insurance claim in Connecticut

2003In Lees , the Court reasoned that the "alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any evidence of misconduct . . ., in the processing of any other claim, does not rise to the level of a `general business practice' as required by 38a-816 (6)." Id. 849 .

2002"In requiring proof that the insurer has engaged in unfair settlement practices with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, the legislature has manifested a clear intent to exempt from coverage under CUIPA isolated instances of insurer misconduct. . . . [T]he . . . alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any [allegations] of misconduct by the defendant in the CT Page 8736 processing of any other claim, does not give rise to the level of a general business practice as required by § 38a-816 (6) ." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; intern

2019Id.

2013In Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 84 Conn. App. 688 , 864 A.2d 1100 , cert. denied, 272 Conn. 906 , 863 A.2d 698 (2004) (Mariculture I), this court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding that the statute under which the plaintiff brought its claim for interest, Me.

2013In Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 84 Conn. App. 688 , 864 A.2d 1100 , cert. denied, 272 Conn. 906 , 863 A.2d 698 (2004) (Mariculture I), this court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding that the statute under which the plaintiff brought its claim for interest, Me.

2013In Mariculture Products Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 84 Conn. App. 688 , 864 A.2d 1100 , cert. denied, 272 Conn. 906 , 863 A.2d 698 (2004) (Mariculture I), this court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding that the statute under which the plaintiff brought its claim for interest, Me.

2007Co. v. Brewer, 315 Mont. 231, 244 , 69 P.3d 652 (2003) (“an insured is entitled to recover attorney fees, pursuant to the insurance exception to the American [r]ule, when the insurer forces the insured to assume the burden of legal action to obtain the full benefit of the insurance contract” in both duty to defend and duty to indemnify cases); Hegler v. Gulf Ins.

2007Co. v. Brewer, 315 Mont. 231, 244 , 69 P.3d 652 (2003) (“an insured is entitled to recover attorney fees, pursuant to the insurance exception to the American [r]ule, when the insurer forces the insured to assume the burden of legal action to obtain the full benefit of the insurance contract” in both duty to defend and duty to indemnify cases); Hegler v. Gulf Ins.

2007Co., 270 S.C. 548, 551 , 243 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (successful insured may recover fees from declaratory judgment action even if insurer has defended underlying action pursuant to reservation of rights); Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Ins.

2007Co., 270 S.C. 548, 551 , 243 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (successful insured may recover fees from declaratory judgment action even if insurer has defended underlying action pursuant to reservation of rights); Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Ins.

2004On June 4,2002, the court denied all three motions in a memorandum of decision. 9 Although the parties stipulated that Maine law would apply to issues involving the interpretation of the subject insurance contract, “we follow the law of Connecticut on procedural issues such as the appropriate standard of appellate review.” Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791 , 807 n.13, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). 10 Because we conclude that the applicability of § 2425 of the Maine Revised Statutes is dispositive of the defendants’ first claim, we need not address the defendants’ remaining t

2004On June 4,2002, the court denied all three motions in a memorandum of decision. 9 Although the parties stipulated that Maine law would apply to issues involving the interpretation of the subject insurance contract, “we follow the law of Connecticut on procedural issues such as the appropriate standard of appellate review.” Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791 , 807 n.13, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). 10 Because we conclude that the applicability of § 2425 of the Maine Revised Statutes is dispositive of the defendants’ first claim, we need not address the defendants’ remaining t

2002In that light, we have recognized that the delivery of a note or an uncertified check suspends an obligation to pay “until dishonor of the note [or uncertified check] or until [either] is paid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, 231 Conn. 441, 447 , 650 A.2d 551 (1994); see also General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 42a-3-802 (“where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation . . . the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument is due or if it is payable upon demand until its presentment”).

2002In that light, we have recognized that the delivery of a note or an uncertified check suspends an obligation to pay “until dishonor of the note [or uncertified check] or until [either] is paid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, 231 Conn. 441, 447 , 650 A.2d 551 (1994); see also General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 42a-3-802 (“where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation . . . the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument is due or if it is payable upon demand until its presentment”).

2002"Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39 ; Gulack v. Gulack , 30 Conn. App. 305 , 309 , 620 A.2d 181 (1993).

2002"Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39 ; Gulack v. Gulack , 30 Conn. App. 305 , 309 , 620 A.2d 181 (1993).

2001Further explanation follows: A. Evidence Concerning When Notice Was Due For substantially the reasons stated by the plaintiff in its memoranda, the court agrees that the first prong of the test set out in Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. , 243 Conn. 401 , 425 , 703 A.2d 1132 (1997), for determining whether notice of an insurance claim was late has been resolved and that the second prong has not been resolved.

2001Further explanation follows: A. Evidence Concerning When Notice Was Due For substantially the reasons stated by the plaintiff in its memoranda, the court agrees that the first prong of the test set out in Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. , 243 Conn. 401 , 425 , 703 A.2d 1132 (1997), for determining whether notice of an insurance claim was late has been resolved and that the second prong has not been resolved.

