overbreadth challenge in Iowa

2010There, the Su *580 preme Court recognized “the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. at 1857 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 77-78 (plurality opinion) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973)).

2010There, the Su *580 preme Court recognized “the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. at 1857 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 77-78 (plurality opinion) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973)).

2010There, the Su *580 preme Court recognized “the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. at 1857 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 77-78 (plurality opinion) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973)).

2006City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 , 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 , 144 L.

2016See State v. Armstrong, 787 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).

2016State v. Armstrong, 787 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).

1993Id.) Moose Lodge #107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 168 , 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1969 , 32 L.Ed.2d 627, 634 (1972).

1993Id.) Moose Lodge #107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 168 , 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1969 , 32 L.Ed.2d 627, 634 (1972).

1973With regard to “standing” the Court said in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 , 80 S.Ct. 519, 522 , 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960): “[O]ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” On the other hand, when an overbreadth challenge is directed towards a statute which purports to regulate speech the “standing” requirement has, to some degree, been thus tempered. “ ‘Although a statute may be neither v

1973With regard to “standing” the Court said in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 , 80 S.Ct. 519, 522 , 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960): “[O]ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” On the other hand, when an overbreadth challenge is directed towards a statute which purports to regulate speech the “standing” requirement has, to some degree, been thus tempered. “ ‘Although a statute may be neither v

2010Id.

2009Id.

2024To prevail on an overbreadth claim, the challenger to the rule must establish the rule “ ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); see Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021) (“In the First Amendment context, however, we have 20 recognized ‘a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate

2023In Virginia v. Hicks, the Supreme Court rejected an overbreadth challenge to a local housing authority’s trespass policy but emphasized that the defendant was not engaged in expressive conduct and had previously been ordered to leave and barred from returning. 539 U.S. 113 , 117–18 (2003).

1973With regard to “standing” the Court said in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 , 80 S.Ct. 519, 522 , 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960): “[O]ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” On the other hand, when an overbreadth challenge is directed towards a statute which purports to regulate speech the “standing” requirement has, to some degree, been thus tempered. “ ‘Although a statute may be neither v

1973With regard to “standing” the Court said in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 , 80 S.Ct. 519, 522 , 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960): “[O]ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” On the other hand, when an overbreadth challenge is directed towards a statute which purports to regulate speech the “standing” requirement has, to some degree, been thus tempered. “ ‘Although a statute may be neither v

1994Id. at 800 , 104 S.Ct. at 2126 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 783 ; Todd, 468 N.W.2d at 466 .

1992We recently confirmed our agreement with this conclusion when we stated that “an overbroad governmental regulation may be invalid on First Amendment grounds even when the litigant’s activity is not itself constitutionally protected. ” State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Iowa 1991) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

1991However, “the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2126 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 783 (1984).

1991However, “the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2126 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 783 (1984).

2024To prevail on an overbreadth claim, the challenger to the rule must establish the rule “ ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); see Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021) (“In the First Amendment context, however, we have 20 recognized ‘a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate

2024Usually, “litigants mounting a facial challenge to a statute normally ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).

2024But “the overbreadth doctrine instructs a court to hold a statute facially unconstitutional even though it has lawful applications, and even at the behest of someone to whom the statute can be lawfully applied.” Id.

2024To prevail on an overbreadth claim, the challenger to the rule must establish the rule “ ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); see Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021) (“In the First Amendment context, however, we have 20 recognized ‘a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate

2024Neff “has not identified, nor do we perceive, a broad swath of speech that would be impermissibly limited 23 by [rule 32:8.4(g)] such that the [r]ule risks chilling or penalizing protected speech.” In re Abrams, 488 P.3d 1043, 1054 (Colo. 2021) (en banc).

2024“An overbreadth challenge is unusual.” United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 769 (2023).

2024To prevail on an overbreadth claim, the challenger to the rule must establish the rule “ ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); see Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021) (“In the First Amendment context, however, we have 20 recognized ‘a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate

2024Neff failed to show from actual fact that “the ratio of unlawful-to-lawful applications is . . . lopsided enough to justify the ‘strong medicine’ of facial invalidation for overbreadth.” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 784 ; see, e.g., Rowles v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 983 F.3d 345, 358 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming the dismissal of an overbreadth challenge to the university’s sexual harassment policy and explaining the challenger failed to show a substantial number of enforcement actions would involve protected speech).

2024To prevail on an overbreadth claim, the challenger to the rule must establish the rule “ ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id. at 770 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)); see Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021) (“In the First Amendment context, however, we have 20 recognized ‘a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate

2010Compare Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 971-72 (9th Cir.2003) (abiding by Salerno's overbreadth doctrine), with A Woman's Choice-E.

1997See State v. Mehner, 480 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Iowa 1992).

1996Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853 , 904 (1991) [hereinafter Overbreadth ] (“First Amendment vagueness doctrine is best conceptualized as a subpart of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.”); Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67, 110-13 (1960) (vagueness and overbreadth are indistinguishable); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-110, 92 S.Ct. at 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 227-28 (discussing vagueness policies); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 , 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408, 413-14 (1972) (discussing overbreadth policies).

1996Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853 , 904 (1991) [hereinafter Overbreadth ] (“First Amendment vagueness doctrine is best conceptualized as a subpart of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.”); Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67, 110-13 (1960) (vagueness and overbreadth are indistinguishable); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-110, 92 S.Ct. at 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 227-28 (discussing vagueness policies); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 , 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408, 413-14 (1972) (discussing overbreadth policies).

1992Accord City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis.2d 24, 40 , 426 N.W.2d 329, 336 (1988) (“[I]n asserting an overbreadth challenge an individual may hypothesize situations in which a statute or ordinance would unconstitutionally intrude upon the First Amendment rights of third parties.”).

1992Accord City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis.2d 24, 40 , 426 N.W.2d 329, 336 (1988) (“[I]n asserting an overbreadth challenge an individual may hypothesize situations in which a statute or ordinance would unconstitutionally intrude upon the First Amendment rights of third parties.”).

1992See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1258-62 (M.D.Pa.1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 , 97 S.Ct. 394 , 50 L.Ed.2d 333 (1976); In re J.M., 768 P.2d at 224-25 .

1992See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1258-62 (M.D.Pa.1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 , 97 S.Ct. 394 , 50 L.Ed.2d 333 (1976); In re J.M., 768 P.2d at 224-25 .

1992See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1258-62 (M.D.Pa.1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 , 97 S.Ct. 394 , 50 L.Ed.2d 333 (1976); In re J.M., 768 P.2d at 224-25 .

1992See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1258-62 (M.D.Pa.1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 , 97 S.Ct. 394 , 50 L.Ed.2d 333 (1976); In re J.M., 768 P.2d at 224-25 .