method factors in North Dakota

2013Langer, 2008 ND 40, ¶ 11 , 745 N.W.2d 649 .

2013Langer, 2008 ND 40, ¶ 11 , 745 N.W.2d 649 .

1999The Court concluded these cases had not altered settled precedent holding that “in rem civil forfeitures are neither ‘punishment’ nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” 518 U.S. at 292 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 . [¶ 50] After confining Kurth Ranch, Austin, and Halper to their specific factual circumstances, the Ursery Court identified the method of inquiry into whether a statute “punishes” for Double Jeopardy purposes.

1999The Court concluded these cases had not altered settled precedent holding that “in rem civil forfeitures are neither ‘punishment’ nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” 518 U.S. at 292 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 . [¶ 50] After confining Kurth Ranch, Austin, and Halper to their specific factual circumstances, the Ursery Court identified the method of inquiry into whether a statute “punishes” for Double Jeopardy purposes.

1996Pulkrabek v. Morton County, 389 N.W.2d 609 (N.D.1986).

1995In Olson, supra, we held that a Board of County Commissioners had statutory authority to render a decision on the installation of a culvert, regardless of *298 whether that decision was right or wrong, and that an appeal, not a collateral attack for injunctive relief, was the appropriate method to challenge the correctness of the Board's decision.

1995In Olson, supra, we held that a Board of County Commissioners had statutory authority to render a decision on the installation of a culvert, regardless of whether that decision was right or wrong, and that an appeal, not a collateral attack for injunctive relief, was the appropriate method to challenge the correctness of the Board’s decision.

1985Recently, in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), the United States Supreme Court addressed this method of analysis, and concluded: "Although we have not examined this exact question at great length in any of our prior opinions, almost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him. * * * * * * "We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypoth

1985Recently, in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), the United States Supreme Court addressed this method of analysis, and concluded: "Although we have not examined this exact question at great length in any of our prior opinions, almost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him. * * * * * * "We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypoth

1975As stated in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 , 95 S.Ct. 896, 908 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 1975 , wherein Pate was clarified and reaffirmed: “There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.” Yet we do know that certain factors are deemed relevant, and Pate has prescribed the method by which these factors are to be analyzed.

1975As stated in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 , 95 S.Ct. 896, 908 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 1975 , wherein Pate was clarified and reaffirmed: “There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.” Yet we do know that certain factors are deemed relevant, and Pate has prescribed the method by which these factors are to be analyzed.