omnibus clause in Nebraska

1993Co. v. Pierce, 182 Neb. 805 , 157 N.W.2d 399 , that the omnibus clause requirement is applicable only to automobile liability insurance policies which have been certified as proof of financial responsibility.

1993Co. v. Pierce, 182 Neb. 805 , 157 N.W.2d 399 , that the omnibus clause requirement is applicable only to automobile liability insurance policies which have been certified as proof of financial responsibility.

1966Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75 , 125 N. W. 2d 179 , we stated: “The purpose of the omnibus clause is to fix the liability of additional insureds and to eliminate ambiguities and defenses with reference thereto as a matter of public policy.

1966Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75 , 125 N. W. 2d 179 , we stated: “The purpose of the omnibus clause is to fix the liability of additional insureds and to eliminate ambiguities and defenses with reference thereto as a matter of public policy.

2002The other cases were on direct appeal and, when the inquiries were found to be inadequate and the reasons stated to be substantial, the convictions were reversed and new trials ordered. *885 In Lockhart, supra, the court concluded that the defendant was denied counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings because after Lockhart had been denied the hearing, he represented himself at an omnibus hearing which was considered a critical stage of the proceedings.

1998Lanoha Landscape Nursery, 250 Neb. 901 , 553 N.W.2d 736 (1996), we held that once the named insured of a policy which contains an omnibus clause extending liability coverage to those driving the covered automobile with the insured’s consent gives such consent to another, any third person allowed to drive the vehicle by the initial permitee likewise is covered, barring theft or conversion.

1998Lanoha Landscape Nursery, 250 Neb. 901 , 553 N.W.2d 736 (1996), we held that once the named insured of a policy which contains an omnibus clause extending liability coverage to those driving the covered automobile with the insured’s consent gives such consent to another, any third person allowed to drive the vehicle by the initial permitee likewise is covered, barring theft or conversion.

1996Ins., 54 Ill. 2d 333 , 297 N.E.2d 163 (1973), the Supreme Court of Illinois quoted extensively from Odolecki and concluded that consistent with the public policy underlying the initial permission rale, once initial permission is given by the named insured, a further grant of permission to a second permittee brings the second permittee within the applicable omnibus clause as an additional insured — that is, barring theft or the like.

1996Ins., 54 Ill. 2d 333 , 297 N.E.2d 163 (1973), the Supreme Court of Illinois quoted extensively from Odolecki and concluded that consistent with the public policy underlying the initial permission rale, once initial permission is given by the named insured, a further grant of permission to a second permittee brings the second permittee within the applicable omnibus clause as an additional insured — that is, barring theft or the like.

1983Co., 169 Neb. 233 , 99 N.W.2d 26 (1959), we were asked to declare the rights of various parties under an omnibus clause identical to the clauses involved in this case.

1983Co., 169 Neb. 233 , 99 N.W.2d 26 (1959), we were asked to declare the rights of various parties under an omnibus clause identical to the clauses involved in this case.

1980Although finding against the insurance company on disputed facts, Bourne v. Manley, 435 S. W. 2d 420 (Mo. App., 1968), laid down the following rules: “We recognize that one relying upon implied permission must prove it, that no implied permission arises merely because someone obtains possession of a vehicle and uses it without the knowledge of the named insured, and that the permission contemplated by the omnibus clause is something more than mere sufferance or tolerance without taking steps to prevent, that term being used rather in the sense of leave, license or authority with the power to p

1980Although finding against the insurance company on disputed facts, Bourne v. Manley, 435 S.W.2d 420 (Mo.App., 1968), laid down the following rules: "We immediately recognize that one relying upon implied permission must prove it, that no implied permission arises merely because someone obtains possession of a vehicle and uses it without the knowledge of the named insured, and that the permission contemplated by the omnibus clause is something more than mere sufferance or tolerance without taking steps to prevent, that term being used rather in the sense of leave, license or authority with the p

1980Co. v. Kersey, 171 Neb. 212 , 106 N.W.2d 31 (1960), was cited in Arndt v. Davis, supra , as supporting the strict rule doctrine.

1980Co. v. Kersey, 171 Neb. 212 , 106 N.W.2d 31 (1960), was cited in Arndt v. Davis, supra , as supporting the strict rule doctrine.

1980Co., 252 S.C. 629 , 167 S.E.2d 745 (1969): "Implied consent involves an inference arising from a course of conduct or relationship between the parties, in which there is mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circumstances signifying assent. * * * However, permission requires something more than mere sufferance or tolerance without taking steps to prevent the use of the automobile *275 and permission cannot be implied from possession and use of the automobile without the knowledge of the named insured." See, also, National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas.

1980Co., 252 S.C. 629 , 167 S.E.2d 745 (1969): "Implied consent involves an inference arising from a course of conduct or relationship between the parties, in which there is mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circumstances signifying assent. * * * However, permission requires something more than mere sufferance or tolerance without taking steps to prevent the use of the automobile *275 and permission cannot be implied from possession and use of the automobile without the knowledge of the named insured." See, also, National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas.

1972Cases such as Jones v. Mid-South Insurance Co., 358 F. 2d 887 , and State Farm Mut.

1969In the case of Witthauer v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 149 Neb. 728 , 32 N. W. 2d 413 , an employee who had deviated from the scope of his employment to the extent of driving his employer’s truck to a cafe for lunch was ruled not to be covered by the omnibus clause contained in the employer’s insurance policy.

1969In the case of Witthauer v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 149 Neb. 728 , 32 N. W. 2d 413 , an employee who had deviated from the scope of his employment to the extent of driving his employer’s truck to a cafe for lunch was ruled not to be covered by the omnibus clause contained in the employer’s insurance policy.

1969In the case of Metcalf v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 176 Neb. 468 , 126 N. W. 2d 471 , a corporation was the owner of the insured automobile.

1969In the case of Metcalf v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 176 Neb. 468 , 126 N. W. 2d 471 , a corporation was the owner of the insured automobile.

1969Co., 180 Neb. 555 , 143 N. W. 2d 923 , it is stated that this court is committed to a broad rather than a narrow construction of the word “permission” and to a liberal construction of the omnibus clause to effectuate its purpose.

1969Co., 180 Neb. 555 , 143 N. W. 2d 923 , it is stated that this court is committed to a broad rather than a narrow construction of the word “permission” and to a liberal construction of the omnibus clause to effectuate its purpose.