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28 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilbert v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2017The Georgia Constitution also provides that the legislature may waive elements of the state’s sovereign immunity by way of the GTCA and provides procedures for claims against “the state and its departments, agencies, officers, and employees.” Id. (a) & (e). 3 “The 1991 amendment [to the Constitution] was passed to extend sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance, and to substitute the insurance waiver provision in previous constitutions with a tort claims waiver.” Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 588 ( 470 SE2d 426 ) (1996) (footnote omitted). 4 “ 2017The Georgia Constitution also provides that the legislature may waive elements of the state’s sovereign immunity by way of the GTCA and provides procedures for claims against “the state and its departments, agencies, officers, and employees.” Id. (a) & (e). 3 “The 1991 amendment [to the Constitution] was passed to extend sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance, and to substitute the insurance waiver provision in previous constitutions with a tort claims waiver.” Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 588 ( 470 SE2d 426 ) (1996) (footnote omitted). 4 “ | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Georgia Ports Authoritygreen2 sentences2017“The 1991 amendment [to the Constitution] was passed to extend sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance, and to substitute the insurance waiver provision in previous constitutions with a tort claims waiver.” Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 588 ( 470 SE2d 426 ) (1996) (footnote omitted). 2017“The 1991 amendment [to the Constitution] was passed to extend sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance, and to substitute the insurance waiver provision in previous constitutions with a tort claims waiver.” Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 588 ( 470 SE2d 426 ) (1996) (footnote omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Todd v. Kellygreen2 sentences2017The Georgia Constitution also provides that the legislature may waive elements of the state’s sovereign immunity by way of the GTCA and provides procedures for claims against “the state and its departments, agencies, officers, and employees.” Id. (a) & (e). 3 “The 1991 amendment [to the Constitution] was passed to extend sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance, and to substitute the insurance waiver provision in previous constitutions with a tort claims waiver.” Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 588 ( 470 SE2d 426 ) (1996) (footnote omitted). 4 “ 2017The Georgia Constitution also provides that the legislature may waive elements of the state’s sovereign immunity by way of the GTCA and provides procedures for claims against “the state and its departments, agencies, officers, and employees.” Id. (a) & (e). 3 “The 1991 amendment [to the Constitution] was passed to extend sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance, and to substitute the insurance waiver provision in previous constitutions with a tort claims waiver.” Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 588 ( 470 SE2d 426 ) (1996) (footnote omitted). 4 “ | 2 | 2 |
Curtis v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgiagreen2 sentences1995See Curtis v. Bd. of Regents, 262 Ga. 226, 228 ( 416 SE2d 510 ) (1992) (intent of 1991 amendment is to “redraw and redefine the terms of the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity”); Donaldson v. Dept, of Transp., 262 Ga. 49, 50 ( 414 SE2d 638 ) (1992) (discussing background of 1991 amendment). 1995See Curtis v. Bd. of Regents, 262 Ga. 226, 228 ( 416 SE2d 510 ) (1992) (intent of 1991 amendment is to “redraw and redefine the terms of the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity”); Donaldson v. Dept, of Transp., 262 Ga. 49, 50 ( 414 SE2d 638 ) (1992) (discussing background of 1991 amendment). | 1 | 2 |
Lynn v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Lynn, 310 Ga. at 617 (4)(c)(ii)(B). (d) Failure to object to evidence about a civil theft case and insurance claim Morey argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object when the state elicited evidence that Cordele Metal Works had also brought a civil action and an insurance claim in connection with the alleged theft. | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green2 sentences2021Co., 208 Ga. App. 166, 169 (1) ( 430 SE2d 75 ) (1993) (an insurer is entitled to summary judgment on a claim under OCGA § 33-4-6 if a factual dispute exists on the underlying merits of the insurance claim). 2021Co., 208 Ga. App. 166, 169 (1) ( 430 SE2d 75 ) (1993) (an insurer is entitled to summary judgment on a claim under OCGA § 33-4-6 if a factual dispute exists on the underlying merits of the insurance claim). | 1 | 1 |
