insurance claim in California

2019But "[r]espondents cannot gain the protection of the privilege to protect their own communications merely by establishing that they anticipated a potential for litigation," as " 'the privilege only arises at the point in time when litigation is no longer a mere possibility, but has instead ripened into a proposed proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration as a means of obtaining access to the courts for the purpose of resolving the dispute.' " ( Eisenberg, supra , 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , quoting Edwards, supra , 53 Cal.App.4t

2019But "[r]espondents cannot gain the protection of the privilege to protect their own communications merely by establishing that they anticipated a potential for litigation," as " 'the privilege only arises at the point in time when litigation is no longer a mere possibility, but has instead ripened into a proposed proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration as a means of obtaining access to the courts for the purpose of resolving the dispute.' " ( Eisenberg, supra , 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , quoting Edwards, supra , 53 Cal.App.4t

2021(See Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 685–691.) Yet the Foley court, when cabining the expansion of the insurance exception, quoted critics of the “special relationship” rubric.

2021(See Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 685–691.) Yet the Foley court, when cabining the expansion of the insurance exception, quoted critics of the “special relationship” rubric.

2021(See Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 830 & 836 [no third party right to enforce contract if unnecessary to effectuate the contract’s objectives].) As mentioned, FAIR Plan agrees it is on the hook to Wexler’s parents for covered damage to Wexler’s property.

2021(See Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 830 & 836 [no third party right to enforce contract if unnecessary to effectuate the contract’s objectives].) As mentioned, FAIR Plan agrees it is on the hook to Wexler’s parents for covered damage to Wexler’s property.

2023(Ibid.) However, the court held that “‘[r]espondents cannot gain the protection of the [litigation] privilege to protect their own communications merely by establishing that they anticipated a potential for litigation,’” as “‘“the privilege only arises at the point in time when litigation is no longer a mere possibility, but has instead ripened into a proposed proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration as a means of obtaining access to the courts for the purpose of resolving the dispute.”’” (Ibid., quoting Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999)

2021A “ ‘statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.’ ” (Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95 , 113–114.) Pappas’s communications related to the substantive issue in the litigation—the insurance claim—and were directed to a person with an interest in the litigation—Opperwall.

2022In the anti-SLAPP context, “‘[a]ny act’ includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 .) This includes conduct ranging from filing an insurance claim as a prerequisite to litigation (People ex rel.

2022In the anti-SLAPP context, “‘[a]ny act’ includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 .) This includes conduct ranging from filing an insurance claim as a prerequisite to litigation (People ex rel.

2021The juvenile court cited People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226 for the proposition that the victim is entitled to restitution regardless of whether the loss had been partially or fully reimbursed by his or her insurance company.

2020Chun’s argument is based on People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226 (Birkett).

2021There, the parties settled the underlying homeowners’ insurance claim so that the homeowners incurred no out-of- pocket repair expenses. ( Waters, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1067-1069.) And the court concluded that because they did not offer proof that they had incurred any fees due to the insurer’s delays, the homeowners suffered no financial loss.

2021There, the parties settled the underlying homeowners’ insurance claim so that the homeowners incurred no out-of- pocket repair expenses. ( Waters, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1067-1069.) And the court concluded that because they did not offer proof that they had incurred any fees due to the insurer’s delays, the homeowners suffered no financial loss.

2019But "[r]espondents cannot gain the protection of the privilege to protect their own communications merely by establishing that they anticipated a potential for litigation," as " 'the privilege only arises at the point in time when litigation is no longer a mere possibility, but has instead ripened into a proposed proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration as a means of obtaining access to the courts for the purpose of resolving the dispute.' " ( Eisenberg, supra , 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , quoting Edwards, supra , 53 Cal.App.4t

2019But "[r]espondents cannot gain the protection of the privilege to protect their own communications merely by establishing that they anticipated a potential for litigation," as " 'the privilege only arises at the point in time when litigation is no longer a mere possibility, but has instead ripened into a proposed proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration as a means of obtaining access to the courts for the purpose of resolving the dispute.' " ( Eisenberg, supra , 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , quoting Edwards, supra , 53 Cal.App.4t

2018Co. (11th Cir. 1985) 760 F.2d 1520 , 1527, which involved an insurance claim for a fire at the insured's restaurant.

2018Co. (11th Cir. 1985) 760 F.2d 1520 , 1527, which involved an insurance claim for a 26 The Interrogation by the Court Was Error The insurers assert that in addition to allowing use of the responses to RFAs, the trial court committed a series of prejudicial errors in how it handled Finberg, beginning with the argument that the court “improperly assumed the role of advocate and impugned Finberg’s integrity before the jury.” Describing the court’s conduct with verbs and adjectives not generally seen in appellate briefs—at least not in briefs from respected counsel, which all three of the insurers’

2017Co. , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 201 , 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 281 P.3d 1000 .) We see no reason to treat the other insurance clause in this case differently just because it was repeated and incorporated into the definition of Ultimate Net Loss.

