12 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Albright v. Olivergreen2 sentences2016See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“ '[W]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’ ” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994))); see also Camara v. Mun. 2016See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“ '[W]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’ ” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994))); see also Camara v. Mun. | 1 | 1 |
County of Sacramento v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2016See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“ '[W]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’ ” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994))); see also Camara v. Mun. 2016See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (“ '[W]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’ ” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 , 114 S.Ct. 807 , 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994))); see also Camara v. Mun. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2014We note that in State v. Lopez, the supreme court addressed the merits of a challenge to the registration requirement on a direct appeal from a conviction for failure to register. 778 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. WMR E-Pin, LLCgreen2 sentences2014Id. at 561-62 ; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. WMR e-PIN, LLC, 653 F.3d 702, 711-12 (8th Cir.2011). 2014Id. at 561-62 ; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. WMR e–PIN, LLC, 653 F.3d 702 , 711–12 (8th Cir. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
County of Hennepin v. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc., Local 19green2 sentences2014Cnty. of Hennepin v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., Local No. 19, 527 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Minn.1995). 2014Cnty. of Hennepin v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., Local No. 19, 527 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Minn. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Olanogreen2 sentences2002See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 , 113 S.Ct. at 1777 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 . 2002See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 , 113 S.Ct. at 1777 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Larsongreen1 sentence1998A prima facie case of juror misconduct is established by submitting "sufficient evidence which, standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 973 , 100 S.Ct. 467 , 62 L.Ed.2d 388 . 8 . | 1 | 1 |
Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co.green2 sentences1998This court, in Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., established a method for inquiry into allegations of juror misconduct. 258 Minn. 325, 328 , 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (1960). 1998This court, in Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., established a method for inquiry into allegations of juror misconduct. 258 Minn. 325, 328 , 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (1960). | 1 | 1 |
Roseville Education Ass'n v. Independent School District No. 623green1 sentence1995See id. (school district); Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237 , 239 n. 3 (Minn.1992) (“[ejertiorari lies to review the quasi-judicial decisions of a broad array of executive bodies.”) But see Stadum v. Norman County, 508 N.W.2d 217 (Minn.App.1993) (employee could bring purely contractual claim in district court where plaintiff was not challenging termination nor seeking reinstatement), review denied (Minn. Jan. 7, 1994). 1 In Dietz, the supreme court determined that certiorari was not only the sole method to challenge teacher termination, but was also the only avenue available for a termina | 1 | 1 |
McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green2 sentences1986See, e.g., McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 306 Minn. 93, 96-97 , 235 N.W.2d 371, 374 (1975) (communications between employer’s agents made in the course of investigating or punishing employee misconduct, when made upon a proper occasion and for a proper purpose, are privileged). 1986See, e.g., McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 306 Minn. 93, 96-97 , 235 N.W.2d 371, 374 (1975) (communications between employer’s agents made in the course of investigating or punishing employee misconduct, when made upon a proper occasion and for a proper purpose, are privileged). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Luther v. Commissioner of Revenue
green
1 sentence2018The correct method of analysis, as the court holds in Part I of the opinion, is to consider all of the "services, benefits, and protections afforded [the taxpayer] by Minnesota." Luther v. Comm'r of Revenue , 588 N.W.2d 502 , 509 (Minn. 1999). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Stufflebean
green
1 sentence2015While in Williams we stated that "Minnesota has not adopted the theory of implied bias,” 764 N.W.2d at 28 , in Stufflebean we characterized Rule 26.02 as providing a method to challenge a juror for implied bias, 329 N.W.2d at 318 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Williams v. State
green
1 sentence2015While in Williams we stated that "Minnesota has not adopted the theory of implied bias,” 764 N.W.2d at 28 , in Stufflebean we characterized Rule 26.02 as providing a method to challenge a juror for implied bias, 329 N.W.2d at 318 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Seagate Technology, LLC v. Western Digital Corp.