Ronald Lee v. Mercury Insurance Company of Georgiagreen1 sentence2021Under this rule, we will affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurer on the issue of bad faith unless there is evidence that the insurer “had no reasonable grounds to contest [the insured’s] claim [under the policy.]” Lee, 343 Ga. App. at 749 (4) (emphasis in original). 9 The advice of an independent consultant may provide an insurer with a reasonable ground to contest an insured’s claim under the policy, entitling the insurer to summary judgment on a claim for bad faith penalties. | 1 | 1 |
Desire v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Desire v. State, 295 Ga. 254, 256 (2) ( 759 SE2d 498 ) (2014) (“Although motive is not an essential element in proving the crimes charged, the State is entitled to present evidence to establish that there was a motive”) (citations omitted). 2021See Desire v. State, 295 Ga. 254, 256 (2) ( 759 SE2d 498 ) (2014) (“Although motive is not an essential element in proving the crimes charged, the State is entitled to present evidence to establish that there was a motive”) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Kirby v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Furthermore, the conversation with Bridges occurred just 18 months prior to Williams’s death, meaning it was not “so remote as to be lacking in evidentiary value.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kirby, supra, 304 Ga. at 484 (4) (a) (i). 2019Furthermore, the conversation with Bridges occurred just 18 months prior to Williams’s death, meaning it was not “so remote as to be lacking in evidentiary value.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kirby, supra, 304 Ga. at 484 (4) (a) (i). | 1 | 1 |
Gurly v. Hinsongreen2 sentences2017See generally Gurly v. Hinson, 194 Ga. App. 673 (1) ( 391 SE2d 483 ) (1990) (any error in trial court prohibiting plaintiff from asking defendant about an insurance claim form was harmless where question was relevant to liability and verdict was rendered for the plaintiff). 9. 2017See generally Gurly v. Hinson, 194 Ga. App. 673 (1) ( 391 SE2d 483 ) (1990) (any error in trial court prohibiting plaintiff from asking defendant about an insurance claim form was harmless where question was relevant to liability and verdict was rendered for the plaintiff). 9. | 1 | 1 |
Tate v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green2 sentences2017Co., 149 Ga. App. 123, 124-125 ( 253 SE2d 775 ) (1979) (Georgia does not recognize a claim for negligent handling of an insurance claim.). 3. 2017Co., 149 Ga. App. 123, 124-125 ( 253 SE2d 775 ) (1979) (Georgia does not recognize a claim for negligent handling of an insurance claim.). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Getz Exterminators of Georgia, Inc. v. Towegreen2 sentences2016We held that because the plaintiff “failed to make the requisite threshold showing of relevance, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to introduce inherently prejudicial collateral source evidence.” Id. 28 the verdict.”38 In Collins, the trial court permitted admission, over repeated strenuous objections and motion for mistrial, that the plaintiff had failed to file a claim with his no-fault insurer.39 The defendant argued that this was relevant to the plaintiff’s claim for lost wages.40 But we explained that the “[f]ailure to file an insurance claim is not an admission that the p 2016We held that because the plaintiff “failed to make the requisite threshold showing of relevance, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to introduce inherently prejudicial collateral source evidence.” Id. 28 the verdict.”38 In Collins, the trial court permitted admission, over repeated strenuous objections and motion for mistrial, that the plaintiff had failed to file a claim with his no-fault insurer.39 The defendant argued that this was relevant to the plaintiff’s claim for lost wages.40 But we explained that the “[f]ailure to file an insurance claim is not an admission that the p | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Davisgreen1 sentence2016We held that because the plaintiff “failed to make the requisite threshold showing of relevance, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to introduce inherently prejudicial collateral source evidence.” Id. 28 the verdict.”38 In Collins, the trial court permitted admission, over repeated strenuous objections and motion for mistrial, that the plaintiff had failed to file a claim with his no-fault insurer.39 The defendant argued that this was relevant to the plaintiff’s claim for lost wages.40 But we explained that the “[f]ailure to file an insurance claim is not an admission that the p | 1 | 1 |
