insurance clause in Kansas

2022Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 58 Kan.

2016And when discussing Manzanares in another context, the court noted that the insurance requirement constituted an adequate remedy “even though the injured party *559 was required to purchase the insurance himself or herself.” Aves v. Shah, 258 Kan. 506, 522-23 , 906 P.2d 642 (1995).

2016And when discussing Manzanares in another context, the court noted that the insurance requirement constituted an adequate remedy “even though the injured party *559 was required to purchase the insurance himself or herself.” Aves v. Shah, 258 Kan. 506, 522-23 , 906 P.2d 642 (1995).

2013Coates, 515 F.Supp. at 648 .

2008Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17 , 804 P.2d 1374 (1991) (the exclusionary clause of an insurance policy applied when the insured’s son intentionally opened fire on school grounds, even though he did not understand his actions were wrongful); Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461 , 674 P.2d 468 (1983) (an insurance policy barred coverage when a playmate fired a BB gun at a friend and ended up shooting him in the eye); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Thomas, 7 Kan.

2008Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17 , 804 P.2d 1374 (1991) (the exclusionary clause of an insurance policy applied when the insured’s son intentionally opened fire on school grounds, even though he did not understand his actions were wrongful); Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461 , 674 P.2d 468 (1983) (an insurance policy barred coverage when a playmate fired a BB gun at a friend and ended up shooting him in the eye); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Thomas, 7 Kan.

2008Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17 , 804 P.2d 1374 (1991) (the exclusionary clause of an insurance policy applied when the insured’s son intentionally opened fire on school grounds, even though he did not understand his actions were wrongful); Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461 , 674 P.2d 468 (1983) (an insurance policy barred coverage when a playmate fired a BB gun at a friend and ended up shooting him in the eye); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Thomas, 7 Kan.

2008Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17 , 804 P.2d 1374 (1991) (the exclusionary clause of an insurance policy applied when the insured’s son intentionally opened fire on school grounds, even though he did not understand his actions were wrongful); Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461 , 674 P.2d 468 (1983) (an insurance policy barred coverage when a playmate fired a BB gun at a friend and ended up shooting him in the eye); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Thomas, 7 Kan.

2008Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17 , 804 P.2d 1374 (1991) (the exclusionary clause of an insurance policy applied when the insured’s son intentionally opened fire on school grounds, even though he did not understand his actions were wrongful); Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461 , 674 P.2d 468 (1983) (an insurance policy barred coverage when a playmate fired a BB gun at a friend and ended up shooting him in the eye); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Thomas, 7 Kan.

1989Noting the “extensive power exercised by government to regulate animals,” the court concluded that the insurance requirement was consti *648 tutionally permissible. 534 So. 2d at 765 .

1989Since the government possesses such broad powers to regulate animals for the public welfare, and “it is likely that a governmental authority could ban pitbulls outright without offending the due process rights of the dog owner, a fortiori, less stringent regulations such as [the insurance requirement] would not so offend.” 534 So. 2d at 765 .

1982The 1969 agreement between the Park Authority and Aquamarine and the subsequent assignments followed Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841 , 457 P.2d 21 (1969), which abolished governmental immunity for proprietary activities.

1982The 1969 agreement between the Park Authority and Aquamarine and the subsequent assignments followed Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841 , 457 P.2d 21 (1969), which abolished governmental immunity for proprietary activities.

1979Several jurisdictions are listed in 46 C.J.S., Insurance § 1209, p. 153, which adhere to the rule that: “Insurer’s rights to subrogation accrue on payment of the insurance claim; but until payment of the claim on the policy no rights to subrogation accrue.” While the insurer would lose its right of subrogation due to the statute of limitations being longer in plaintiff’s action against its insurer under its uninsured motorist clause, that policy decision was made some years ago when it was ruled that plaintiff had five years to sue its carrier on the contract of insurance (Van Hoozer v. Farmer

1979Several jurisdictions are listed in 46 C.J.S., Insurance § 1209, p. 153, which adhere to the rule that: “Insurer’s rights to subrogation accrue on payment of the insurance claim; but until payment of the claim on the policy no rights to subrogation accrue.” While the insurer would lose its right of subrogation due to the statute of limitations being longer in plaintiff’s action against its insurer under its uninsured motorist clause, that policy decision was made some years ago when it was ruled that plaintiff had five years to sue its carrier on the contract of insurance (Van Hoozer v. Farmer

1979Winner v. Ratzlaff, 211 Kan. 59 , 505 P.2d 606 (1973).

