87 California opinions name it 3 courts 1928–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kline v. Turnergreen2 sentences2025Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1); Certain Underwriters, at p. 972.) “We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 .) In doing so, we must liberally construe the opposing party’s evidence, strictly construe the moving party’s evidence, and resolve all doubts and reasonable inferences in favor of 26 the opposing party. 2024Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 .) Under Aguilar, the movant initially carries the burden of making a prima facie showing in its favor. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “The prima facie showing by the moving party must be such that it would, if uncontradicted, entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] That is, ‘a moving defendant must present evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence [i.e | 4 | 15 |
Brantley v. Pisarogreen2 sentences2021(Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601 .) We consider all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers, except that as to which objections have been made and sustained. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) “We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court. 2021(Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601 .) “We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court. | 4 | 12 |
Johnson v. American Standard, Inc.green2 sentences2025(Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64 ; McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88 , 96–97; Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 ; Borman, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1055.) PII moved for summary adjudication on the ground that the insuring agreements did not cover attorney fees paid in connection with the Hardison settlement.13 In support, the insurer offered a declaration from the Hardison tenants’ attorney, stating he had received a total of $407,000 in fees from the settlement paid to the tenants. 2018Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards." ( Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369 , 1373, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 699 .) In performing our de novo review, "we must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party [citation], liberally construing her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants' own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff's favor." ( Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 768, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 23 P.3d 1143 ; accord, *821 Johnson v. Ame | 3 | 4 |
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences2025Proc., ]§ 437c, subd. (c); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 (Aguilar).) ‘We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court. 2024(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Argument presented for the first time in reply will generally “not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 .) We see no reason to depart from the general rule here. 6 25 Cal.4th 826 (Aguilar).) “We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court. | 3 | 3 |
City of Santee v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory 2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory | 3 | 3 |
Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400green2 sentences2025(Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64 ; McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88 , 96–97; Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 ; Borman, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1055.) PII moved for summary adjudication on the ground that the insuring agreements did not cover attorney fees paid in connection with the Hardison settlement.13 In support, the insurer offered a declaration from the Hardison tenants’ attorney, stating he had received a total of $407,000 in fees from the settlement paid to the tenants. 2018Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards." ( Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369 , 1373, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 699 .) In performing our de novo review, "we must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party [citation], liberally construing her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants' own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff's favor." ( Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 768, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 23 P.3d 1143 ; accord, *821 Johnson v. Ame | 2 | 4 |
Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesagreen2 sentences1994Usually, “a proceeding [for a writ of administrative mandate] under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is the exclusive remedy for judicial review of the quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of the local-level agency. [Citation.] Unless a party seeks a declaration a statute or ordinance controlling development is facially unconstitutional as applied to all property governed and not to a particular parcel of land, an action for declaratory relief may not be had. [Citations.] An action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review the validity of an administrative decision. [Citati 1994Usually, “a proceeding [for a writ of administrative mandate] under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is the exclusive remedy for judicial review of the quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of the local-level agency. [Citation.] Unless a party seeks a declaration a statute or ordinance controlling development is facially unconstitutional as applied to all property governed and not to a particular parcel of land, an action for declaratory relief may not be had. [Citations.] An action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review the validity of an administrative decision. [Citati | 2 | 3 |