2000Because the stipulated facts do not purport to address whether Platcow was, in fact, misled in any way, 20 the plaintiffs’ claim devolves into the proposition that, as a matter of law, any lease that is a form contract is unconscionable and unenforceable if its terms fail to provide guidance to a lessee about insurance options that are not precluded by the lease. 21 Although the ultimate determination of whether a contract is unconscionable is a question of law; Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80, 87 , 612 A.2d 1130 (1992); courts do not decide such issues of law in a fact

2000Because the stipulated facts do not purport to address whether Platcow was, in fact, misled in any way, 20 the plaintiffs’ claim devolves into the proposition that, as a matter of law, any lease that is a form contract is unconscionable and unenforceable if its terms fail to provide guidance to a lessee about insurance options that are not precluded by the lease. 21 Although the ultimate determination of whether a contract is unconscionable is a question of law; Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80, 87 , 612 A.2d 1130 (1992); courts do not decide such issues of law in a fact

1998Co. , 28 Conn. App. 145 , 155 , 612 A.2d 64 (1992) (under § 38-175a-4 now ( 38a-334-4 ) excess insurance policies are excluded from mandatory uninsured motorist coverage requirements as they "[contain] an underlying insurance requirement").

1998Co. , 28 Conn. App. 145 , 155 , 612 A.2d 64 (1992) (under § 38-175a-4 now ( 38a-334-4 ) excess insurance policies are excluded from mandatory uninsured motorist coverage requirements as they "[contain] an underlying insurance requirement").

1997The defendants rely on the case of Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's suit alleging a state law tort of bad-faith handling of an insurance claim by an employer was preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.

1997The defendants rely on the case of Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's suit alleging a state law tort of bad-faith handling of an insurance claim by an employer was preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.

1996In Schmidt v. Yardney Electric Corporation, 4 Conn. App. 69 , 492 A.2d 512 (1985), the plaintiff alleged that his employer's president had ordered him to falsify an insurance claim, that he CT Page 5204-I did so, but then cooperated with company auditors by admitting the fraud when they questioned him about the insurance claim, and that he was terminated for such cooperation.

1996In Schmidt v. Yardney Electric Corporation, 4 Conn. App. 69 , 492 A.2d 512 (1985), the plaintiff alleged that his employer's president had ordered him to falsify an insurance claim, that he CT Page 5204-I did so, but then cooperated with company auditors by admitting the fraud when they questioned him about the insurance claim, and that he was terminated for such cooperation.

1996Co., 14 Conn. L.

1996First Count (CUTPA) The Calandros' allegations against Biller Associates in the third count of their amended complaint are essentially the same CT Page 6767 as Allstate's allegations in its CUTPA claim against Biller Associates, and both involve the manner in which Biller Associates handled the Calandros' insurance claim. "[T]he same issues of fact and law are presented by the complaint and the cross claim and . . . separate trials on each of the respective claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort by the parties and the courts." Jackson v. Conland , 171 Conn. 161 , 166-67 , 368

1996First Count (CUTPA) The Calandros' allegations against Biller Associates in the third count of their amended complaint are essentially the same CT Page 6767 as Allstate's allegations in its CUTPA claim against Biller Associates, and both involve the manner in which Biller Associates handled the Calandros' insurance claim. "[T]he same issues of fact and law are presented by the complaint and the cross claim and . . . separate trials on each of the respective claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort by the parties and the courts." Jackson v. Conland , 171 Conn. 161 , 166-67 , 368

1995In Warner v. Konover, 210 Conn. 150 , 553 A.2d 1138 (1989), the Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue.

1995In Warner v. Konover, 210 Conn. 150 , 553 A.2d 1138 (1989), the Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue.

1995The court, then, in affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the landlord, found that "even though the harm to the appellants was perhaps foreseeable, there are a vast number of policy considerations and legal impediments to imposing a duty on the (landlord) to enforce the insurance clause in the subject lease agreement." Id., 1589 .

1995A party to an agreement is not required in an absolute sense to comply with the agreement." Id., 1587 .

1994We conclude that the defendant’s alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any evidence of misconduct by the defendant in the processing of any other claim, does not rise to the level of a “general business practice” as required by § 38a-816 (6). 9 Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, t

1994We conclude that the defendant’s alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any evidence of misconduct by the defendant in the processing of any other claim, does not rise to the level of a “general business practice” as required by § 38a-816 (6). 9 Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, t

1994The United States Supreme Court addressed the requisite intent of an insured in making a false material statement in connection with an insurance claim in Claflin v. Commonwealth Insurance Company, 110 U.S. 81 (1884), where it held that a false statement wilfully made by an insured with knowledge of its falsity was sufficient to void the policy: if the matter were material and the statement false, to the knowledge of the party making it, and wilfully made, the intention to deceive the insurer would be necessarily implied, for the law presumes every man to intend the natural consequences of his

1994We conclude that the defendant’s alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any evidence of misconduct by the defendant in the processing of any other claim, does not rise to the level of a “general business practice” as required by § 38a-816 (6). 9 Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, t

1994We conclude that the defendant’s alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any evidence of misconduct by the defendant in the processing of any other claim, does not rise to the level of a “general business practice” as required by § 38a-816 (6). 9 Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, t

1993This includes all sums paid under Part A; (liability coverage) . . ." Defendant claims that the validity of the above insurance clause was recently upheld in American Motorists Insurance Company v. Gould, 213 Conn. 625 (1990).

1992App. 269 , 447 A.2d 896 , 902 (1982), where the court stated: It seems clear to us that the overwhelming weight of authority is that where purported conflicts between a policy providing essentially primary coverage is made excess by the involvement of a non-owned vehicle and a policy providing umbrella or catastrophe policy are in conflict, the courts have held that the umbrella policy need contribute only after the primary and ordinary excess coverages as `other collectible insurance' in the meaning of the other insurance clause of the umbrella policy are exhausted.