83 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2021 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Seattle v. Huffgreen2 sentences2021In City of Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wn.2d 923, 928 (1989), our high court denied the overbreadth challenge to a City of Seattle telephonic harassment ordinance, which ordinance used identical language to the Washington’s telephonic harassment statute. 1994In Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wn.2d at 925-26 , the Washington Supreme Court set out the overbreadth analysis in the context of determining the constitutionality of a subsection of a municipal telephone harassment ordinance identical to RCW 9.61.230(3). | 2 | 8 |
State v. Talleygreen2 sentences2021Id. (citing Talley, 122 Wn.2d at 198, 210 ). 1994See Talley, 122 Wn.2d at 210 (upholding a subsection of the malicious harassment statute against an overbreadth challenge because it primarily regulated conduct and its "incidental impact” on speech was minimal). | 2 | 3 |
| Ward v. State of Utahgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Gunwallgreen | 2 | 2 |
Broadrick v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2017Overbreadth doctrine creates a limited exception to the usual rule that a party "will not be heard to challenge [a] statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S. Ct. 2908 , 37 L. 2017Overbreadth doctrine creates a limited exception to the usual rule that a party "will not be heard to challenge [a] statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S. Ct. 2908 , 37 L. | 1 | 17 |
State v. Halstiengreen2 sentences2021“Application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine, . . . and should be employed by a court sparingly and only as a last resort.” State v. Halstien, 17 No. 37693-1-III State v. Warnock 122 Wn.2d 109, 122 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993). 2021“Application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine, . . . and should be employed by a court sparingly and only as a last resort.” State v. Halstien, 17 No. 37693-1-III State v. Warnock 122 Wn.2d 109, 122 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993). | 1 | 12 |
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincentgreen2 sentences2013However, “the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S. Ct. 2118 , 80 L. 2013However, “the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 , 104 S. Ct. 2118 , 80 L. | 1 | 9 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2017"A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly vague." Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497 , 102 S. Ct. 1186 , 71 L. 2017"A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly vague." Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497 , 102 S. Ct. 1186 , 71 L. | 1 | 7 |
New York v. Ferbergreen2 sentences2009O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash.2d 796, 804 , 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982)). ¶ 15 In conducting an overbreadth analysis, a court's first task is to determine whether the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech or conduct. 2009O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash.2d 796, 804 , 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982)). ¶ 15 In conducting an overbreadth analysis, a court's first task is to determine whether the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech or conduct. | 1 | 7 |
City of Seattle v. Webstergreen2 sentences2011A violation of SCC 10.010.040 is an infraction unless two violations of the ordinance are committed within a 24-hour period, in which case the second violation is criminalized as a misdemeanor. ¶3 Although the facts of this case are not critical in an overbreadth challenge, see City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 640 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990), we offer them by way of background. 2011A violation of SCC 10.010.040 is an infraction unless two violations of the ordinance are committed within a 24-hour period, in which case the second violation is criminalized as a misdemeanor. ¶3 Although the facts of this case are not critical in an overbreadth challenge, see City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 640 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990), we offer them by way of background. | 1 | 4 |
City of Bellevue v. Loranggreen2 sentences2011Lorang, 140 Wn.2d at 27 . ¶28 The threshold inquiry in the overbreadth analysis is whether the statute prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech. 2011City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19, 26 , 992 P.2d 496 (2000) (“An overbreadth challenge is facial, and will prevail even if the statute could constitutionally be applied to a litigant.”). ¶70 With these principles in mind, I turn to the county’s horn ordinance, which contains several relevant provisions. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Rilesred2 sentences2020See State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 346 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010); see also State v. Aljutily, 149 Wn. 2008As the court said there, imposing such orders “seems in context to require some relationship to the crime.” Id. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Rilesred2 sentences2020See State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 346 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010); see also State v. Aljutily, 149 Wn. 2008As the court said there, imposing such orders "seems in context to require some relationship to the crime." Id. [25] The judgment and sentence indicates a maximum term of life and imposes community custody per RCW 9.94A.712 for "any period of time the defendant is released from total confinement before the expiration of the maximum sentence as set forth above." RCW 9.94A.712(5) provides: When a court sentences a person to the custody of the department under this section, the court shall, in addition to the other terms of the sentence, sentence the offender to community custody under the superv | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011Ed. 2d 772 (1984). “[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.” Id. at 801 . ¶17 The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to “strike a balance between competing social costs.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S. Ct. 1830 , 170 L. 2011Ed. 2d 772 (1984). “[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.” Id. at 801 . ¶17 The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to “strike a balance between competing social costs.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S. Ct. 1830 , 170 L. | 1 | 3 |
