method test in Alabama

1998Samuels v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles , 687 So.2d 1287 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996); Ellard v. State , 474 So.2d 743 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), aff'd, 474 So.2d 758 (Ala. 1985).

1996"In the absence of the right to appeal or other adequate remedy, the writ of certiorari lies to review the rulings of an administrative board or commission." Ellard v. State , 474 So.2d 743 , 748 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), aff'd, 474 So.2d 758 (Ala. 1985).

1998Samuels v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles , 687 So.2d 1287 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996); Ellard v. State , 474 So.2d 743 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), aff'd, 474 So.2d 758 (Ala. 1985).

1996"In the absence of the right to appeal or other adequate remedy, the writ of certiorari lies to review the rulings of an administrative board or commission." Ellard v. State , 474 So.2d 743 , 748 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), aff'd, 474 So.2d 758 (Ala. 1985).

1999Ex parte Jones , 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Alexander , 558 So.2d 364 (Ala. 1990).

1999Ex parte Jones, 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala.1996); Ex parte Alexander, 558 So.2d 364 (Ala.1990).

1999Ex parte Jones , 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Alexander , 558 So.2d 364 (Ala. 1990).

1999Ex parte Jones, 686 So.2d 1166 (Ala.1996); Ex parte Alexander, 558 So.2d 364 (Ala.1990).

1997Although mandamus is the appropriate method to challenge a pre-trial ruling on a motion to recuse, Ex parte Sanders , 659 So.2d 1036 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995), it is not available to review a ruling on a motion for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity or a ruling on a motion for a continuance.

1996Ex parte Sanders , 659 So.2d 1036 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995).

1958Lurie v. Kegan-Grace Co., 209 Ala. 339 , 96 So. 344 , among many other cases collected in 16 Alabama Digest, Pleading, ©^193(8).

1958Lurie v. Kegan-Grace Co., 209 Ala. 339 , 96 So. 344 , among many other cases collected in 16 Alabama Digest, Pleading, ©^193(8).

1958Nesbitt v. Hagan, supra; Wiggins Estate Co. v. Jeffery, 246 Ala. 183, 185 , 19 So.2d 769 .

1958Nesbitt v. Hagan, supra; Wiggins Estate Co. v. Jeffery, 246 Ala. 183, 185 , 19 So.2d 769 .

1944Co., 211 Ala. 531 , 100 So. 843 ; Pearson v. City of Birmingham, 210 Ala. 296 , 97 So. 916 ; Smith v. Grayson, 214 Ala. 197 , 107 So. 448 ; Wiggins v. Stewart Bros., 215 Ala. 9 , 109 So. 101 ; Ex parte Brown & Co., 240 Ala. 157, 160 , 198 So. 138 . *444 Though demurrer is the appropriate method to test the legal sufficiency of the motion to transfer, Code 1940, Title 13, Sec. 153, the action of the trial court, here, in striking the motion was but a denial to transfer, and the ruling was, under the stated rule, not reviewable in the present proceedings.

1944Co., 211 Ala. 531 , 100 So. 843 ; Pearson v. City of Birmingham, 210 Ala. 296 , 97 So. 916 ; Smith v. Grayson, 214 Ala. 197 , 107 So. 448 ; Wiggins v. Stewart Bros., 215 Ala. 9 , 109 So. 101 ; Ex parte Brown & Co., 240 Ala. 157, 160 , 198 So. 138 . *444 Though demurrer is the appropriate method to test the legal sufficiency of the motion to transfer, Code 1940, Title 13, Sec. 153, the action of the trial court, here, in striking the motion was but a denial to transfer, and the ruling was, under the stated rule, not reviewable in the present proceedings.

2011In Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir.1983), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained: “The proper method of analysis is to examine whether the elements of a cause of action for the tort of copyright infringement are equivalent to the elements of the crime of dealing in stolen property as it applies in this case.

2006In interpreting a predecessor statute to § 36-2-1 (a)(3), this Court held that "`ineligible' . . . means inelectable — that is, not capable of being chosen — and hence the qualifications enumerated relate to the date of election, and not merely to the date of actual induction into office. — Finklea v. Farish , 160 Ala. 230 , 237 , 49 So. 366 [, 368 (1909)]." Shepherd v. Sartain , 185 Ala. 439 , 446 , 64 So. 57 , 61 (1913).