We Do Graphics, Inc. v. Mercury Casualty Co.green2 sentences2024Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 .) Under Aguilar, the movant initially carries the burden of making a prima facie showing in its favor. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “The prima facie showing by the moving party must be such that it would, if uncontradicted, entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] That is, ‘a moving defendant must present evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence [i.e 2024Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 .) Under Aguilar, the movant initially carries the burden of making a prima facie showing in its favor. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “The prima facie showing by the moving party must be such that it would, if uncontradicted, entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] That is, ‘a moving defendant must present evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence [i.e | 2 | 2 |
Pipitone v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2024Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 .) Under Aguilar, the movant initially carries the burden of making a prima facie showing in its favor. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “The prima facie showing by the moving party must be such that it would, if uncontradicted, entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] That is, ‘a moving defendant must present evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence [i.e 2024Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 .) Under Aguilar, the movant initially carries the burden of making a prima facie showing in its favor. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “The prima facie showing by the moving party must be such that it would, if uncontradicted, entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] That is, ‘a moving defendant must present evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence [i.e | 2 | 2 |
Leyva v. Garciagreen2 sentences2024Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 .) Under Aguilar, the movant initially carries the burden of making a prima facie showing in its favor. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “The prima facie showing by the moving party must be such that it would, if uncontradicted, entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] That is, ‘a moving defendant must present evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence [i.e 2024Essentially, we assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards.” (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 .) Under Aguilar, the movant initially carries the burden of making a prima facie showing in its favor. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “The prima facie showing by the moving party must be such that it would, if uncontradicted, entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] That is, ‘a moving defendant must present evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence [i.e | 2 | 2 |
Reichert v. General Insurance of Americagreen2 sentences2023Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 838 [“[P]laintiff waived the disqualification by his failure to urge it in the manner and at the time required by the statute.”]; Develop-Amatic Engineering v. Republic Mortg. 2023Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 838 [“[P]laintiff waived the disqualification by his failure to urge it in the manner and at the time required by the statute.”]; Develop-Amatic Engineering v. Republic Mortg. | 2 | 2 |
John Breuner Co. v. Bryantgreen2 sentences2023(See § 904.1, subd. (a)(1) [appeal may not be taken from a “judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222”4]; John Breuner Co. v. Bryant (1951) 36 Cal.2d 877, 878 (John Breuner Co.) [“It is well settled that orders and judgments made in cases of contempt are not appealable, and this rule has been held applicable both where the trial court 4 Section 1222 provides: “The judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive.” (§ 1222.) 6 imposed punishment for contempt and where the alleged contemner was discharged.”]; Imuta v. Nak 2023Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 .) 10 Under section 904(a)(1), an appeal may not be taken from “a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222.” Section 1222 provides that “[t]he judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive.” Thus, under those statutory provisions, “[i]t is well settled that orders and judgments made in cases of contempt are not appealable.” (John Breuner Co. v. Bryant (1951) 36 Cal.2d 877, 878 (Breuner); McCord v. Smith (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 358 , 367.) “The proper meth | 2 | 2 |
Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage District v. Jarvisgreen2 sentences2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 | 2 | 2 |
Tad Imuta v. Takaaki Nakanogreen2 sentences2023(See § 904.1, subd. (a)(1) [appeal may not be taken from a “judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222”4]; John Breuner Co. v. Bryant (1951) 36 Cal.2d 877, 878 (John Breuner Co.) [“It is well settled that orders and judgments made in cases of contempt are not appealable, and this rule has been held applicable both where the trial court 4 Section 1222 provides: “The judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive.” (§ 1222.) 6 imposed punishment for contempt and where the alleged contemner was discharged.”]; Imuta v. Nak 2013(See People v. Gonzalez, supra, at p. 816 [contempt judgment reviewable by writ]; Koehler v. Superior Court, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 [prohibition lies to challenge contempt order except when petitioner is in custody, in which case habeas corpus is appropriate remedy]; Imuta v. Nakano (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1570, 1584, fn. 18 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 681 ] [writ of certiorari is remedy for invalid contempt judgment], ) Section 800, subdivision (a) provides that a minor in a. proceeding under section 601 may appeal from “any subsequent order” following a judgment as “an order after judgment.” Al | 2 | 2 |
Muller v. Mullergreen2 sentences2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 | 2 | 2 |
Zetterberg v. State Department of Public Healthgreen2 sentences2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory 2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory | 2 | 2 |
Rezai v. City of Tustingreen2 sentences2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory 2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory | 2 | 2 |