Assurance Co. v. BBB Service Co.green2 sentences2015Co. v. Smith, 266 Ga. App. 411, 413 (2) ( 597 SE2d 500 ) (2004) (holding that the insurer’s grounds for refusing coverage were reasonable when there was a genuine conflict over whether the insurance claim was legitimate); Assurance Co. of Am., 259 Ga. App. at 58 (2) (holding that bad-faith penalties were unauthorized when the insurance company had reasonable grounds to contest the insured’s claims). 2015Co. v. Smith, 266 Ga. App. 411, 413 (2) ( 597 SE2d 500 ) (2004) (holding that the insurer’s grounds for refusing coverage were reasonable when there was a genuine conflict over whether the insurance claim was legitimate); Assurance Co. of Am., 259 Ga. App. at 58 (2) (holding that bad-faith penalties were unauthorized when the insurance company had reasonable grounds to contest the insured’s claims). | 1 | 1 |
Allstate Insurance v. Smithgreen2 sentences2015Co. v. Smith, 266 Ga. App. 411, 413 (2) ( 597 SE2d 500 ) (2004) (holding that the insurer’s grounds for refusing coverage were reasonable when there was a genuine conflict over whether the insurance claim was legitimate); Assurance Co. of Am., 259 Ga. App. at 58 (2) (holding that bad-faith penalties were unauthorized when the insurance company had reasonable grounds to contest the insured’s claims). 2015Co. v. Smith, 266 Ga. App. 411, 413 (2) ( 597 SE2d 500 ) (2004) (holding that the insurer’s grounds for refusing coverage were reasonable when there was a genuine conflict over whether the insurance claim was legitimate); Assurance Co. of Am., 259 Ga. App. at 58 (2) (holding that bad-faith penalties were unauthorized when the insurance company had reasonable grounds to contest the insured’s claims). | 1 | 1 |
MCG Health, Inc. v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2010Barnes, P. J., and Blackwell, J., concur. 1 MCG Health, Inc. v. Nelson, 270 Ga. App. 409 ( 606 SE2d 576 ) (2004) (“MCG Health I”). 2 On appeal, plaintiffs initially challenged the trial court’s decision to grant the Board of Regents’s renewed and amended motion to dismiss (which was based on plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the state’s statutory ante litem notice requirements), but abandoned this challenge in their reply brief. 2010Barnes, P. J., and Blackwell, J., concur. 1 MCG Health, Inc. v. Nelson, 270 Ga. App. 409 ( 606 SE2d 576 ) (2004) (“MCG Health I”). 2 On appeal, plaintiffs initially challenged the trial court’s decision to grant the Board of Regents’s renewed and amended motion to dismiss (which was based on plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the state’s statutory ante litem notice requirements), but abandoned this challenge in their reply brief. | 1 | 1 |
Peloso v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.green1 sentence2010See 267 A2d at 501 . | 1 | 1 |
| Reddick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Treadwell v. Treadwellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sunbelt Life Insurance v. Bank of Alapahagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lewis v. ALFRED L. SIMPSON & COMPANY, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| DeRosa v. Shiahgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Donaldson v. Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whipper v. McLENDON MOVERS, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dover v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tuxedo Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Lie-Nielsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Charter Medical-Fayette County, Inc. v. Health Planning Agency, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Bryantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lewyn v. Morrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weems v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walter v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences2019Co. , 294 Ga. 477 , 754 S.E.2d 358 (2014). 9 In Walter v. Mitchell , 294 Ga. App. 689 , 690-691 (2), 669 S.E.2d 706 (2008), we considered an insurance claim representative's letter memorializing the terms of the agreement and found that it supported the trial court's conclusion that the parties had reached a binding settlement. 10 To the extent that Nugent contends the failure to execute the release evinces a lack of assent between Warren and the adjuster, "an agreement to settle may be enforced in the absence of a formal release where there is evidence that the terms of the agreement were suf 2019Co. , 294 Ga. 477 , 754 S.E.2d 358 (2014). 9 In Walter v. Mitchell , 294 Ga. App. 689 , 690-691 (2), 669 S.E.2d 706 (2008), we considered an insurance claim representative's letter memorializing the terms of the agreement and found that it supported the trial court's conclusion that the parties had reached a binding settlement. 10 To the extent that Nugent contends the failure to execute the release evinces a lack of assent between Warren and the adjuster, "an agreement to settle may be enforced in the absence of a formal release where there is evidence that the terms of the agreement were suf | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hospital Authority of Clarke County v. Geico General Insurance Co.