2017Co. , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 201 , 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 281 P.3d 1000 .) We see no reason to treat the other insurance clause in this case differently just because it was repeated and incorporated into the definition of Ultimate Net Loss.

2016Three insurers accepted the tender and ultimately settled the suit, but the fourth insurer (Century) refused to provide a defense on the ground its policy contained an other insurance clause that “ ‘If other valid and collectible insurance is available to any insured for a loss we cover under Coverage A or B of this Coverage Part, then this insurance is excess of such insurance and we will have no duty to defend any claim or “suit” that any other insurer has a duty to defend.’ ” (Century, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1252 .) The other carriers’ policies stated that, if other primary insurance

2016(Id. at pp. 1256-1260.) “[E]xcess insurance is insurance that is expressly understood by both the insurer and insured to be secondary to specific underlying coverage which will not begin until after that underlying coverage is exhausted and which does not broaden that underlying coverage. [Citation.] That is not the kind of „excess‟ insurance involved in this case. [¶] The „excess‟ insurance problem before us arises when one insurer attempts, through the use of a so-called other insurance clause, to reduce a primary coverage obligation into a more limited excess liability. „Insurance policies

2016Courts have found for the pro rata solution when confronted by a variety of conflicts between differing types of “other insurance” provisions. . . . [¶] A predicate for prorating policies with conflicting “other insurance” provisions is that the policies operate on the same level of coverage, that is to say, two or more policies apply to the same damage or loss suffered by the same party. [Citations.] Put another way, “an ‘other insurance’ dispute can only arise between carriers on the same level, it cannot arise between excess and primary insurers.” [Citation.]’ ” ( Century, supra, 109 Cal.Ap

2016Courts have found for the pro rata solution when confronted by a variety of conflicts between differing types of “other insurance” provisions. . . . [¶] A predicate for prorating policies with conflicting “other insurance” provisions is that the policies operate on the same level of coverage, that is to say, two or more policies apply to the same damage or loss suffered by the same party. [Citations.] Put another way, “an ‘other insurance’ dispute can only arise between carriers on the same level, it cannot arise between excess and primary insurers.” [Citation.]’ ” ( Century, supra, 109 Cal.Ap

2016In Hamilton, supra, 270 F.3d 778 , Hamilton filed an insurance claim for damage and loss he attributed to tenants he had just evicted from a house he owned.

2016In Hamilton, supra, 270 F.3d 778 , Hamilton filed an insurance claim for damage and loss he attributed to tenants he had just evicted from a house he owned.

2015(Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 .) Instead, he argues that the Board records submitted in support of the restitution award did not meet the evidentiary requirements of section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(B), because the insurance claim forms did not specify the nature of services provided.

2015(Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 .) Instead, he argues that the Board records submitted in support of the restitution award did not meet the evidentiary requirements of section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(B), because the insurance claim forms did not specify the nature of services provided.

2014Regional relied on Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 ] (Armstrong), where the court found property damage within an insurance clause based on the incorporation of asbestos tiles and insulation into a building because the potentially hazardous material was physically linked to the building.

2014Regional relied on Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 690 ] (Armstrong), where the court found property damage within an insurance clause based on the incorporation of asbestos tiles and insulation into a building because the potentially hazardous material was physically linked to the building.

2006Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 433 [bad faith denial of an insurance claim]; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 892 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 [same]), or the defendant took action to protect or minimize the injury to the plaintiff. ( American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 [breach of fiduciary duty where defendant attorney attempted to protect the plaintiff's interests after agreeing to appear as a deposition witness for another client over the o

2006Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 433 [bad faith denial of an insurance claim]; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 892 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 [same]), or the defendant took action to protect or minimize the injury to the plaintiff. ( American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 [breach of fiduciary duty where defendant attorney attempted to protect the plaintiff's interests after agreeing to appear as a deposition witness for another client over the o

2006Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 433 [bad faith denial of an insurance claim]; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 892 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 [same]), or the defendant took action to protect or minimize the injury to the plaintiff. ( American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 [breach of fiduciary duty where defendant attorney attempted to protect the plaintiff's interests after agreeing to appear as a deposition witness for another client over the o

2006(American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 ] [breach of fiduciary duty where defendant attorney attempted to protect the plaintiff’s interests after agreeing to appear as a deposition witness for another client over the objections of plaintiff, a prior and current client]; Mayfield v. Johnson (Miss. 1967) 202 So.2d 630 [automobile collision].) Plaintiff has not cited any cases involving a collision where the court found the defendant’s conduct was despicable, and we have found no California cases on point.