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29 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cannongreen2 sentences2025Under that standard, we begin with defendant’s arguments that the warrants were overbroad, i.e., that they authorized a search that was “ ‘broader than the supporting affidavit supplies probable cause to justify.’ ” Mansor II, 363 Or at 212 ; see State v. Cannon, 299 Or App 616, 626 , 450 P3d 567 (2019) (“[T]he gravamen of an overbreadth challenge is an asserted lack of probable cause * * *.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 2025Under that standard, we begin with defendant’s arguments that the warrants were overbroad, i.e., that they authorized a search that was “ ‘broader than the supporting affidavit supplies probable cause to justify.’ ” Mansor II, 363 Or at 212 ; see State v. Cannon, 299 Or App 616, 626 , 450 P3d 567 (2019) (“[T]he gravamen of an overbreadth challenge is an asserted lack of probable cause * * *.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2022Under that framework, when a law focuses on forbidden effects but the proscribed means of causing those effects includes expression, then the law is analyzed for overbreadth—viz., whether it “announces a prohibition that reaches conduct which may not be prohibited.” Id. at 410 ; see also State v. Garcias, 296 Or 688 , 699 n 10, 679 P2d 1354 (1984) (holding that Robertson had refined the overbreadth analysis by “recogniz[ing] that a statute which reaches con- stitutionally protected behavior only rarely when compared with legitimate applications of the law need not succumb to an overbreadth att 1996But neither the statute at issue, nor the order issued based on it, requires any such limiting factual conditions. 9 As this court has said in discussing an overbreadth analysis of a statute focused on effects, “It is, * * * in the first instance a legislative responsibility to narrow and clarify the coverage of a statute so as to eliminate most apparent applications to free speech or writing, leaving only marginal and unforeseeable instances of unconstitutional applications to judicial exclusion.” State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 437 , 649 P2d 569 (1982), cited in Stoneman, 323 Or at 550 ; see | 2 | 7 |
State v. Servengreen2 sentences2025See State v. Serven, 265 Or App 614, 615 , 335 P3d 875 (2014) (objection on different ground did not preserve claim that special condition was overbroad). 2025See State v. Serven, 265 Or App 614, 615 , 335 P3d 875 (2014) (objection on different ground did not preserve claim that special condition was overbroad). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stonemangreen2 sentences2021If the actual focus of the enactment is on such a harm, the legislation may survive scrutiny under Article I, section 8. * * * If such a statute expressly prohibits certain forms of expression, it must survive an overbreadth inquiry before it can be found constitutional.” State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 543 , 920 P2d 535 (1996). 2021If the actual focus of the enactment is on such a harm, the legislation may survive scrutiny under Article I, section 8. * * * If such a statute expressly prohibits certain forms of expression, it must survive an overbreadth inquiry before it can be found constitutional.” State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 543 , 920 P2d 535 (1996). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Illig-Renngreen2 sentences2020Thus, because the guideline does not expressly refer to expression as a means of causing some harm, and it does not ‘obviously’ prohibit expression within the meaning of Moyle, it is not subject to an overbreadth challenge under the second category of Robertson.” Babson, 355 Or at 403-04 ; see also State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or 228, 236-37 , 142 P3d 62 (2006) (“In summary, the state is correct that only statutes that by their terms proscribe the exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of assembly or expression are susceptible to a facial overbreadth chal- lenge under Article I, section 2020Thus, because the guideline does not expressly refer to expression as a means of causing some harm, and it does not ‘obviously’ prohibit expression within the meaning of Moyle, it is not subject to an overbreadth challenge under the second category of Robertson.” Babson, 355 Or at 403-04 ; see also State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or 228, 236-37 , 142 P3d 62 (2006) (“In summary, the state is correct that only statutes that by their terms proscribe the exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of assembly or expression are susceptible to a facial overbreadth chal- lenge under Article I, section | 1 | 2 |
Moser v. Frohnmayergreen2 sentences1996But neither the statute at issue, nor the order issued based on it, requires any such limiting factual conditions. 9 As this court has said in discussing an overbreadth analysis of a statute focused on effects, “It is, * * * in the first instance a legislative responsibility to narrow and clarify the coverage of a statute so as to eliminate most apparent applications to free speech or writing, leaving only marginal and unforeseeable instances of unconstitutional applications to judicial exclusion.” State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 437 , 649 P2d 569 (1982), cited in Stoneman, 323 Or at 550 ; see 1993Moser v. Frohnmayer, 315 Or 372 , 845 P2d 1284 (1993). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Garciasgreen2 sentences2022Under that framework, when a law focuses on forbidden effects but the proscribed means of causing those effects includes expression, then the law is analyzed for overbreadth—viz., whether it “announces a prohibition that reaches conduct which may not be prohibited.” Id. at 410 ; see also State v. Garcias, 296 Or 688 , 699 n 10, 679 P2d 1354 (1984) (holding that Robertson had refined the overbreadth analysis by “recogniz[ing] that a statute which reaches con- stitutionally protected behavior only rarely when compared with legitimate applications of the law need not succumb to an overbreadth att 2022Under that framework, when a law focuses on forbidden effects but the proscribed means of causing those effects includes expression, then the law is analyzed for overbreadth—viz., whether it “announces a prohibition that reaches conduct which may not be prohibited.” Id. at 410 ; see also State v. Garcias, 296 Or 688 , 699 n 10, 679 P2d 1354 (1984) (holding that Robertson had refined the overbreadth analysis by “recogniz[ing] that a statute which reaches con- stitutionally protected behavior only rarely when compared with legitimate applications of the law need not succumb to an overbreadth att | 1 | 1 |
State v. Babsongreen2 sentences2020Thus, because the guideline does not expressly refer to expression as a means of causing some harm, and it does not ‘obviously’ prohibit expression within the meaning of Moyle, it is not subject to an overbreadth challenge under the second category of Robertson.” Babson, 355 Or at 403-04 ; see also State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or 228, 236-37 , 142 P3d 62 (2006) (“In summary, the state is correct that only statutes that by their terms proscribe the exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of assembly or expression are susceptible to a facial overbreadth chal- lenge under Article I, section 2020Id. at 398 . | 1 | 1 |
Virginia v. Hicksgreen1 sentence2013For there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech, or especially to constitutionally unprotected conduct.” 539 US at 119 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Chestergreen1 sentence2013No analogous arguments obtain in the Second Amendment context.” United States v. Chester, 628 F3d 673, 688 (4th Cir 2010). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rangelgreen2 sentences2010Reviewing its prior case law, the court concluded that, to survive an overbreadth challenge, it had required “a showing that the communicative act itself is unprotected because, for example, it is a prelude to imminent and serious proscribable harm.” Id. at 301 (citations omitted). 2010Reviewing its prior case law, the court concluded that, to survive an overbreadth challenge, it had required "a showing that the communicative act itself is unprotected because, for example, it is a prelude to imminent and serious proscribable harm." Id. at 301 , 977 P.2d 379 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Kovacs v. Coopergreen2 sentences1988See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 US 77 , 69 S Ct 448 , 93 L Ed 513 (1949). 1 The dissent’s overbreadth analysis is substantially eroded by City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174 , 759 P2d 242 (1988). 1988See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 US 77 , 69 S Ct 448 , 93 L Ed 513 (1949). 1 The dissent’s overbreadth analysis is substantially eroded by City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174 , 759 P2d 242 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
City of Portland v. Tidymangreen2 sentences1988See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 US 77 , 69 S Ct 448 , 93 L Ed 513 (1949). 1 The dissent’s overbreadth analysis is substantially eroded by City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174 , 759 P2d 242 (1988). 1988See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 US 77 , 69 S Ct 448 , 93 L Ed 513 (1949). 1 The dissent’s overbreadth analysis is substantially eroded by City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174 , 759 P2d 242 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Lambertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mansor
green
2 sentences2025Under that standard, we begin with defendant’s arguments that the warrants were overbroad, i.e., that they authorized a search that was “ ‘broader than the supporting affidavit supplies probable cause to justify.’ ” Mansor II, 363 Or at 212 ; see State v. Cannon, 299 Or App 616, 626 , 450 P3d 567 (2019) (“[T]he gravamen of an overbreadth challenge is an asserted lack of probable cause * * *.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 2025Under that standard, we begin with defendant’s arguments that the warrants were overbroad, i.e., that they authorized a search that was “ ‘broader than the supporting affidavit supplies probable cause to justify.’ ” Mansor II, 363 Or at 212 ; see State v. Cannon, 299 Or App 616, 626 , 450 P3d 567 (2019) (“[T]he gravamen of an overbreadth challenge is an asserted lack of probable cause * * *.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). | 4 | 2025–2025 |
Broadrick v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2015Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 612 , 93 S Ct 2908 , 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973). 2015Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 612 , 93 S Ct 2908 , 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973). | 3 | 2013–2015 |
Bigelow v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2015Bigelow, 421 US at 817-18 . 2015Bigelow, 421 US at 817-18 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc.