City of Bellevue v. Loranggreen2 sentences2011City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19, 26 , 992 P.2d 496 (2000) (“An overbreadth challenge is facial, and will prevail even if the statute could constitutionally be applied to a litigant.”). ¶70 With these principles in mind, I turn to the county’s horn ordinance, which contains several relevant provisions. 2006“An overbreadth challenge is facial.. ..” City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19, 26 , 992 P.2d 496 (2000); see Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 2005) (an overbreadth challenge is a facial challenge). | 1 | 3 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen2 sentences1986Ed. 2d 222 , 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972) discloses that the third aspect of the vagueness inquiry is really little more than a truncated approach to the traditional overbreadth analysis. 1978As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972): "Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.11 Although the majority opinion appears somewhat critical of this rule, it is nonetheless binding on this court under the supremacy clause. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Paulinggreen2 sentences2019That statute provided, “A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he commits extortion by means of a threat as defined in then RCW 9A.04.1 10(25)(d) through 0).” The court concluded the statute prohibited “a real and substantial amount of protected speech that the government may not infringe upon.”44 But our Supreme Court determined it was “unnecessary to strike [the extortion statute] because we may impose a limiting construction in the form of a requirement that there be a ‘lack of nexus’ that limits its application to only unprotected speech.”45 According to Pauling, in the co 2006See State v. Pauling, 149 Wash.2d 381, 386 , 69 P.3d 331 (2003); Lorang, 140 Wash.2d at 26-27 , 992 P.2d 496 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Paulinggreen2 sentences2019That statute provided, “A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he commits extortion by means of a threat as defined in then RCW 9A.04.1 10(25)(d) through 0).” The court concluded the statute prohibited “a real and substantial amount of protected speech that the government may not infringe upon.”44 But our Supreme Court determined it was “unnecessary to strike [the extortion statute] because we may impose a limiting construction in the form of a requirement that there be a ‘lack of nexus’ that limits its application to only unprotected speech.”45 According to Pauling, in the co 2006See State v. Pauling, 149 Wash.2d 381, 386 , 69 P.3d 331 (2003); Lorang, 140 Wash.2d at 26-27 , 992 P.2d 496 . | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Valenciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Valenciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Aljutilygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Of Washington, V Russell David Homangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Meaney v. Devergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weil v. McCloughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Tacoma v. Luvene
green
2 sentences2021Id. at 7 (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 122 , 857 P.2d 270 (1995)). 2019That statute provided, “A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he commits extortion by means of a threat as defined in then RCW 9A.04.1 10(25)(d) through 0).” The court concluded the statute prohibited “a real and substantial amount of protected speech that the government may not infringe upon.”44 But our Supreme Court determined it was “unnecessary to strike [the extortion statute] because we may impose a limiting construction in the form of a requirement that there be a ‘lack of nexus’ that limits its application to only unprotected speech.”45 According to Pauling, in the co | 10 | 1993–2021 |
O'DAY v. King County
green
2 sentences2009O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash.2d 796, 804 , 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982)). ¶ 15 In conducting an overbreadth analysis, a court's first task is to determine whether the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech or conduct. 2009O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash.2d 796, 804 , 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982)). ¶ 15 In conducting an overbreadth analysis, a court's first task is to determine whether the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech or conduct. | 10 | 1996–2009 |
State v. Motherwell
green
2 sentences2019Constitutionality of RCW 9A.76.180 Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment presents a question of law that we review de novo.13 Because of the important rights protected by the First Amendment, the overbreadth doctrine allows a litigant to challenge a statute on its face, rather than as applied to his own facts, and have a statute invalidated for overbreadth where it would be unconstitutional as applied to others even if not as applied to him.t14~ ~ ki.at 11:34-12:37. 12 Ex. 28. 13 State v. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d 1, 6 , 267 P.3d 305 (2011). 14 State v. Motherwell 2019Constitutionality of RCW 9A.76.180 Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment presents a question of law that we review de novo.13 Because of the important rights protected by the First Amendment, the overbreadth doctrine allows a litigant to challenge a statute on its face, rather than as applied to his own facts, and have a statute invalidated for overbreadth where it would be unconstitutional as applied to others even if not as applied to him.t14~ ~ ki.at 11:34-12:37. 12 Ex. 28. 13 State v. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d 1, 6 , 267 P.3d 305 (2011). 14 State v. Motherwell | 4 | 2000–2019 |
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad
green
2 sentences2006The overbreadth doctrine will invalidate a statute only if the “ ‘enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,’ ” City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 , 107 S. Ct. 2502 , 96 L. 2006The overbreadth doctrine will invalidate a statute only if the "`enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,'" City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 , 107 S.Ct. 2502 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)), "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). | 4 | 1990–2006 |
City of Houston v. Hill
green
2 sentences2006The overbreadth doctrine will invalidate a statute only if the “ ‘enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,’ ” City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 , 107 S. Ct. 2502 , 96 L. 2006The overbreadth doctrine will invalidate a statute only if the “ ‘enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,’ ” City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 , 107 S. Ct. 2502 , 96 L. | 4 | 1990–2006 |
