method analysis in Washington

2020Our state constitution “requires a method of analysis substantially the same as the federal Sixth Amendment analysis and does not afford a defendant greater speedy trial rights.” State v. Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d 273, 290 , 217 P.3d 768 (2009).

2015Our state constitution “requires a method of analysis substantially the same as the federal Sixth Amendment analysis and does not afford a defendant greater speedy trial rights.” State v. Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d 273, 290 , 217 P.3d 768 (2009).

1999However, in Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96 , the Supreme Court “disavow[ed] the method of analysis used in United States v. Halper” The Supreme Court reasoned that the analysis applied by the Halper Court deviated from our traditional double jeopardy doctrine in two key respects.

1999However, in Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , the Supreme Court "disavow[ed] the method of analysis used in United States v. Halper." The Supreme Court reasoned that the analysis applied by the Halper Court deviated from our traditional double jeopardy doctrine in two key respects.

2012Johnson, 318 U.S. at 200 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S. Ct. 391 , 80 L.

2012Johnson, 318 U.S. at 200 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S. Ct. 391 , 80 L.

2005Cleveland, 21 P.3d at 1238 .

2005Cleveland, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 , 21 P.3d at 1238 . [9] WILLIAM L.

1998The Court disavowed the method of analysis used in Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , and reaffirmed the previously established rule exemplified in Ward, 448 U.S. 242 .

1998The Court disavowed the method of analysis used in Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , and reaffirmed the previously established rule exemplified in Ward, 448 U.S. 242 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 .

1998The Court disavowed the method of analysis used in Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , and reaffirmed the previously established rule exemplified in Ward, 448 U.S. 242 .

1998The Court disavowed the method of analysis used in Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , and reaffirmed the previously established rule exemplified in Ward, 448 U.S. 242 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 .

2025Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 290 (“ [W]e hold that article I, section 22 requires a method of analysis substantially the same as the federal Sixth Amendment analysis and does not afford a defendant greater speedy trial rights.”). 26 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S. Ct. 2039 , 80 L.

2025Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 290 (“ [W]e hold that article I, section 22 requires a method of analysis substantially the same as the federal Sixth Amendment analysis and does not afford a defendant greater speedy trial rights.”). 26 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S. Ct. 2039 , 80 L.

2025Ed. 2d 657 (1984). 27 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2025Ed. 2d 657 (1984). 27 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2019Rather, this part of jury selection occurred ~ The Supreme Court has noted that this method, as defined in jj~y, 170 Wn.2d at 886 , does not establish the exclusive method to test whether the error was harmless.

2019State v. Slert (Slert II), 186 Wn.2d 869 , 879 n. 4, 383 P.3d 466 (2016) 16 No. 75074-7-1/17 as a communication between prosecution and defense. ~ The parties agreed to the dismissals, such that the actual court proceeding was non-adversarial and the court had no need to resolve any factual issues.

2019State v. Slert (Slert II), 186 Wn.2d 869 , 879 n. 4, 383 P.3d 466 (2016) 16 No. 75074-7-1/17 as a communication between prosecution and defense. ~ The parties agreed to the dismissals, such that the actual court proceeding was non-adversarial and the court had no need to resolve any factual issues.

2018However, the court in Stevens also stated that challenges to the trial court’s method of analysis could not be raised for the first time on appeal unless under RAP 2.5(a)(3) the challenge involved a manifest constitutional error. 58 Wn.

2018Id.

2014No. 70638-1-1/3 Where a defendant claims the denial of these rights, our review is de novo.4 The defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial attach when a charge is filed or an arrest is made, whichever occurs first.5 Some pretrial delay is often "inevitable and wholly justifiable,"6 and any "inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case."7 Accordingly, we utilize "an ad hoc balancing test that examines the conduct of both the State and the defendant to determine whether speedy trial rights have been denied."8 Th

2014No. 70638-1-1/3 Where a defendant claims the denial of these rights, our review is de novo.4 The defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial attach when a charge is filed or an arrest is made, whichever occurs first.5 Some pretrial delay is often "inevitable and wholly justifiable,"6 and any "inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case."7 Accordingly, we utilize "an ad hoc balancing test that examines the conduct of both the State and the defendant to determine whether speedy trial rights have been denied."8 Th

1992As the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged, there can be "`no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose *910 death.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978)), cited in State v. Mak, supra at 724 and State v. Rupe, supra at 766-67 .

1992As the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged, there can be "`no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose *910 death.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978)), cited in State v. Mak, supra at 724 and State v. Rupe, supra at 766-67 .

1992As the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged, there can be "`no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose *910 death.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978)), cited in State v. Mak, supra at 724 and State v. Rupe, supra at 766-67 .

1992As the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged, there can be "`no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose *910 death.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978)), cited in State v. Mak, supra at 724 and State v. Rupe, supra at 766-67 .

1989The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986) set forth the proper method of inquiry for the appellate court reviewing an exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.210(4)(a). 6 Initially, the appellate court must make the determination of whether the sentencing judge's reasons for imposing an exceptional sentence are supported by the record.

1989The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986) set forth the proper method of inquiry for the appellate court reviewing an exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.210(4)(a). 6 Initially, the appellate court must make the determination of whether the sentencing judge's reasons for imposing an exceptional sentence are supported by the record.

1988See, e.g., State v. Cox, 94 Wn.2d 170 , 615 P.2d 465 (1980); United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977).

1988See, e.g., State v. Cox, 94 Wn.2d 170 , 615 P.2d 465 (1980); United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977).

1987This court employed a similar method of analysis in State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361 , 693 P.2d 81 (1985), where a defendant challenged a warrant affidavit alleging a material omission or misrepresentation.

1987This court employed a similar method of analysis in State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361 , 693 P.2d 81 (1985), where a defendant challenged a warrant affidavit alleging a material omission or misrepresentation.

1987In Cord , this court adopted a rule enunciated in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 57 L.

1987In Cord , this court adopted a rule enunciated in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 57 L.

1967Gamble v. Superior Court, 190 Wash. 127 , 66 P.2d 1135 (1937), we held that where a party has a right independent of the merits of the issues pending to a trial in a particular place, an extraordinary legal remedy such as certiorari is the proper method to test that right in this court.

1967Gamble v. Superior Court, 190 Wash. 127 , 66 P.2d 1135 (1937), we held that where a party has a right independent of the merits of the issues pending to a trial in a particular place, an extraordinary legal remedy such as certiorari is the proper method to test that right in this court.