green
2 sentences2015In Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484 US 383 , 108 S Ct 636 , 98 L Ed 2d 782 (1988), for instance, the plaintiff challenged as unconstitutionally overbroad a state law prohibiting the display of visual or written materials to juveniles depicting, among other things, sexual conduct. 2015In Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484 US 383 , 108 S Ct 636 , 98 L Ed 2d 782 (1988), for instance, the plaintiff challenged as unconstitutionally overbroad a state law prohibiting the display of visual or written materials to juveniles depicting, among other things, sexual conduct. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Christian
green
2 sentences2015State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013). 6 In light of that case law, we reject plaintiffs contention that the fact that he asserts an overbreadth claim excuses him from establishing the justiciability of that claim. 3. 2015State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013). 6 In light of that case law, we reject plaintiffs contention that the fact that he asserts an overbreadth claim excuses him from establishing the justiciability of that claim. 3. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Marker
green
2 sentences2018In Marker , we considered an overbreadth challenge to ORS 166.025(1)(b) and, relying on a decision by a California court, held that the statute could constitutionally prohibit noise that involves expression "only if there is a clear and present danger of violence or if the communication is not constitutionally protected speech but merely a guise to disturb persons." Id. at 679 , 536 P.2d 1273 . 2018In Marker , we considered an overbreadth challenge to ORS 166.025(1)(b) and, relying on a decision by a California court, held that the statute could constitutionally prohibit noise that involves expression "only if there is a clear and present danger of violence or if the communication is not constitutionally protected speech but merely a guise to disturb persons." Id. at 679 , 536 P.2d 1273 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Blocker
green
2 sentences2013In Blocker, 291 Or 255 , for the first time, we addressed an overbreadth challenge in an Article I, section 27, case where a statute criminalized the mere possession of certain weapons, including the possession of a billy club, without regard to the application of the statute to the facts of that particular case. 2013State v Ausmus, 336 Or 493 , 85 P3d 864 (2004).” 338 Or at 628 . 10 The Court of Appeals stated: “It is also worth noting that this ‘overbreadth’ rule derives from United States Supreme Court cases under the First Amendment, State v. Blocker, 291 Or 255, 261 , 630 P2d 824 (1981), and is, in federal law, limited to such cases, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 611 , 93 S Ct 2908 , 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Hirsch/Friend
green
1 sentence2013State v Ausmus, 336 Or 493 , 85 P3d 864 (2004).” 338 Or at 628 . 10 The Court of Appeals stated: “It is also worth noting that this ‘overbreadth’ rule derives from United States Supreme Court cases under the First Amendment, State v. Blocker, 291 Or 255, 261 , 630 P2d 824 (1981), and is, in federal law, limited to such cases, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 611 , 93 S Ct 2908 , 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Ausmus
green
2 sentences2013State v Ausmus, 336 Or 493 , 85 P3d 864 (2004).” 338 Or at 628 . 10 The Court of Appeals stated: “It is also worth noting that this ‘overbreadth’ rule derives from United States Supreme Court cases under the First Amendment, State v. Blocker, 291 Or 255, 261 , 630 P2d 824 (1981), and is, in federal law, limited to such cases, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 611 , 93 S Ct 2908 , 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973). 2013State v Ausmus, 336 Or 493 , 85 P3d 864 (2004).” 338 Or at 628 . 10 The Court of Appeals stated: “It is also worth noting that this ‘overbreadth’ rule derives from United States Supreme Court cases under the First Amendment, State v. Blocker, 291 Or 255, 261 , 630 P2d 824 (1981), and is, in federal law, limited to such cases, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 611 , 93 S Ct 2908 , 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Boyce
green
2 sentences2012In State v. Boyce, 61 Or.App. 662 , 658 P.2d 577 , rev. den., 295 Or. 122 , 666 P.2d 1344 (1983), this court rejected an overbreadth challenge to former PCC 14.32.010, reasoning that the city's restriction against carrying loaded firearms within its boundaries did not violate Article I, section 27. 2012In State v. Boyce, 61 Or.App. 662 , 658 P.2d 577 , rev. den., 295 Or. 122 , 666 P.2d 1344 (1983), this court rejected an overbreadth challenge to former PCC 14.32.010, reasoning that the city's restriction against carrying loaded firearms within its boundaries did not violate Article I, section 27. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Delgado