Walker v. Munrogreen2 sentences2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory 2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory | 2 | 2 |
| AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bankgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of Californiagreen | 2 | 2 |
| County of Imperial v. McDougalgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. M.R.green2 sentences2023(Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2022) § 16.130, p. 16-91; see In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 558 [“An order of contempt cannot stand if the underlying order is invalid”]; In re M.R. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 49, 65 [“The proper method to challenge a contempt order is to seek extraordinary writ relief”].) However, “[b]ecause the shield law provides only an immunity from contempt, there is nothing from which to seek [writ] relief until a newsperson has been adjudged in contempt.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 459 .) Therefore, “a newsperson’s petition for extraordinary rel 2023Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 .) 10 Under section 904(a)(1), an appeal may not be taken from “a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222.” Section 1222 provides that “[t]he judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive.” Thus, under those statutory provisions, “[i]t is well settled that orders and judgments made in cases of contempt are not appealable.” (John Breuner Co. v. Bryant (1951) 36 Cal.2d 877, 878 (Breuner); McCord v. Smith (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 358 , 367.) “The proper meth | 1 | 3 |
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventuragreen2 sentences2014(See State of California v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 248-249; Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 126-127 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 514 P.2d 111 ].) B. 1977The appropriate method by which to consider such a claim is by a proceeding in mandamus under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. . . .” (Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 10 Cal.3d 110, 128 .) Plaintiffs point out their case is different from Selby in that the plaintiff in that action sought judicial relief before complying with the city’s demand and hence mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 was an appropriate method to test the validity of the conditions the city was attempting to impose. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1955(People v. Garcia, 98 Cal.App. 702 [ 277 P. 747 ]; People v. Wilkerson, 99 Cal.App. 123 [ 278 P. 466 ]; People v. Spinato, 100 Cal.App. 600 [ 280 P. 691 ]; People v. Woods, 126 Cal.App. 158 [ 14 P.2d 313 ]; People v. Washington, 95 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 213 P.2d 70 ].) The right to trial by jury in a criminal case is a sacred one and accordingly the method of waiver provided in the Constitution must be strictly followed. 1955(People v. Garcia, 98 Cal.App. 702 [ 277 P. 747 ]; People v. Wilkerson, 99 Cal.App. 123 [ 278 P. 466 ]; People v. Spinato, 100 Cal.App. 600 [ 280 P. 691 ]; People v. Woods, 126 Cal.App. 158 [ 14 P.2d 313 ]; People v. Washington, 95 Cal.App.2d 454 [ 213 P.2d 70 ].) The right to trial by jury in a criminal case is a sacred one and accordingly the method of waiver provided in the Constitution must be strictly followed. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2023Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 .) 10 Under section 904(a)(1), an appeal may not be taken from “a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222.” Section 1222 provides that “[t]he judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive.” Thus, under those statutory provisions, “[i]t is well settled that orders and judgments made in cases of contempt are not appealable.” (John Breuner Co. v. Bryant (1951) 36 Cal.2d 877, 878 (Breuner); McCord v. Smith (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 358 , 367.) “The proper meth 2013Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a) [appeal may not be taken from a “judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222”]; People v. Gonzalez, *65 supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 816 .) The proper method to challenge a contempt order is to seek extraordinary writ relief, either through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, or prohibition. | 1 | 2 |
Tri-County Special Education Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumnegreen2 sentences2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory 2014Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ], quoting Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67, 72 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737 ] [“ ‘The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree.’ ”]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 100 ] [“A difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy [for declaratory | 1 | 2 |
| Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| Couch v. San Juan Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People Ex Rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Misenergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Silvers v. Board of Equalizationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clovis Unified School District v. Chianggreen | 1 | 1 |
| V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Erikson v. Nunninkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Harmelin v. Michigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ewing v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
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| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
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|---|---|---|
Mayo v. Beber
green
2 sentences2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 | 3 | 1965–2023 |
People v. Tully
green