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 561-62 ; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. WMR e-PIN, LLC, 653 F.3d 702, 711-12 (8th Cir.2011). 2014Id. at 561-62 ; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. WMR e–PIN, LLC, 653 F.3d 702 , 711–12 (8th Cir. 2011). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States Department of Health, Education, & Welfare v. Romeo Community Schools
green
1 sentence1998A prima facie case of juror misconduct is established by submitting "sufficient evidence which, standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 973 , 100 S.Ct. 467 , 62 L.Ed.2d 388 . 8 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Larson v. Minnesota
green
1 sentence1998A prima facie case of juror misconduct is established by submitting "sufficient evidence which, standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 973 , 100 S.Ct. 467 , 62 L.Ed.2d 388 . 8 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Fare v. Scott K.
green
1 sentence1998A prima facie case of juror misconduct is established by submitting "sufficient evidence which, standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 973 , 100 S.Ct. 467 , 62 L.Ed.2d 388 . 8 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Stadum v. Norman County
green
1 sentence1995See id. (school district); Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237 , 239 n. 3 (Minn.1992) (“[ejertiorari lies to review the quasi-judicial decisions of a broad array of executive bodies.”) But see Stadum v. Norman County, 508 N.W.2d 217 (Minn.App.1993) (employee could bring purely contractual claim in district court where plaintiff was not challenging termination nor seeking reinstatement), review denied (Minn. Jan. 7, 1994). 1 In Dietz, the supreme court determined that certiorari was not only the sole method to challenge teacher termination, but was also the only avenue available for a termina | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dietz v. Dodge County
green
2 sentences1995See id. (school district); Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237 , 239 n. 3 (Minn.1992) (“[ejertiorari lies to review the quasi-judicial decisions of a broad array of executive bodies.”) But see Stadum v. Norman County, 508 N.W.2d 217 (Minn.App.1993) (employee could bring purely contractual claim in district court where plaintiff was not challenging termination nor seeking reinstatement), review denied (Minn. Jan. 7, 1994). 1 In Dietz, the supreme court determined that certiorari was not only the sole method to challenge teacher termination, but was also the only avenue available for a termina 1995See id. (school district); Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237 , 239 n. 3 (Minn.1992) (“[ejertiorari lies to review the quasi-judicial decisions of a broad array of executive bodies.”) But see Stadum v. Norman County, 508 N.W.2d 217 (Minn.App.1993) (employee could bring purely contractual claim in district court where plaintiff was not challenging termination nor seeking reinstatement), review denied (Minn. Jan. 7, 1994). 1 In Dietz, the supreme court determined that certiorari was not only the sole method to challenge teacher termination, but was also the only avenue available for a termina | 1 | 1995–1995 |
White Bear Lake Care Center, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare
green
1 sentence1987Id. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1986The majority finds that because article 2 indicates an intent for prospective application, article 1 must be construed as retroactive since no words denying this are stated in the Act. 3 This method of analysis ignores the mandate of Lovgren that a statute is to be construed as retroactive only, where there is a “clear and manifest legislative intent that [it] be applied retroactively.” Id., 380 N.W.2d at 796 . 1986The majority finds that because article 2 indicates an intent for prospective application, article 1 must be construed as retroactive since no words denying this are stated in the Act. [3] This method of analysis ignores the mandate of Lovgren that a statute is to be construed as retroactive only where there is a "clear and manifest legislative intent that [it] be applied retroactively." Id., 380 N.W.2d at 796 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
In Re Trusts Created by Agreement With Harrington
green
2 sentences1985In re Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 311 Minn. 403 , 250 N.W.2d 163 (1977), delineated the method of analysis to be applied when construing whether a trust instrument excludes adopted children. 1985In re Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 311 Minn. 403 , 250 N.W.2d 163 (1977), delineated the method of analysis to be applied when construing whether a trust instrument excludes adopted children. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.