1979Winner v. Ratzlaff, 211 Kan. 59 , 505 P.2d 606 (1973).

1977The policy provision quoted in Rosson is identical to the provision contained in the present Hartford policy and reads: “ ‘To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from die owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury . . (p. 796.) Another case bearing upon the question was Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 212 Kan. 640 , 512 P. 2d 507 , reh. den. 213 Kan. 84 , 515 P. 2d 1115 , in which this court held the other insurance clause, the consent to sue clause and other clauses in the policy which a

1977The policy provision quoted in Rosson is identical to the provision contained in the present Hartford policy and reads: “ ‘To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from die owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury . . (p. 796.) Another case bearing upon the question was Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 212 Kan. 640 , 512 P. 2d 507 , reh. den. 213 Kan. 84 , 515 P. 2d 1115 , in which this court held the other insurance clause, the consent to sue clause and other clauses in the policy which a

1977The policy provision quoted in Rosson is identical to the provision contained in the present Hartford policy and reads: “ ‘To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from die owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury . . (p. 796.) Another case bearing upon the question was Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 212 Kan. 640 , 512 P. 2d 507 , reh. den. 213 Kan. 84 , 515 P. 2d 1115 , in which this court held the other insurance clause, the consent to sue clause and other clauses in the policy which a

1977The policy provision quoted in Rosson is identical to the provision contained in the present Hartford policy and reads: “ ‘To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from die owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury . . (p. 796.) Another case bearing upon the question was Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 212 Kan. 640 , 512 P. 2d 507 , reh. den. 213 Kan. 84 , 515 P. 2d 1115 , in which this court held the other insurance clause, the consent to sue clause and other clauses in the policy which a

1974Similarly, In re Bodkin, 21 Ill. 2d 458 , 173 N. E. 2d 440 (1961), dealt with the situation of a suspended attorney who completed negotiations to settle an insurance claim after his period of suspension had begun.

1974Similarly, In re Bodkin, 21 Ill. 2d 458 , 173 N. E. 2d 440 (1961), dealt with the situation of a suspended attorney who completed negotiations to settle an insurance claim after his period of suspension had begun.

1971Co., 205 Kan. 561, 565 , 470 P. 2d 756 .) We thus again recognized that an insurance company is not required to pay a claim while a bona fide question of liability exists.

1971Co., 205 Kan. 561, 565 , 470 P. 2d 756 .) We thus again recognized that an insurance company is not required to pay a claim while a bona fide question of liability exists.

1939S. 1935, 67-305, and Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Humphrey, 148 Kan. 779 , 85 P. 2d 7 .) Appellants urge appellee abandoned her right to consider the building as personalty when she later took a real-estate mortgage covering the entire debt and purchased insurance, under the insurance clause of the real-estate mortgage, when the Ihingers failed to provide the insurance.

1939S. 1935, 67-305, and Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Humphrey, 148 Kan. 779 , 85 P. 2d 7 .) Appellants urge appellee abandoned her right to consider the building as personalty when she later took a real-estate mortgage covering the entire debt and purchased insurance, under the insurance clause of the real-estate mortgage, when the Ihingers failed to provide the insurance.

1902The defendant in error cites the case of The Queen Insurance Co., of Liverpool, England, v. The Hudnut Company, 8 Ind. App. 22 , 35 N. E. 397 .

1902The defendant in error cites the case of The Queen Insurance Co., of Liverpool, England, v. The Hudnut Company, 8 Ind. App. 22 , 35 N. E. 397 .