2 sentences2024(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Argument presented for the first time in reply will generally “not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 .) We see no reason to depart from the general rule here. 9 25 Cal.4th 826 (Aguilar).) “We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court. 2024(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Argument presented for the first time in reply will generally “not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 .) We see no reason to depart from the general rule here. 6 25 Cal.4th 826 (Aguilar).) “We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Pratt
green
2 sentences2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Shakin v. Board of Medical Examiners
green
2 sentences2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 2023Caminetti, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 391 [“While the 1927 amendment does not specify in so many words a penalty for failure to urge disqualification at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity,’ the intention is clear that failure to comply with the provision constitutes a waiver.”]; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 799, 801 [“where an objection to the judge on the ground of his disqualification was not made at the earliest practicable opportunity, it was waived by the conduct of the parties”]; Mayo v. Beber (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ; People v. Pratt (1962) 20 | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Carmony
green
2 sentences2014(Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1005 [115 L.Ed.2d at pp. 871-872] (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution proscribes “cruel or unusual punishment.” Although this language is construed separately from the federal constitutional ban on “cruel and unusual punishment” (People v. Carmony (2005) 47 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1085 ), the method of analysis is similar: the reviewing court considers “the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society”; the comparison of “the challenged penalty with 2013He notes that he was 18 years and three months old at the time of the shooting, and while an adult, he was still relatively youthful and came from a broken home and had his own substance abuse problems and untreated mental health issues.1 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment.” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108, 117 ], italics added.) Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution proscribes “cruel or unusual punishment.” Although this language is construed separately from the federal constitutional ban | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Miller v. State of California
green
2 sentences2000Pearl's reliance on Allen v. City of Long Beach (1955) 45 Cal.2d 128 , 287 P.2d 765 and Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal.2d 438 , 326 P.2d 484 is misplaced for the reason stated in Miller v. State of California, supra., 18 Cal.3d at p. 818 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 557 P.2d 970 : "Since we conclude that plaintiffs loss of a larger retirement allowance resulted from his lawful termination before his right to it matured, we need not undertake the method of analysis required by Allen and Abbott for determining whether the changes in the state's pension system were reasonable. 2000Pearl's reliance on Allen v. City of Long Beach (1955) 45 Cal.2d 128 , 287 P.2d 765 and Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal.2d 438 , 326 P.2d 484 is misplaced for the reason stated in Miller v. State of California, supra., 18 Cal.3d at p. 818 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 557 P.2d 970 : "Since we conclude that plaintiffs loss of a larger retirement allowance resulted from his lawful termination before his right to it matured, we need not undertake the method of analysis required by Allen and Abbott for determining whether the changes in the state's pension system were reasonable. | 2 | 1989–2000 |
Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2000As we have said, this method of analysis was wrong. "[T]he presumption of correctness normally accorded on appeal to the jury's verdict is replaced by a presumption in favor of the [new trial] order." ( Neal, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 932 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 389 , 582 P.2d 980 , italics added.) Finally, the Court of Appeal noted that, "[w]hile the trial court's order sets forth many factual reasons for granting a new trial, many of these facts do not take into account the conflicting evidence in support of the jury verdicts." We reject the premise of this argument. 2000As we have said, this method of analysis was wrong. “[T]he presumption of correctness normally accorded on appeal to the jury’s verdict is replaced by a presumption in favor of the [new trial] order.” (Neal, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 932 , italics added.) Finally, the Court of Appeal noted that, “[w]hile the trial court’s order sets forth many factual reasons for granting a new trial, many of these facts do not take into account the conflicting evidence in support of the jury verdicts.” We reject the premise of this argument. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| Caminetti v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal. green | 2 | 1959–1965 |
| Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College District green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| New York Times Co. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Sierra Club v. County of Fresno green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Friends of Old Trees v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In Re Zacharia D. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Harrison green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Berghuis v. Smith green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Burgener green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Bell green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Greene v. Municipal Court green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Weddle green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Lona v. Citibank, N.A. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Lynch red | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation v. Edmund A. Gray Co. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Wong v. Thrifty Corp. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.