omnibus clause in Ohio

2025An omnibus clause provides the named insured with the discretionary power to select other persons as "additional insureds." Fox v. Crawford (Ohio App. 1947), 50 Ohio Law Abs. 553, 556 , 80 N.E.2d 187 .

2025An omnibus clause provides the named insured with the discretionary power to select other persons as "additional insureds." Fox v. Crawford (Ohio App. 1947), 50 Ohio Law Abs. 553, 556 , 80 N.E.2d 187 .

2019Co. v. Selz, 6 Ohio St.3d 169, 171 , 451 N.E.2d 1203 (1983), following Gulla v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio St. 147, 154 , 85 N.E.2d 116 (1949). {¶ 13} Analyzing the phrase “scope of permission,” Ohio courts have adopted the slight or minor deviation rule which provides: [W]here the use of the property deviates only slightly from the purpose for which permission was initially granted, the standard omnibus clause in a liability insurance policy will be interpreted to extend coverage.

2019Co. v. Selz, 6 Ohio St.3d 169, 171 , 451 N.E.2d 1203 (1983), following Gulla v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio St. 147, 154 , 85 N.E.2d 116 (1949). {¶ 13} Analyzing the phrase “scope of permission,” Ohio courts have adopted the slight or minor deviation rule which provides: [W]here the use of the property deviates only slightly from the purpose for which permission was initially granted, the standard omnibus clause in a liability insurance policy will be interpreted to extend coverage.

1994For example, in Marolt, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus, the court held that “[w]here the omnibus clause of an insurance policy covers one who uses the automobile with the permission of the named insured, the burden of proof is on a person injured to establish that the individual operating the automobile at the time of the accident comes within the protective provisions of the policy.” Accord Baily, supra, 67 Ohio App. 259 , 21 O.O. 248 , 35 N.E.2d 1006 , paragraph three of the syllabus; Carver, supra, 91 Ohio Law Abs. at 42 , 191 N.E.2d at 63 .

1994For example, in Marolt, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus, the court held that “[w]here the omnibus clause of an insurance policy covers one who uses the automobile with the permission of the named insured, the burden of proof is on a person injured to establish that the individual operating the automobile at the time of the accident comes within the protective provisions of the policy.” Accord Baily, supra, 67 Ohio App. 259 , 21 O.O. 248 , 35 N.E.2d 1006 , paragraph three of the syllabus; Carver, supra, 91 Ohio Law Abs. at 42 , 191 N.E.2d at 63 .

1994For example, in Marolt, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus, the court held that “[w]here the omnibus clause of an insurance policy covers one who uses the automobile with the permission of the named insured, the burden of proof is on a person injured to establish that the individual operating the automobile at the time of the accident comes within the protective provisions of the policy.” Accord Baily, supra, 67 Ohio App. 259 , 21 O.O. 248 , 35 N.E.2d 1006 , paragraph three of the syllabus; Carver, supra, 91 Ohio Law Abs. at 42 , 191 N.E.2d at 63 .

1994For example, in Marolt, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus, the court held that “[w]here the omnibus clause of an insurance policy covers one who uses the automobile with the permission of the named insured, the burden of proof is on a person injured to establish that the individual operating the automobile at the time of the accident comes within the protective provisions of the policy.” Accord Baily, supra, 67 Ohio App. 259 , 21 O.O. 248 , 35 N.E.2d 1006 , paragraph three of the syllabus; Carver, supra, 91 Ohio Law Abs. at 42 , 191 N.E.2d at 63 .

2005Id. {¶ 26} The trial court in this case concluded that based on the Progressive policy language, Young was not an "insured" at the time of the accident.

2005Co. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 63 , 66 . {¶ 25} The above quoted clause in the Progressive policy sets forth what is commonly known as an "omnibus clause." An omnibus clause extends liability coverage to persons, other than the named insured, who had permission of the insured to use the covered vehicle.

1986The court reiterated the rule in Boggs, supra, and stated: “Where ‘original entrustment’ is shown to exist, liability thus imposed on the owner will not be altered because of a departure beyond the scope of authority.” Blanton, supra, at 39 .

1986The court reiterated the rule in Boggs, supra, and stated: “Where ‘original entrustment’ is shown to exist, liability thus imposed on the owner will not be altered because of a departure beyond the scope of authority.” Blanton, supra, at 39 .

1986Co. (Fla. App. 1980), 390 So.2d 76 , which expressly adopted the minor deviation rule with respect to an omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy (such as the one here in question).

1959Pleasant Valley Lima Bean Growers & Warehouse Assn. v. Cal-Farm Insurance Company 298 P. 2d 109 , holds at p. 112: “(1) Cal-Farm maintains that coverage does not extend to plaintiff and Croker under the omnibus clause, but before considering the interpretation of that clause which is advocated, we shall discuss the separate contention that any liability of Brucker or Pleasant Valley for bodily injury to Nungaray, Brucker’s employe, is expressely excluded from coverage under its policy by the above quoted exclusion clause.

1949The decision on which the plaintiff places special reliance is in the case of Dickinson, Admr., v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101 Conn., 369 , 125 A., 866 , 41 A. L.

1949The decision on which the plaintiff places special reliance is in the case of Dickinson, Admr., v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101 Conn., 369 , 125 A., 866 , 41 A. L.