method challenge in Connecticut

2002"The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 232-33 , 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

2002"The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 232-33 , 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

2002"The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 232-33 , 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

2000"The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 232-33 , 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

2002"The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 232-33 , 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

2000"The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 232-33 , 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

2007“Practice Book [§ 10-39] allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.” Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).

2007“Practice Book [§ 10-39] allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.” Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).

2002The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co ., 242 Conn. 375 , 378 , 698 A.2d 859 (1997).

2002The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co ., 242 Conn. 375 , 378 , 698 A.2d 859 (1997).

2023See State v. Riddick, 194 Conn. App. 243 , 244–45, 220 A.3d 908 (2019) (‘‘petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a motion directed at the sentencing court, is the proper method to challenge the [commissioner’s] application of presentence confinement credit’’); State v. Carmona, 104 Conn. App. 828, 833 , 936 A.2d 243 (2007) (habeas proceeding, not motion to correct illegal sentence, is proper method to raise claim concerning presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 919 , 946 A.2d 1249 (2008). 7 Generally, ‘‘[w]e defer to the broad authority that legislatures possess i

2023See State v. Riddick, 194 Conn. App. 243 , 244–45, 220 A.3d 908 (2019) (‘‘petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a motion directed at the sentencing court, is the proper method to challenge the [commissioner’s] application of presentence confinement credit’’); State v. Carmona, 104 Conn. App. 828, 833 , 936 A.2d 243 (2007) (habeas proceeding, not motion to correct illegal sentence, is proper method to raise claim concerning presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 919 , 946 A.2d 1249 (2008). 7 Generally, ‘‘[w]e defer to the broad authority that legislatures possess i

2023See State v. Riddick, 194 Conn. App. 243 , 244–45, 220 A.3d 908 (2019) (‘‘petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a motion directed at the sentencing court, is the proper method to challenge the [commissioner’s] application of presentence confinement credit’’); State v. Carmona, 104 Conn. App. 828, 833 , 936 A.2d 243 (2007) (habeas proceeding, not motion to correct illegal sentence, is proper method to raise claim concerning presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 919 , 946 A.2d 1249 (2008). 7 Generally, ‘‘[w]e defer to the broad authority that legislatures possess i

2023See State v. Riddick, 194 Conn. App. 243 , 244–45, 220 A.3d 908 (2019) (‘‘petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a motion directed at the sentencing court, is the proper method to challenge the [commissioner’s] application of presentence confinement credit’’); State v. Carmona, 104 Conn. App. 828, 833 , 936 A.2d 243 (2007) (habeas proceeding, not motion to correct illegal sentence, is proper method to raise claim concerning presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 919 , 946 A.2d 1249 (2008). 7 Generally, ‘‘[w]e defer to the broad authority that legislatures possess i

1996Krasnow v. Christensen , 40 Conn. Sup. 287 , 288 (1985).

1995Krasnow v. Christensen, 40 Conn. Sup. 287 , 288 (1985).

1996"Summary judgment as a method to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint is available where the standard applicable to all cases for summary judgment are met." Hoey v. Textron, Inc. , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 270203 (March 17, 1994, Rodriguez, J., 9 CSCR 423 ).

1995"Summary judgment as a method to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint is available where the standard CT Page 7575 applicable to all cases for summary judgment are met." Hoey v. Textron, Inc., supra, 9 CSCR 423 .

1992Furthermore, Connecticut courts "have not always been consistent in requiring a declaratory judgment action as the method by which to challenge the validity of zoning or planning regulations" (citation omitted) and the proper inquiry is whether or not "the rationales behind the requirement of a CT Page 6368 declaratory judgment action apply to the [plaintiff's] claims in this case." Id., 744 .

1992Furthermore, Connecticut courts "have not always been consistent in requiring a declaratory judgment action as the method by which to challenge the validity of zoning or planning regulations" Citation omitted) and the proper inquiry is whether or not "the rationals behind the requirements of a declaratory judgment action apply to the [plaintiff's] claims in this case." Id., 744 .

2002"The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 232-33 , 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

2000"The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 232-33 , 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

2001"Practice Book . . . § 10-39 , allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded." Pamela B. v. Ment , 244 Conn. 296 , 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). "[T]he court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc ., 224 Conn. 210 , 215 , 618 A.2d 25 (1992).