2006In interpreting a predecessor statute to § 36-2-1 (a)(3), this Court held that "`ineligible' . . . means inelectable — that is, not capable of being chosen — and hence the qualifications enumerated relate to the date of election, and not merely to the date of actual induction into office. — Finklea v. Farish , 160 Ala. 230 , 237 , 49 So. 366 [, 368 (1909)]." Shepherd v. Sartain , 185 Ala. 439 , 446 , 64 So. 57 , 61 (1913).

2006In interpreting a predecessor statute to § 36-2-1 (a)(3), this Court held that "`ineligible' . . . means inelectable — that is, not capable of being chosen — and hence the qualifications enumerated relate to the date of election, and not merely to the date of actual induction into office. — Finklea v. Farish , 160 Ala. 230 , 237 , 49 So. 366 [, 368 (1909)]." Shepherd v. Sartain , 185 Ala. 439 , 446 , 64 So. 57 , 61 (1913).

2006In interpreting a predecessor statute to § 36-2-1 (a)(3), this Court held that "`ineligible' . . . means inelectable — that is, not capable of being chosen — and hence the qualifications enumerated relate to the date of election, and not merely to the date of actual induction into office. — Finklea v. Farish , 160 Ala. 230 , 237 , 49 So. 366 [, 368 (1909)]." Shepherd v. Sartain , 185 Ala. 439 , 446 , 64 So. 57 , 61 (1913).

2003Pearson's deposition testimony on August 20, 2002, indicated that she was quite familiar with Brooks and Black and their duties and responsibilities at Perdue Farms. [2] The affidavit does not contradict Pearson's knowledge of the existence of a relationship that could give rise to a duty, and, while the affidavit does not in that respect contradict her deposition, it does not avoid the consequences of the rule in Marsh where, as previously noted, we defined ignorance under Rule 9(h) as "ignorance of the existence of a relationship that could give rise to a duty." 732 So.2d at 989 .

2003Pearson's deposition testimony on August 20, 2002, indicated that she was quite familiar with Brooks and Black and their duties and responsibilities at Perdue Farms. 2 The affidavit does not contradict Pearson's knowledge of the existence of a relationship that could give rise to a duty, and, while the affidavit does not in that respect contradict her deposition, it does not avoid the consequences of the rule in Marsh where, as previously noted, we defined ignorance under Rule 9(h) as "ignorance of the existence of a relationship that could give rise to a duty." 732 So.2d at 989 .

2000Because a writ *Page 487 of prohibition is the proper method to test jurisdiction and "lies when a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction," Ex parte City of Tuskegee , 447 So.2d 713 , 716 (Ala. 1984), and because it is "the proper remedy to intercept and put an end to a usurpation of jurisdiction," Ex parte State ex rel.

2000Bragg , 240 Ala. 80 , 85 , 197 So. 32 , 36 (1940), we conclude that a petition for such a writ is the appropriate method for securing a review.

2000Bragg , 240 Ala. 80 , 85 , 197 So. 32 , 36 (1940), we conclude that a petition for such a writ is the appropriate method for securing a review.

1998Samuels v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles , 687 So.2d 1287 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996); Ellard v. State , 474 So.2d 743 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), aff'd, 474 So.2d 758 (Ala. 1985).

1997Hale v. State , 611 So.2d 1202 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992).

1996We reviewed this exact issue raised in a petition for a writ mandamus in Ex parte Bell, 511 So.2d 519 (Ala.Cr.App.1987).

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1985See, for example: Garner v. State, 31 Ala.App. 52 , 11 So.2d 872 (1943) (conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would not bar a subsequent conviction for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol under a theory of "double jeopardy”); Echols v. State, 35 Ala.App. 602 , 51 So.2d 260 (1951) (conviction of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident would not bar subsequent prosecution for a charge of manslaughter under a theory of “autrefois convict”); Smith v. City of Irondale, 293 Ala. 357 , 303 So.2d 130 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct.

1979Patton v. City of Decatur , 337 So.2d 321 (Ala. 1976), clearly held that written standards are required which govern not only which test method is approved by the State Board of Health but also govern the method in which the test is administered.

1958Goldsby v. Goldsby, supra; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. [354] 377, 34 So. 905 , 96 Am.St.Rep, 26.” [Emphasis supplied.] See, also, Nesbitt v. Hagan, 265 Ala. 213, 216-217 , 90 So.2d 217 ; Cook v. Whitehead, 255 Ala. 401, 409 , 51 So.2d 886 ; Rochelle v. Rochelle, 237 Ala. 530, 532 , 187 So. 451 ; Barrow v. Lindsey, 230 Ala. 45, 46 , 159 So. 232 ; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 377 , 34 So. 905 , 906 Am.St.Rep. 26 ; McCall v. McCurdy, 69 Ala. 65, 71-72 ; Goldsby v. Goldsby, 67 Ala. 560, 561-564 , supra. A demurrer is the proper method to test the sufficiency of such a bill of review.

