10 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kramergreen2 sentences2019See State v. Kramer , 318 Md. 576 , 593, 569 A.2d 674 (1990). 2019See State v. Kramer , 318 Md. 576 , 593, 569 A.2d 674 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movementgreen2 sentences2014See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130 . 2014Narrow Tailoring Under the second prong of the time, place, and manner test, an insurance requirement must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130 . “[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,’” and the government does “not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States | 1 | 1 |
Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Councilgreen2 sentences2014The Second Circuit in Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group took care to clarify that an insurance requirement might “be valid when reasonably applied.” 723 F.2d at 1057 ; see also Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457, 462-63 (S.D. 2014The Second Circuit in Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group took care to clarify that an insurance requirement might “be valid when reasonably applied.” 723 F.2d at 1057 ; see also Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457, 462-63 (S.D. | 1 | 1 |
Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beachgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of York, 481 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (striking down a requirement that special event applicants reimburse the costs of policing an event because the provision was the “flip side” of an insurance requirement, which would also be unconstitutionally content-based); Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902 , 908 (8th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an insurance requirement for solicitation on public property); Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 14 Cal. App. 4th 312, 340 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1050-51 (Berz 2014See Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 339 (explaining that a provision allowing the city manager to waive the insurance requirement if Gen. 50] 83 he perceives no significant liability exposure was “suspect” because there were no objective criteria cabining the discretionary judgment). | 1 | 1 |
Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beachgreen1 sentence2014Because the primary purposes of an insurance requirement are to protect the government from financial liability and to provide a pool from which injured participants and spectators can obtain compensation—neither of which has anything to do with content—numerous courts have concluded that such a requirement is content-neutral.22 See, e.g., Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522 F.3d 1010, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008); Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., writing for the majority); iMatter Utah, 2013 U.S. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Benson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Benson v. State, 389 Md. 615, 634 (2005) (explaining that “burthen” in Article 14 should be read synonymously with the current definition of burden). 2014The Court of Appeals has characterized Article 14 as “encompass[ing] a wide variety of payments to the government,” id. at 635 (emphasis added), and we are not aware of any instance where the rule has been applied to regulatory measures of this type. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 794639green2 sentences2014Because the primary purposes of an insurance requirement are to protect the government from financial liability and to provide a pool from which injured participants and spectators can obtain compensation—neither of which has anything to do with content—numerous courts have concluded that such a requirement is content-neutral.22 See, e.g., Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522 F.3d 1010, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008); Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1057 (Kleinfeld, J., writing for the majority); iMatter Utah, 2013 U.S. Dist. 2014See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of York, 481 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (striking down a requirement that special event applicants reimburse the costs of policing an event because the provision was the “flip side” of an insurance requirement, which would also be unconstitutionally content-based); Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902 , 908 (8th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an insurance requirement for solicitation on public property); Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 14 Cal. App. 4th 312, 340 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1050-51 (Berz | 1 | 1 |
The Nationalist Movement v. City of Yorkgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of York, 481 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (striking down a requirement that special event applicants reimburse the costs of policing an event because the provision was the “flip side” of an insurance requirement, which would also be unconstitutionally content-based); Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902 , 908 (8th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an insurance requirement for solicitation on public property); Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 14 Cal. App. 4th 312, 340 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1050-51 (Berz 2014See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of York, 481 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (striking down a requirement that special event applicants reimburse the costs of policing an event because the provision was the “flip side” of an insurance requirement, which would also be unconstitutionally content-based); Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902 , 908 (8th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an insurance requirement for solicitation on public property); Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 14 Cal. App. 4th 312, 340 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1050-51 (Berz | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Albertinigreen2 sentences2014Narrow Tailoring Under the second prong of the time, place, and manner test, an insurance requirement must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130 . “[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,’” and the government does “not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States 2014Although a regulation “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of serving the government’s significant interest, it must not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” Id. at 798-99 . 23 This change might also be helpful for another reason. | 1 | 1 |
Nationalist Movement v. City of Bostongreen1 sentence2014Although a plaintiff could theoretically raise an as-applied challenge where, for some reason, use of State roads would be “an essential part of the message sought to be conveyed” or “essential to communicating with the intended audience,” Van Arnam, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (quoting Nationalist Movement v. City of Boston, 12 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Van Arnam v. General Services Administrationgreen2 sentences2014LEXIS 158371 at *22-28; Van Arnam, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 396-400 . 2014See 332 F. Supp. 2d at 392-93 . | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Jordangreen2 sentences2005Comm’n v. Jordan, 386 Md. 583, 600 , 873 A.2d 1161, 1171 (2005). 2005Comm’n v. Jordan, 386 Md. 583, 600 , 873 A.2d 1161, 1171 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Whiting ex rel. Sun Mutual Insurance v. Independent Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2024The earliest case cited by the parties is Whiting v. Independent Mutual Insurance Co., 15 Md. 297 (1860). 2024The earliest case cited by the parties is Whiting v. Independent Mutual Insurance Co., 15 Md. 297 (1860). | 3 | 2024–2024 |
CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta
green
1 sentence2014Camp Legal Defense Fund, 451 F.3d at 1282-83 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Jenkins v. Riggs
green
1 sentence2014See, e.g., LG § 12-503(b); Jenkins, 100 Md. at 436 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
green
2 sentences2014Narrow Tailoring Under the second prong of the time, place, and manner test, an insurance requirement must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130 . “[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,’” and the government does “not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States 2014With this background in mind, a court could reasonably find that an insurance requirement “burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests” in protecting itself and its citizens, Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 , especially where the type of event at issue does not pose a Gen. 50] 79 significant risk of harm or the government can protect itself from liability in other ways, see iMatter Utah, 2013 U.S. Dist. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Arthur B. Powers
green
2 sentences2014The Second Circuit in Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group took care to clarify that an insurance requirement might “be valid when reasonably applied.” 723 F.2d at 1057 ; see also Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457, 462-63 (S.D. 2014The Second Circuit in Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group took care to clarify that an insurance requirement might “be valid when reasonably applied.” 723 F.2d at 1057 ; see also Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457, 462-63 (S.D. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Adam Steele v. City Of Bemidji
green
2 sentences2014See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of York, 481 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (striking down a requirement that special event applicants reimburse the costs of policing an event because the provision was the “flip side” of an insurance requirement, which would also be unconstitutionally content-based); Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902 , 908 (8th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an insurance requirement for solicitation on public property); Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 14 Cal. App. 4th 312, 340 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1050-51 (Berz 2014See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of York, 481 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (striking down a requirement that special event applicants reimburse the costs of policing an event because the provision was the “flip side” of an insurance requirement, which would also be unconstitutionally content-based); Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902 , 908 (8th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an insurance requirement for solicitation on public property); Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 14 Cal. App. 4th 312, 340 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1050-51 (Berz | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Coe v. Town of Blooming Grove
green
1 sentence2014In that context—where the insurance requirement effectively precludes the plaintiff from receiving a permit—courts have held that “[w]hatever marginal benefit the [government] might derive from choosing not to exempt indigent persons from its insurance requirement does not justify the very substantial burden” on the free speech rights of people with limited financial means.24 Coe, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 566 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Child Evangelism Fellowship of Maryland, Inc. v. Montgomery County Public Schools
green
2 sentences2014Although an insurance requirement in a non-public forum would still have to be viewpoint neutral and include adequate standards to cabin administrator discretion, it need only be “reasonable” rather than “narrowly tailored to a significant government interest.” Id. at 383 . 2014Therefore, if a court classified a major highway as a non-public forum, an insurance requirement applying only to major highways would be reviewed under a more deferential standard. 27 The Fourth Circuit in Child Evangelism recognized a fourth category, which it called a “limited public forum.” 457 F.3d at 382 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
2 sentences2011The Court observed that, in Wisconsin, the tort of bad faith handling of an insurance claim “intrinsically relate[d] to the nature and existence of the contract,” rendering the *647 “duties imposed and rights established through the state tort” wholly derivative from “the rights and obligations established by the contract.” Id. at 216-17 , 105 S.Ct. at 1914 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 218-19 . 2011The Court observed that, in Wisconsin, the tort of bad faith handling of an insurance claim “intrinsically relate[d] to the nature and existence of the contract,” rendering the *647 “duties imposed and rights established through the state tort” wholly derivative from “the rights and obligations established by the contract.” Id. at 216-17 , 105 S.Ct. at 1914 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 218-19 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1997One issue is whether the ‘unattended vehicle’ exclusion contained in the insurance policy is ambiguous, as maintained by Tivoli and Goldman, so as to preclude summary judgment.” Id. at 710 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mungin v. Calmar Steamship Corporation
green
1 sentence1991The United States District Court in Mungin v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 342 F.Supp. 484 (D.Md.1972), was faced with a case which involved an insurance claim that had resulted in litigation. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. White
green
2 sentences1989As support for this argument, he relies on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), and Sweeten v. National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C., 233 Md. 52 , 194 A.2d 817 (1963). 1989As support for this argument, he relies on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), and Sweeten v. National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C., 233 Md. 52 , 194 A.2d 817 (1963). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Sweeten v. National Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1989As support for this argument, he relies on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), and Sweeten v. National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C., 233 Md. 52 , 194 A.2d 817 (1963). 1989As support for this argument, he relies on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), and Sweeten v. National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C., 233 Md. 52 , 194 A.2d 817 (1963). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.