Blondheim v. State
green
2 sentences2003Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash.2d 874, 878 , 529 P.2d 1096 (1975). 1986The State responds that an overbreadth challenge may only be made when a claim is made that the statute is "so broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior but may also prohibit constitutionally protected activity as well." Blondheim v. State, 84 Wn.2d at 878 . | 4 | 1980–2003 |
City of Seattle v. Ivan
green
2 sentences2020“Overbreadth analysis is intended to ensure that the legislative enactments do not prohibit constitutionally protected conduct, such as free speech.” City of Seattle v. hian, 71 Wn. 2020“Overbreadth analysis is intended to ensure that legislative enactments do not prohibit constitutionally protected conduct, such as free speech.” City of Seattle v. Ivan, 71 Wn. | 3 | 1998–2020 |
Virginia v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2014The showing that a law punishes a “substantial” amount of protected free speech, “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, “until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 , 123 S. Ct. 2191 , 156 L. 2011Instead, it noted that “[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial challenges.” Id. | 3 | 2011–2014 |
Eastland v. Texas
green
2 sentences2005The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine may invalidate a law on its face only if the law is ‘substantially overbroad.’ In determining overbreadth, ‘a court’s first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.’ Criminal statutes require particular scrutiny and may be facially invalid if they ‘make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. .. even if they also have legitimate application.’ ” Glas, 147 Wn.2d at 419 (quoting City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 641 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990), cert. deni 1991We disagree. [5, 6] Our Supreme Court recently outlined the overbreadth doctrine in Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1690 (1991): A law is overbroad if it sweeps within its prohibitions constitutionally protected free speech activities. | 3 | 1991–2005 |
State v. Immelt
green
2 sentences2019Constitutionality of RCW 9A.76.180 Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment presents a question of law that we review de novo.13 Because of the important rights protected by the First Amendment, the overbreadth doctrine allows a litigant to challenge a statute on its face, rather than as applied to his own facts, and have a statute invalidated for overbreadth where it would be unconstitutional as applied to others even if not as applied to him.t14~ ~ ki.at 11:34-12:37. 12 Ex. 28. 13 State v. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d 1, 6 , 267 P.3d 305 (2011). 14 State v. Motherwell 2019Constitutionality of RCW 9A.76.180 Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment presents a question of law that we review de novo.13 Because of the important rights protected by the First Amendment, the overbreadth doctrine allows a litigant to challenge a statute on its face, rather than as applied to his own facts, and have a statute invalidated for overbreadth where it would be unconstitutional as applied to others even if not as applied to him.t14~ ~ ki.at 11:34-12:37. 12 Ex. 28. 13 State v. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d 1, 6 , 267 P.3d 305 (2011). 14 State v. Motherwell | 2 | 2019–2021 |
State v. Dyson
green
2 sentences2021Id. (citing Talley, 122 Wn.2d at 198, 210 ). 1996Finally, even if the statute reaches a substantial amount of protected speech, it will not be overturned if: (1) the court can place a sufficient limiting construction on the statute; or (2) the statute’s regulation of protected speech is permissible under the First Amendment. 11 Use of the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate a statute is considered "strong medicine” to be applied "only as a last resort.” Dyson, 74 Wn. | 2 | 1996–2021 |
State v. Moultrie
green
2 sentences2014Moultrie, 143 Wn. 2014Moultrie,. 143 Wn. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. American Library Assn., Inc.
green
2 sentences2010But a public library has no obligation to make available any and all constitutionally protected material, and the goal of libraries has never, as the plurality in A.L.A. noted, been to provide "`universal coverage.'" A.L.A., 539 U.S. at 204 , 123 S.Ct. 2297 (quoting Am. 2010But a public library has no obligation to make available any and all constitutionally protected material, and the goal of libraries has never, as the plurality in A.L.A. noted, been to provide “ ‘universal coverage.’ ’’A.L.A., 539 U.S. at 204 (quoting Am. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Hearn
green
2 sentences2007“An offender’s usual constitutional rights during community placement are subject to [Sentencing Reform Act]-authorized infringements.” State v. Hearn, 131 Wn. 2007"An offender's usual constitutional rights during community placement are subject to SRA-authorized infringements." State v. Hearn, 131 Wash. App. 601, 607 , 128 P.3d 139 (2006)(citing State v. Riles, 135 Wash.2d 326, 347 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998)). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| City of Bellevue v. Miller green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Glas green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Knowles green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| City of Seattle v. Eze green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| City of Seattle v. Montana green | 2 | 1997–2001 |
| City of Seattle v. Montana green | 2 | 1997–2001 |
| Schall v. Martin green | 2 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Padilla green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Alexander green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| City of Lakewood v. Willis green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Bradford green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Dana green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Kitsap County v. Mattress Outlet green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| City of Seattle v. Abercrombie green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Cox v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| cluster 2144 green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Compas green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Dombrowski v. Pfister green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Colten v. Kentucky green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Hearn neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Wisconsin v. Mitchell green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Texas v. Johnson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.