method analysis in Texas

2015See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 257 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).

2015See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 257 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).

2015See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 257 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).

2015See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 257 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).

2018See Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin, 825 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. 1991); Isabel v. Pinnell, 207 S.W.3d 394, 408 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.).

2015Id. at 438 .

1999See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)); see also Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d at 739 ; Parrish, 869 S.W.2d at 353-54 .

1999See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)); see also Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d at 739 ; Parrish, 869 S.W.2d at 353-54 .

1999See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)); see also Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d at 739 ; Parrish, 869 S.W.2d at 353-54 .

1999See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)); see also Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d at 739 ; Parrish, 869 S.W.2d at 353-54 .

1999See Dixon , 509 U.S. at 704 (overruling Grady v. Corbin , 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990)); see also Rhodes , 974 S.W.2d at 739 ; Parrish , 869 S.W.2d at 353-54 .

1999See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)); see also Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d at 739 ; Parrish, 869 S.W.2d at 353-54 .

2008Id. at *7; see Laidlaw Waste Systems (Dallas), Inc., 904 S.W.2d at 658 ; Alexander Oil Co., 825 S.W.2d at 436 ; City of Port Isabel v. Pinnell, 161 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); see also TEX .

2008Id. at *7; see Laidlaw Waste Systems (Dallas), Inc. , 904 S.W.2d at 658 ; Alexander Oil Co. , 825 S.W.2d at 436 ; City of Port Isabel v. Pinnell , 161 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.

2008Id. at *7; see Laidlaw Waste Systems (Dallas), Inc., 904 S.W.2d at 658 ; Alexander Oil Co., 825 S.W.2d at 436 ; City of Port Isabel v. Pinnell, 161 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); see also TEX .

2008Id. at *7; see Laidlaw Waste Systems (Dallas), Inc. , 904 S.W.2d at 658 ; Alexander Oil Co. , 825 S.W.2d at 436 ; City of Port Isabel v. Pinnell , 161 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.

2025Because no right of appeal exists from an order allowing a Rule 202 deposition, In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding), mandamus is the proper method to challenge such an order.

2024Because no right of appeal exists from an order allowing a Rule 202 deposition, In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding), mandamus is the proper method to challenge such an order.

2019Evid. 702); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993). 50 Mendez, 204 S.W.3d at 800 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 713 ). 34 the opinion is without probative value and cannot support a verdict or judgment.”51 That said, courts do not determine whether an expert’s opinion is reliable by deciding whether the expert’s opinion appears to be correct.52 Rather, the factors courts use when determining if the expert’s opinions are reliable look to the reliability of the method and analysis the expert used in forming the opinions the expert expressed in the trial.53 The

2019Evid. 702); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993). 50 Mendez, 204 S.W.3d at 800 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 713 ). 34 the opinion is without probative value and cannot support a verdict or judgment.”51 That said, courts do not determine whether an expert’s opinion is reliable by deciding whether the expert’s opinion appears to be correct.52 Rather, the factors courts use when determining if the expert’s opinions are reliable look to the reliability of the method and analysis the expert used in forming the opinions the expert expressed in the trial.53 The

2019Evid. 702); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993). 50 Mendez, 204 S.W.3d at 800 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 713 ). 34 the opinion is without probative value and cannot support a verdict or judgment.”51 That said, courts do not determine whether an expert’s opinion is reliable by deciding whether the expert’s opinion appears to be correct.52 Rather, the factors courts use when determining if the expert’s opinions are reliable look to the reliability of the method and analysis the expert used in forming the opinions the expert expressed in the trial.53 The

2019Evid. 702); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993). 50 Mendez, 204 S.W.3d at 800 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 713 ). 34 the opinion is without probative value and cannot support a verdict or judgment.”51 That said, courts do not determine whether an expert’s opinion is reliable by deciding whether the expert’s opinion appears to be correct.52 Rather, the factors courts use when determining if the expert’s opinions are reliable look to the reliability of the method and analysis the expert used in forming the opinions the expert expressed in the trial.53 The

2019Evid. 702); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993). 50 Mendez, 204 S.W.3d at 800 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 713 ). 34 the opinion is without probative value and cannot support a verdict or judgment.”51 That said, courts do not determine whether an expert’s opinion is reliable by deciding whether the expert’s opinion appears to be correct.52 Rather, the factors courts use when determining if the expert’s opinions are reliable look to the reliability of the method and analysis the expert used in forming the opinions the expert expressed in the trial.53 The

2019Evid. 702); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993). 50 Mendez, 204 S.W.3d at 800 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 713 ). 34 the opinion is without probative value and cannot support a verdict or judgment.”51 That said, courts do not determine whether an expert’s opinion is reliable by deciding whether the expert’s opinion appears to be correct.52 Rather, the factors courts use when determining if the expert’s opinions are reliable look to the reliability of the method and analysis the expert used in forming the opinions the expert expressed in the trial.53 The

2006See Quimby , 10 S.W.3d at 779 .

2006See Quimby, 10 S.W.3d at 779 .

2006See Pringle, 862 S.W.2d at 724 .

2006See Pringle, 862 S.W.2d at 724 .

2003State v. Benavides , 772 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).

2003State v. Benavides, 772 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).

2002State v. San Miguel , 2 S.W.3d 249,251 (Tex. 1999) (decision to use barrels and signs as a warning device was a discretionary policy decision); State v. Rodriguez , 985 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999)(claim that detour was unreasonably dangerous and had inadequate warning signs did not state a claim under the tort claims act because the design of the detour was a discretionary act).

2002Id.

2002State v. San Miguel , 2 S.W.3d 249,251 (Tex. 1999) (decision to use barrels and signs as a warning device was a discretionary policy decision); State v. Rodriguez , 985 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999)(claim that detour was unreasonably dangerous and had inadequate warning signs did not state a claim under the tort claims act because the design of the detour was a discretionary act).

2002State v. San Miguel, 2 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tex.1999)(decision to use barrels and signs as a warning device was a discretionary policy decision); State v. Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex.1999)(claim that detom* was unreasonably dangerous and had inadequate warning signs did not state a claim under the tort claims act because the design of the detour was a discretionary act).

2023In re Campos, No. 2-07-197-CV, 2007 WL 2013057 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 12, 2007, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (per curiam) (citing Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d at 360 ).

2023In re Campos, No. 2- 07-197-CV, 2007 WL 2013057 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 12, 2007, orig. 28 proceeding [mand. denied]) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (citing In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied])).

2024The failure to file the oath with the Secretary of State does not vitiate the oath or deprive the judge of the authority to preside in a case.”); Wilson v. State, 944 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997) (“It is well settled that the proper method to challenge the authority of the trial judge is to bring a direct action through a quo warranto proceeding rather than by a collateral attack on appeal.”), aff’d, 977 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1998); Randall v. State, 875 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (“When a judge is holding office under color of title by appointment o

2024See Wiley v. State, 112 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d); see also Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (“After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court, or the highest court of the State having jurisdiction of the particular case, the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.”).