neutral
2 sentences2019Co. , 294 Ga. 477 , 754 S.E.2d 358 (2014). 9 In Walter v. Mitchell , 294 Ga. App. 689 , 690-691 (2), 669 S.E.2d 706 (2008), we considered an insurance claim representative's letter memorializing the terms of the agreement and found that it supported the trial court's conclusion that the parties had reached a binding settlement. 10 To the extent that Nugent contends the failure to execute the release evinces a lack of assent between Warren and the adjuster, "an agreement to settle may be enforced in the absence of a formal release where there is evidence that the terms of the agreement were suf 2019Co. , 294 Ga. 477 , 754 S.E.2d 358 (2014). 9 In Walter v. Mitchell , 294 Ga. App. 689 , 690-691 (2), 669 S.E.2d 706 (2008), we considered an insurance claim representative's letter memorializing the terms of the agreement and found that it supported the trial court's conclusion that the parties had reached a binding settlement. 10 To the extent that Nugent contends the failure to execute the release evinces a lack of assent between Warren and the adjuster, "an agreement to settle may be enforced in the absence of a formal release where there is evidence that the terms of the agreement were suf | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Trust Co. v. Refrigeration Supplies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Trust Co. of Columbus v. Refrigeration Supplies, Inc. , 241 Ga. 406 , 409, 246 S.E.2d 282 (1978). 2018Trust Co. of Columbus v. Refrigeration Supplies, Inc. , 241 Ga. 406 , 409, 246 S.E.2d 282 (1978). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
City of Thomasville v. Shank
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 625 (1), 437 S.E.2d 306 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hibbs v. City of Riverdale
green
1 sentence2018(Citation and footnote omitted.) Hibbs, 267 Ga. at 338 . 2 its stead a Tort Claims Act waiver,2] as that amendment deals with the concept of waiver, and in the case of nuisance we are dealing not with a waiver of but an exception to sovereign immunity. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Home Builders Ass'n of Savannah, Inc. v. Chatham County
green
1 sentence2017The Georgia Constitution also provides that the legislature may waive elements of the state’s sovereign immunity by way of the GTCA and provides procedures for claims against “the state and its departments, agencies, officers, and employees.” Id. (a) & (e). 3 “The 1991 amendment [to the Constitution] was passed to extend sovereign immunity to all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance, and to substitute the insurance waiver provision in previous constitutions with a tort claims waiver.” Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 588 ( 470 SE2d 426 ) (1996) (footnote omitted). 4 “ | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Clemmons v. Smith
green
1 sentence2016We held that because the plaintiff “failed to make the requisite threshold showing of relevance, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to introduce inherently prejudicial collateral source evidence.” Id. 28 the verdict.”38 In Collins, the trial court permitted admission, over repeated strenuous objections and motion for mistrial, that the plaintiff had failed to file a claim with his no-fault insurer.39 The defendant argued that this was relevant to the plaintiff’s claim for lost wages.40 But we explained that the “[f]ailure to file an insurance claim is not an admission that the p | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Nelson v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
green
1 sentence2011(Footnotes omitted.) Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Associates, Inc., Architects, Planners, Engineers
green
1 sentence2008There is no allegation that such an insurance clause exists in this case. [3] The clause in Valhal read fully as follows: The OWNER agrees to limit the Design Professional's liability to the OWNER and to all construction Contractors and Subcontractors on the project, due to the Design Professional's professional negligent acts, errors or omissions, such that the total aggregate liability of each Design Professional shall not exceed $50,000 or the Design Professional's total fee for services rendered on this project. [4] Like Valhal, supra, the clauses in 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc., | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Fort Knox Self Storage, Inc. v. Western Technologies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008There is no allegation that such an insurance clause exists in this case. [3] The clause in Valhal read fully as follows: The OWNER agrees to limit the Design Professional's liability to the OWNER and to all construction Contractors and Subcontractors on the project, due to the Design Professional's professional negligent acts, errors or omissions, such that the total aggregate liability of each Design Professional shall not exceed $50,000 or the Design Professional's total fee for services rendered on this project. [4] Like Valhal, supra, the clauses in 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc., 2008The limitation of liability clauses in 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc., supra, 217 Ariz. 465 , 176 P.3d 33 , and Fort Knox Self Storage v. Western Technologies, supra, 140 N.M. 233 , 142 P.3d 1 also do not allow for such reimbursement. [6] We reject the notion that the clause agreed upon by Lanier and PEC is a "limitation of liability clause," simply capping damages. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Fort Knox Self Storage v. Western