1958Goldsby v. Goldsby, supra; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. [354] 377, 34 So. 905 , 96 Am.St.Rep, 26.” [Emphasis supplied.] See, also, Nesbitt v. Hagan, 265 Ala. 213, 216-217 , 90 So.2d 217 ; Cook v. Whitehead, 255 Ala. 401, 409 , 51 So.2d 886 ; Rochelle v. Rochelle, 237 Ala. 530, 532 , 187 So. 451 ; Barrow v. Lindsey, 230 Ala. 45, 46 , 159 So. 232 ; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 377 , 34 So. 905 , 906 Am.St.Rep. 26 ; McCall v. McCurdy, 69 Ala. 65, 71-72 ; Goldsby v. Goldsby, 67 Ala. 560, 561-564 , supra. A demurrer is the proper method to test the sufficiency of such a bill of review.

1958Goldsby v. Goldsby, supra; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. [354] 377, 34 So. 905 , 96 Am.St.Rep, 26.” [Emphasis supplied.] See, also, Nesbitt v. Hagan, 265 Ala. 213, 216-217 , 90 So.2d 217 ; Cook v. Whitehead, 255 Ala. 401, 409 , 51 So.2d 886 ; Rochelle v. Rochelle, 237 Ala. 530, 532 , 187 So. 451 ; Barrow v. Lindsey, 230 Ala. 45, 46 , 159 So. 232 ; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 377 , 34 So. 905 , 906 Am.St.Rep. 26 ; McCall v. McCurdy, 69 Ala. 65, 71-72 ; Goldsby v. Goldsby, 67 Ala. 560, 561-564 , supra. A demurrer is the proper method to test the sufficiency of such a bill of review.

1958Goldsby v. Goldsby, supra; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. [354] 377, 34 So. 905 , 96 Am.St.Rep, 26.” [Emphasis supplied.] See, also, Nesbitt v. Hagan, 265 Ala. 213, 216-217 , 90 So.2d 217 ; Cook v. Whitehead, 255 Ala. 401, 409 , 51 So.2d 886 ; Rochelle v. Rochelle, 237 Ala. 530, 532 , 187 So. 451 ; Barrow v. Lindsey, 230 Ala. 45, 46 , 159 So. 232 ; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 377 , 34 So. 905 , 906 Am.St.Rep. 26 ; McCall v. McCurdy, 69 Ala. 65, 71-72 ; Goldsby v. Goldsby, 67 Ala. 560, 561-564 , supra. A demurrer is the proper method to test the sufficiency of such a bill of review.

1958Goldsby v. Goldsby, supra; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. [354] 377, 34 So. 905 , 96 Am.St.Rep, 26.” [Emphasis supplied.] See, also, Nesbitt v. Hagan, 265 Ala. 213, 216-217 , 90 So.2d 217 ; Cook v. Whitehead, 255 Ala. 401, 409 , 51 So.2d 886 ; Rochelle v. Rochelle, 237 Ala. 530, 532 , 187 So. 451 ; Barrow v. Lindsey, 230 Ala. 45, 46 , 159 So. 232 ; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 377 , 34 So. 905 , 906 Am.St.Rep. 26 ; McCall v. McCurdy, 69 Ala. 65, 71-72 ; Goldsby v. Goldsby, 67 Ala. 560, 561-564 , supra. A demurrer is the proper method to test the sufficiency of such a bill of review.

1958Goldsby v. Goldsby, supra; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. [354] 377, 34 So. 905 , 96 Am.St.Rep, 26.” [Emphasis supplied.] See, also, Nesbitt v. Hagan, 265 Ala. 213, 216-217 , 90 So.2d 217 ; Cook v. Whitehead, 255 Ala. 401, 409 , 51 So.2d 886 ; Rochelle v. Rochelle, 237 Ala. 530, 532 , 187 So. 451 ; Barrow v. Lindsey, 230 Ala. 45, 46 , 159 So. 232 ; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 377 , 34 So. 905 , 906 Am.St.Rep. 26 ; McCall v. McCurdy, 69 Ala. 65, 71-72 ; Goldsby v. Goldsby, 67 Ala. 560, 561-564 , supra. A demurrer is the proper method to test the sufficiency of such a bill of review.