19 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1939–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Brockton Public Markets, Inc.green1 sentence2017Mkts., Inc., 369 Mass. 387, 390 (1975) (process defined as “the papers issued by a court to bring a party or property within its jurisdiction”), and the defendants do not suggest any connection between the insurance claims and the defendants’ use of process. | 1 | 1 |
McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp.green1 sentence2006While such an assertion may imply that there are facts which justify the claim, or at least an absence of facts that are incompatible, see McEneaney v Chestnut Hill Realty Corp., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 575 (1995), claims are submitted for the purpose of ensuring that they are reviewed rather than rejected for failure to provide notice. | 1 | 1 |
Julie Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Julie Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2006See Holmgren, 976 F.2d at 577 (“In a bad faith insurance claim settlement case, the ‘strategy, mental impressions and opinion of [the insurer’s] agents concerning the handling of the claim are directly at issue’ ” and the plaintiffs need for the documents “was compelling”), quoting Reavis v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Lease-It, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authoritygreen1 sentence2003“When a party to an agreement commits an immaterial breach of that agreement, the injured party is entitled to bring an immediate action for damages; it may not stop performing its obligations under the agreement.” Lease-It, Inc., id., at 396, citing Farnsworth, Contracts §8:16, at 442 (1990). 6 Turning first to the alleged violation of the insurance clause, there is no question but that the defendant failed to maintain the plaintiffs as insureds under the insurance policy for a closed period of time from January 1996, until May 1997. | 1 | 1 |
Gulezian v. Lincoln Insurancegreen1 sentence2000Co., 399 Mass. 606, 613 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Gourdeau Construction Co.green1 sentence1999See Gourdeau, supra at 663 . | 1 | 1 |
Vaiarella v. Hanover Insurancegreen2 sentences1995Co., 409 Mass. 523, 526 (1991), only where the underlying facts and circumstances of the insurance claim are uncontro-verted or have been judicially determined. 1995Id. at 524 . | 1 | 1 |
Jacobs v. Town Clerk of Arlingtongreen1 sentence1994See generally, Jacobs v. Town Clerk of Arlington, 402 Mass. 824, 829 (1988); Van Dyke v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Imperiali v. Picagreen1 sentence1994See Imperiali v. Pica, 338 Mass. 494, 498 (1959). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Coopergreen1 sentence1980See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 374 (1928). | 1 | 1 |
Avery v. Wardgreen2 sentences1966As has been indicated above, Avery v. Ward, 150 Mass. 160, 163 (fn. 10), asserted that the insurance claim oath there considered was not in a “proceeding in a course of justice,” thus in effect recognizing that this term dealt only with adjudicatory proceedings comparable to those discussed in Jones v. Daniels, 15 Gray, 438 . 1966As has been indicated above, Avery v. Ward, 150 Mass. 160, 163 (fn. 10), asserted that the insurance claim oath there considered was not in a "proceeding in a course of justice," thus in effect recognizing that this term dealt only with adjudicatory proceedings comparable to those discussed in Jones v. Daniels, 15 Gray, 438 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Allyn v. Allynneutral1 sentence1991But see Allyn v. Allyn, 154 Mass. 570, 572-573 (1891), as to contracts which, like this one, expressly contemplate the possibility of destruction by fire or other casualty. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rivera-Catellano v. Kinkela
neutral
1 sentence2010Rivera-Catellano v. Kinkela, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 144, 145 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
2 sentences2007This case is markedly different from Lueck, 471 U.S. at 216 , where resolution of the employee’s State law claim depended on the meaning of a CBA because the duties imposed and rights established under State law derived from the rights and obligations established by the CBA. 6 In Lueck , the CBA provided the basis not only for the benefits claimed by the employee, but also for the right to payments in a timely manner, the alleged violation of which formed the basis of the State tort of bad faith handling of an insurance claim. 2007Id. at 214-218 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Kahn v. Royal Insurance
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Catholic Relief Insurance Co. of America v. Liquor Liability Joint Underwriting Ass'n
neutral
1 sentence2002Co. v. Liquor Liability Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 8 Mass. L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Commonwealth v. Ciampa
green
1 sentence1999Prior to admitting the agreement, or allowing the Commonwealth to examine Louis regarding its contents, the judge expressly cautioned the Commonwealth about impermissible vouching, at the same time noting that defense counsel during cross-examination had placed in question whether the agreement obligated Louis to testify truthfully. 4 Furthermore, although the Commonwealth sought to read the redacted version of the agreement during his redirect, see id., the judge precluded the Commonwealth from doing so. 5 The judge did not err in her handling of Louis’s plea agreement and testimony. (b) The | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commonwealth v. Anolik
green
1 sentence1998Anolik, supra 27 Mass. at 709-10 (real estate agreements governing transfer of property from third party to lawyer’s client, and an insurance claim form filed with insurance company, were “not privileged communications because they were not intended to stop with the lawyer as a confidence, but were meant to be passed along to third persons”). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences1984The Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983), indicates forcefully that that Court would not grant wide scope to the insurance exception expressed in ERISA § 514 (b) (2) (A). 1984The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983), indicates forcefully that that Court would not grant wide scope to the insurance exception expressed in ERISA § 514 (b) (2) (A). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Berry v. Donovan
green
1 sentence1939Intentional interference with the plaintiff’s contract of employment without lawful justification by those having knowledge of such a contract, “is malicious in law, even if it is from good motives and without express malice.” Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 356 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.