2001"Practice Book . . . § 10-39 , allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded." Pamela B. v. Ment , 244 Conn. 296 , 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). "[T]he court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc ., 224 Conn. 210 , 215 , 618 A.2d 25 (1992).

2001As noted in Carbone v. New Britain, 33 Conn. App. 754 (1994) [FN10]: [T]he language in Sullivan v. Norwalk, 28 Conn. App. 449 , 457 , 612 A.2d 114 (1992), stating that "it is settled that the substantial factor test is not the proper method of analysis for establishing causation under the statute [General Statutes 13a-149 ]," is not inconsistent with this opinion.

2001As noted in Carbone v. New Britain, 33 Conn. App. 754 (1994) [FN10]: [T]he language in Sullivan v. Norwalk, 28 Conn. App. 449 , 457 , 612 A.2d 114 (1992), stating that "it is settled that the substantial factor test is not the proper method of analysis for establishing causation under the statute [General Statutes 13a-149 ]," is not inconsistent with this opinion.

2000Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269 , 270 (1998); see also Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn. App. 305 , 309 (1993) (the proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial).

2000"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d 558 (1998). "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp. , 231 Conn. 381 , 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); see also Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989).

2000"A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded." (Citations omitted.) Parsons v. United Technologies Corp ., 243 Conn. 66 , 68 , 700 A.2d 655 (1997).

2000"A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded." (Citations omitted.) Parsons v. United Technologies Corp ., 243 Conn. 66 , 68 , 700 A.2d 655 (1997).

1992CT Page 7782 Because these constitutional provisions proceed under the same method of analysis, they will be analyzed together. "`The concept of equal protection under both the federal and state constitutions has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.'" Franklin v. Berger, 211 Conn. 591 , 594 , 560 A.2d 444 (1989), quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed. 313 (1

1992CT Page 7782 Because these constitutional provisions proceed under the same method of analysis, they will be analyzed together. "`The concept of equal protection under both the federal and state constitutions has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.'" Franklin v. Berger, 211 Conn. 591 , 594 , 560 A.2d 444 (1989), quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed. 313 (1

1997See, e.g., Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971) (a motion for summary judgment may be used to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings); Burke v. Avitabile, 32 Conn. App. 765 , 769 , CT Page 9642 630 A.2d 624 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 908 , 634 A.2d 297 (1993) (where court found that, while a motion to strike is the proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint, it is not the burden of the defendant to attempt to correct a deficient complaint by motion).

1997See, e.g., Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971) (a motion for summary judgment may be used to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings); Burke v. Avitabile, 32 Conn. App. 765 , 769 , 630 A.2d 624 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 908 , 634 A.2d 297 (1993) (where court found that, while a motion to strike is the proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint, it is not the burden of the defendant to attempt to correct a deficient complaint by motion).

1997See, e.g., Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971) (a motion for summary judgment may be used to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings); Burke v. Avitabile, 32 Conn. App. 765 , 769 , CT Page 9642 630 A.2d 624 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 908 , 634 A.2d 297 (1993) (where court found that, while a motion to strike is the proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint, it is not the burden of the defendant to attempt to correct a deficient complaint by motion).

1997See, e.g., Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971) (a motion for summary judgment may be used to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings); Burke v. Avitabile, 32 Conn. App. 765 , 769 , 630 A.2d 624 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 908 , 634 A.2d 297 (1993) (where court found that, while a motion to strike is the proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint, it is not the burden of the defendant to attempt to correct a deficient complaint by motion).

1997See, e.g., Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971) (a motion for summary judgment may be used to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings); Burke v. Avitabile, 32 Conn. App. 765 , 769 , 630 A.2d 624 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 908 , 634 A.2d 297 (1993) (where court found that, while a motion to strike is the proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint, it is not the burden of the defendant to attempt to correct a deficient complaint by motion).

1997See, e.g., Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971) (a motion for summary judgment may be used to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings); Burke v. Avitabile, 32 Conn. App. 765 , 769 , 630 A.2d 624 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 908 , 634 A.2d 297 (1993) (where court found that, while a motion to strike is the proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint, it is not the burden of the defendant to attempt to correct a deficient complaint by motion).