green
2 sentences2008There is no allegation that such an insurance clause exists in this case. [3] The clause in Valhal read fully as follows: The OWNER agrees to limit the Design Professional's liability to the OWNER and to all construction Contractors and Subcontractors on the project, due to the Design Professional's professional negligent acts, errors or omissions, such that the total aggregate liability of each Design Professional shall not exceed $50,000 or the Design Professional's total fee for services rendered on this project. [4] Like Valhal, supra, the clauses in 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc., 2008The limitation of liability clauses in 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc., supra, 217 Ariz. 465 , 176 P.3d 33 , and Fort Knox Self Storage v. Western Technologies, supra, 140 N.M. 233 , 142 P.3d 1 also do not allow for such reimbursement. [6] We reject the notion that the clause agreed upon by Lanier and PEC is a "limitation of liability clause," simply capping damages. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Glazer v. Crescent Wallcoverings, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008ESI, Inc. of Tennessee v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 254 Ga.App. 332 (1), 562 S.E.2d 198 (2002) (no violation of OCGA § 13-8-2(b) where insurance clause encompassed indemnity clause); Glazer v. Crescent Wallcoverings, Inc., 215 Ga.App. 492 (1), 451 S.E.2d 509 (1994) (where landlord and tenant contract showed intent to shift liability for fire to insurer, there was no violation of OCGA § 13-8-2(b)). 2008ESI, Inc. of Tennessee v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 254 Ga.App. 332 (1), 562 S.E.2d 198 (2002) (no violation of OCGA § 13-8-2(b) where insurance clause encompassed indemnity clause); Glazer v. Crescent Wallcoverings, Inc., 215 Ga.App. 492 (1), 451 S.E.2d 509 (1994) (where landlord and tenant contract showed intent to shift liability for fire to insurer, there was no violation of OCGA § 13-8-2(b)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
1800 OCOTILLO, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008There is no allegation that such an insurance clause exists in this case. [3] The clause in Valhal read fully as follows: The OWNER agrees to limit the Design Professional's liability to the OWNER and to all construction Contractors and Subcontractors on the project, due to the Design Professional's professional negligent acts, errors or omissions, such that the total aggregate liability of each Design Professional shall not exceed $50,000 or the Design Professional's total fee for services rendered on this project. [4] Like Valhal, supra, the clauses in 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc., 2008There is no allegation that such an insurance clause exists in this case. [3] The clause in Valhal read fully as follows: The OWNER agrees to limit the Design Professional's liability to the OWNER and to all construction Contractors and Subcontractors on the project, due to the Design Professional's professional negligent acts, errors or omissions, such that the total aggregate liability of each Design Professional shall not exceed $50,000 or the Design Professional's total fee for services rendered on this project. [4] Like Valhal, supra, the clauses in 1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc., | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| ESI, Inc. of Tennessee v. Westpoint Stevens green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Kendrick v. Kalmanson green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Rabenstein v. Cannizzo green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Mitchell v. W. S. Badcock Corp. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Habachy v. Georgia Health Group, P. C. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Hadson Gas Systems, Inc. v. Atlanta Airlines Terminal Corp. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Logue v. Wright green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Litterilla v. Hosp. Auth. of Fulton County green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Favors v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| McAbee Construction Co. v. Georgia Kraft Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Fritz v. Eller neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.