

2018In considering an overbreadth challenge, the court must decide “whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 115, 92 S.Ct. at 2302 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 231 .

2018In considering an overbreadth challenge, the court must decide “whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 115, 92 S.Ct. at 2302 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 231 .

2001It is well-settled in Ohio that the overbreadth doctrine has limited application, and "outside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad." State v. Collier (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 267 , 272 , citing Schall v. Martin (1984), 467 U.S. 253 , 269 , 104 S.Ct. 2403 , 2412 , 81 L.Ed.2d 207 , 220 , fn. 18.

2001It is well-settled in Ohio that the overbreadth doctrine has limited application, and "outside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad." State v. Collier (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 267 , 272 , citing Schall v. Martin (1984), 467 U.S. 253 , 269 , 104 S.Ct. 2403 , 2412 , 81 L.Ed.2d 207 , 220 , fn. 18.

2026For this reason, it has been said that the overbreadth doctrine is ‘manifestly strong medicine’ that is employed sparingly, and only as a last resort.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 2004-Ohio-3199, ¶ 13 , (7th Dist.), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). {¶30} A party asserting a First Amendment overbreadth challenge must show that “a substantial number of [the law's] applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to [the law's] plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010).

2003Where * * * a statute regulates conduct rather than pure speech, its overbreadth ‘ * * * must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” State v. Young (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 249, 251 , 525 N.E.2d 1363 , quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973), 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 . {¶ 8} In Young , the Ohio Supreme Court overruled an overbreadth challenge to R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), after construing that statute to prohibit “the possession or viewing of material or performance of a minor who is in a state of nudity, where

2013The overbreadth doctrine is reserved for cases involving alleged violations of First Amendment rights, such as freedom of the press, speech or assembly: “generalized overbreadth challenges are recognized only in First Amendment issues * * *.” State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184 , 2003-Ohio- 3193, 790 N.E.2d 303 at ¶64 citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982).

2013The overbreadth doctrine is reserved for cases involving alleged violations of First Amendment rights, such as freedom of the press, speech or assembly: “generalized overbreadth challenges are recognized only in First Amendment issues * * *.” State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184 , 2003-Ohio- 3193, 790 N.E.2d 303 at ¶64 citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982).

2001It is well-settled in Ohio that the overbreadth doctrine has limited application, and "outside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad." State v. Collier (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 267 , 272 , citing Schall v. Martin (1984), 467 U.S. 253 , 269 , 104 S.Ct. 2403 , 2412 , 81 L.Ed.2d 207 , 220 , fn. 18.

1995Overbreadth As to application of the overbreadth doctrine, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “it is generally well recognized that the overbreadth doctrine has limited application, and ‘outside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad.’ ” Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d at 272 , 581 N.E.2d at 555 , quoting Scholl v. Martin (1984), 467 U.S. 253, 268 , 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2412 , 81 L.Ed.2d 207, 220, fn. 18 .

2008See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), 535 U.S. 234 , 255 , 122 S.Ct. 1389 , 1404 ("The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process."). *Page 9 {¶ 18} In support of their contention that R.C. 3517.21 (B)(1) is unconstitutional because it prohibits certain implications, appellants cite Pestrak , supra. In Pestrak , the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States determined that R.C. 3599.091 (B)(10), which is currently codified as R.C. 3517.21 (B)(10), is not unc

2008See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), 535 U.S. 234 , 255 , 122 S.Ct. 1389 , 1404 ("The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process."). *Page 9 {¶ 18} In support of their contention that R.C. 3517.21 (B)(1) is unconstitutional because it prohibits certain implications, appellants cite Pestrak , supra. In Pestrak , the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States determined that R.C. 3599.091 (B)(10), which is currently codified as R.C. 3517.21 (B)(10), is not unc

2002See Howard Opera House Assoc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc. (D.Vt.2001), 131 F.Supp.2d 559, 564 . *219 {¶ 31} In appellant’s third argument, he contends that Ord. 539.07(b)(1) was applied in a selective and discriminatory manner.

2002See Howard Opera House Assoc. v. O'Neill, Crawford Green (D.Vt., 2001), 131 F. Supp.2d 559 , 564 . {¶ 33} This leads us to a review of Appellant's conviction to see if there is a constitutional violation as applied to the facts of the case.