2023See State v. Riddick, 194 Conn. App. 243 , 244–45, 220 A.3d 908 (2019) (‘‘petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a motion directed at the sentencing court, is the proper method to challenge the [commissioner’s] application of presentence confinement credit’’); State v. Carmona, 104 Conn. App. 828, 833 , 936 A.2d 243 (2007) (habeas proceeding, not motion to correct illegal sentence, is proper method to raise claim concerning presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 919 , 946 A.2d 1249 (2008). 7 Generally, ‘‘[w]e defer to the broad authority that legislatures possess i

2023See State v. Riddick, 194 Conn. App. 243 , 244–45, 220 A.3d 908 (2019) (‘‘petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a motion directed at the sentencing court, is the proper method to challenge the [commissioner’s] application of presentence confinement credit’’); State v. Carmona, 104 Conn. App. 828, 833 , 936 A.2d 243 (2007) (habeas proceeding, not motion to correct illegal sentence, is proper method to raise claim concerning presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 919 , 946 A.2d 1249 (2008). 7 Generally, ‘‘[w]e defer to the broad authority that legislatures possess i

2019See General Statutes § 18-98d; State v. Montanez, 149 Conn. App. 32, 41 , 88 A.3d 575 (holding that court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion motion to revise judgment mittimus raising claim of misapplication of presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 955 , 97 A.3d 985 (2014); State v. Carmona, 104 Conn. App. 828, 833 , 936 A.2d 243 (2007) (habeas proceeding, rather than motion to cor- rect illegal sentence, proper method to assert claim concerning presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 919 , 946 A.2d 1249 (2008).

2019See General Statutes § 18-98d; State v. Montanez, 149 Conn. App. 32, 41 , 88 A.3d 575 (holding that court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion motion to revise judgment mittimus raising claim of misapplication of presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 955 , 97 A.3d 985 (2014); State v. Carmona, 104 Conn. App. 828, 833 , 936 A.2d 243 (2007) (habeas proceeding, rather than motion to cor- rect illegal sentence, proper method to assert claim concerning presentence confinement credit), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 919 , 946 A.2d 1249 (2008).

2015We do not reach the merits of this claim because it is moot. ‘‘General Statutes § 54-63g allows defendants to seek immediate review of an allegedly unauthorized condition of pretrial release.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Hopkins, 62 Conn. App. 665, 679 , 772 A.2d 657 (2001). ‘‘It is axiomatic that the exclusive method to challenge an order pertaining to bail is to file a petition for review with this court pursuant to . . . § 54-63g.’’ State v. Crosby, 125 Conn. App. 775, 781 , 9 A.3d 794 (2011).

2015We do not reach the merits of this claim because it is moot. ‘‘General Statutes § 54-63g allows defendants to seek immediate review of an allegedly unauthorized condition of pretrial release.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Hopkins, 62 Conn. App. 665, 679 , 772 A.2d 657 (2001). ‘‘It is axiomatic that the exclusive method to challenge an order pertaining to bail is to file a petition for review with this court pursuant to . . . § 54-63g.’’ State v. Crosby, 125 Conn. App. 775, 781 , 9 A.3d 794 (2011).

2015We do not reach the merits of this claim because it is moot. ‘‘General Statutes § 54-63g allows defendants to seek immediate review of an allegedly unauthorized condition of pretrial release.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Hopkins, 62 Conn. App. 665, 679 , 772 A.2d 657 (2001). ‘‘It is axiomatic that the exclusive method to challenge an order pertaining to bail is to file a petition for review with this court pursuant to . . . § 54-63g.’’ State v. Crosby, 125 Conn. App. 775, 781 , 9 A.3d 794 (2011).

2015We do not reach the merits of this claim because it is moot. ‘‘General Statutes § 54-63g allows defendants to seek immediate review of an allegedly unauthorized condition of pretrial release.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Hopkins, 62 Conn. App. 665, 679 , 772 A.2d 657 (2001). ‘‘It is axiomatic that the exclusive method to challenge an order pertaining to bail is to file a petition for review with this court pursuant to . . . § 54-63g.’’ State v. Crosby, 125 Conn. App. 775, 781 , 9 A.3d 794 (2011).