green
2 sentences2005Finally, in State v. Delgado, 298 Or 395 , 692 P2d 610 (1984), this court again addressed a constitutional challenge to former ORS 166.510(1) (1983), repealed by Or Laws 1985, chapter 709, section 4. 18 That case concerned an overbreadth challenge involving the possession of a switch-blade knife— which the defendant purportedly had carried “for protection” — discovered during a patdown search. 298 Or at 397-98 . 2005Finally, in State v. Delgado, 298 Or 395 , 692 P2d 610 (1984), this court again addressed a constitutional challenge to former ORS 166.510(1) (1983), repealed by Or Laws 1985, chapter 709, section 4. 18 That case concerned an overbreadth challenge involving the possession of a switch-blade knife— which the defendant purportedly had carried “for protection” — discovered during a patdown search. 298 Or at 397-98 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Henry
green
2 sentences2000Robertson, 293 Or. at 433 , 649 P.2d 569 . [4] The court did caution, somewhat cryptically, that statutes enacted contemporaneously with the state constitution are "not necessarily [to] be given much weight," because constitutional drafters "are concerned with broad principles of long-range significance." Henry, 302 Or. at 521-22 , 732 P.2d 9 . 2000Robertson, 293 Or. at 433 , 649 P.2d 569 . [4] The court did caution, somewhat cryptically, that statutes enacted contemporaneously with the state constitution are "not necessarily [to] be given much weight," because constitutional drafters "are concerned with broad principles of long-range significance." Henry, 302 Or. at 521-22 , 732 P.2d 9 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Woodcock
green
2 sentences2000Because ORS 167.065(1)(b) applies to the giving, renting, loaning or otherwise providing materials containing `obscenities,' regardless of the significance of the words in the context of the work taken as a whole, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad under the Oregon Constitution." Woodcock, 75 Or.App. at 662-63 , 706 P.2d 1012 . [15] The reasoning of Frink and Woodcock controls the overbreadth analysis in this case as well. 2000Because ORS 167.065(1)(b) applies to the giving, renting, loaning or otherwise providing materials containing `obscenities,' regardless of the significance of the words in the context of the work taken as a whole, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad under the Oregon Constitution." Woodcock, 75 Or.App. at 662-63 , 706 P.2d 1012 . [15] The reasoning of Frink and Woodcock controls the overbreadth analysis in this case as well. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
City of Eugene v. Miller
green
2 sentences1997City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or 480, 488 , 871 P2d 454 (1994); State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992). 1997City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or 480, 488 , 871 P2d 454 (1994); State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Plowman
green
2 sentences1997City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or 480, 488 , 871 P2d 454 (1994); State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992). 1997City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or 480, 488 , 871 P2d 454 (1994); State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164 , 838 P2d 558 (1992). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985ORCP 7.36(1). 5 More recently, in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 US 489, 498 , 102 S Ct 1186 , 71 L Ed 2d 362 (1982), the Supreme Court stated: «* ‡ * rpijg degree 0f vagueness that the Constitution tolerates — as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement — depend in part on the nature of the enactment. 1985ORCP 7.36(1). 5 More recently, in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 US 489, 498 , 102 S Ct 1186 , 71 L Ed 2d 362 (1982), the Supreme Court stated: «* ‡ * rpijg degree 0f vagueness that the Constitution tolerates — as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement — depend in part on the nature of the enactment. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In re SHERIN green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Carricarte v. State
green
1 sentence1982Statutes which punish only the spoken word will withstand an overbreadth challenge only if they may be narrowly construed to delete application to protected speech." (Citations omitted). 384 So.2d at 1262 . [18] Even under an extortion statute, long before a claim of "overbreadth" was known, the South Dakota Supreme Court found a violation when a lawyer wrote an errant husband that he would have him arrested if he did not release some property to his wife, rejecting the lawyer's contention that he was performing a professional duty to his client rather than benefitting himself in part on the g | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.