2017The "mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge." Members of City Council at 800 [ 104 S.Ct. 2118 ].

2014In considering an overbreadth challenge, 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the court must decide “whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id., 408 U.S. at 115, 92 S.Ct. at 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d at 231.

2011It permits a party to challenge a statute on its face when others not presently before the court may be affected by the statute’s application.”) Although Pouliot and Riverside frame their assignment of error as a challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance merely as applied to them, we will nevertheless address their argument that the ordinance is constitutionally overbroad. {¶12} The overbreadth doctrine is applicable only within the narrow context of First Amendment rights and serves to invalidate a legislative enactment only where the statute or ordinance “prohibits constitutionally

2004Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 524 , 528 , 709 N.E.2d 1148 . {¶ 13} When a court applies the overbreadth doctrine, the statute or ordinance in question is declared to be facially invalid.

2017Hill at 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502 . {¶ 20} This Court rejects R.H.'s overbreadth challenge because his argument focuses on the potential effect of certain behavior rather than the conduct prohibited by the statute.

2014“In considering an overbreadth challenge, the court must decide ‘whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” Akron v. Rowland, 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 387 , 618 N.E.2d 138 (1993), quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 115, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). {¶ 36} “[C]riminal statutes ‘that make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate application.’” Id., quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 , 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 ,

2014“In considering an overbreadth challenge, the court must decide ‘whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” Akron v. Rowland, 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 387 , 618 N.E.2d 138 (1993), quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 115, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). {¶ 36} “[C]riminal statutes ‘that make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate application.’” Id., quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 , 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 ,

2008“In considering an overbreadth challenge, the court must decide ‘whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’ ” Id., quoting Grayned at 115, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 . “ ‘Only a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face.’ ” Id., quoting Houston v. Hill (1987), 482 U.S. 451, 458 , 107 S.Ct. 2502 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398 .

2011Court of Appeals (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 354, 357 (“The overbreadth doctrine represents an exception to the usual rules applicable to standing.

2001Court of Appeals (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 354 , 588 N.E.2d 116 , as follows: “The overbreadth doctrine represents an exception to the usual rules applicable to standing.

2026“The first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged [law]; it is impossible to determine whether a [law] reaches too far without first knowing what the [law] covers.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). {¶31} In George and Clavin, we explained that the relevant prostitution statute focuses on prohibited conduct rather than speech, expression, or association.

2013United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292-293 , 128 S.Ct. 1830 , 170 L.Ed.2d 260 (2008); State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 155 , 661 N.E.2d 1030 (1996).

1994Professor Fallon notes that, although the majority in Kolender rejected “the dissent's view,” which would confine a vagueness challenge (unlike an overbreadth challenge) to a statute’s constitutionality "as applied,” the court "has sent mixed signals as to whether a party may challenge a statute [that] clearly applies to her conduct, on the ground that it would be impermissibly vague as applied to the different conduct of someone else.” Fallon, supra, at 904, fn. 309 (comparing Gooding v. Wilson [1972], 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 , with Broadrick, supra). 7 .

1994Professor Fallon notes that, although the majority in Kolender rejected “the dissent's view,” which would confine a vagueness challenge (unlike an overbreadth challenge) to a statute’s constitutionality "as applied,” the court "has sent mixed signals as to whether a party may challenge a statute [that] clearly applies to her conduct, on the ground that it would be impermissibly vague as applied to the different conduct of someone else.” Fallon, supra, at 904, fn. 309 (comparing Gooding v. Wilson [1972], 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 , with Broadrick, supra). 7 .

2026For this reason, it has been said that the overbreadth doctrine is ‘manifestly strong medicine’ that is employed sparingly, and only as a last resort.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 2004-Ohio-3199, ¶ 13 , (7th Dist.), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). {¶30} A party asserting a First Amendment overbreadth challenge must show that “a substantial number of [the law's] applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to [the law's] plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010).

2026For this reason, it has been said that the overbreadth doctrine is ‘manifestly strong medicine’ that is employed sparingly, and only as a last resort.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 2004-Ohio-3199, ¶ 13 , (7th Dist.), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). {¶30} A party asserting a First Amendment overbreadth challenge must show that “a substantial number of [the law's] applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to [the law's] plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010).