omnibus clause in Tennessee

1993Co., 157 Tenn. 301 , 8 S.W.2d 473 (1928), in which, “a traveling salesman with general custody of his employer’s automobile, was held to be covered under the omnibus clause even though he used the car for a purpose not expressly authorized by his employer.” 246 S.W.2d at 961 .

1993Co., 157 Tenn. 301 , 8 S.W.2d 473 (1928), in which, “a traveling salesman with general custody of his employer’s automobile, was held to be covered under the omnibus clause even though he used the car for a purpose not expressly authorized by his employer.” 246 S.W.2d at 961 .

1986The authorities cited in respondents’ brief, such as Shores v. Shores (1965) 217 Tenn. 96 , 395 S.W.2d 388 , go no further than to enunciate the proposition that under the Act, as amended, where the employee has suffered only a scheduled injury, an award on a basis of the body as a whole is interdicted.” 3 .

1986The authorities cited in respondents’ brief, such as Shores v. Shores (1965) 217 Tenn. 96 , 395 S.W.2d 388 , go no further than to enunciate the proposition that under the Act, as amended, where the employee has suffered only a scheduled injury, an award on a basis of the body as a whole is interdicted.” 3 .

2005Co. v.] Lewellen, [ 184 F.2d 891 (8th Cir.1950)] we find the omnibus clause in Employer’s policy extended coverage to Hyman for this accident despite his violation of Employer’s rule against drinking alcohol while driving the van.

2005Co. of America v. Margerum, 375 Pa.Super. 361 , 544 A.2d 512 (Pa.Super.Ct.1988), the Georgia Court held: “Permissive use” clauses such as the one in Royal’s policy are valid, even where the named insured can limit the scope of the permission through instructions, rules, or regulations.

2005Co. of America v. Margerum, 375 Pa.Super. 361 , 544 A.2d 512 (Pa.Super.Ct.1988), the Georgia Court held: “Permissive use” clauses such as the one in Royal’s policy are valid, even where the named insured can limit the scope of the permission through instructions, rules, or regulations.

2005Tennessee law as to the scope of permissive user under an omnibus clause is considered at length in Estate of Adkins v. White Consolidated Ind., Inc., et al., 788 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn.Ct.

1993Co., 157 Tenn. 301 , 8 S.W.2d 473 (1928), in which, “a traveling salesman with general custody of his employer’s automobile, was held to be covered under the omnibus clause even though he used the car for a purpose not expressly authorized by his employer.” 246 S.W.2d at 961 .

1966Plaintiff in error asserts that the recent case of Teague v. Tate, 213 Tenn. 269 , 375 S.W.2d 840 (1964), changes the law in Tennessee with respect to coverage of a second permittee under the omnibus clause.

1966Plaintiff in error asserts that the recent case of Teague v. Tate, 213 Tenn. 269 , 375 S.W.2d 840 (1964), changes the law in Tennessee with respect to coverage of a second permittee under the omnibus clause.

1966In Globe Indemnity Co. v. French, supra, one student loaned another student his car, knowing that the other student was double-dating with still a third student.

1956Pearson v. Johnson, 215 Minn. 480 , 10 N.W.2d 357 ; Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 , 119 A.L.R. 1390 .

1956Pearson v. Johnson, 215 Minn. 480 , 10 N.W.2d 357 ; Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 , 119 A.L.R. 1390 .

1956Pearson v. Johnson, 215 Minn. 480 , 10 N.W.2d 357 ; Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 , 119 A.L.R. 1390 .

1956Pearson v. Johnson, 215 Minn. 480 , 10 N.W.2d 357 ; Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581 , 281 N.W. 671 , 119 A.L.R. 1390 .

1952If it was not the owner, then of course the omnibus clause (L) would not operate, and there would be no basis for the operation of clause (e). * * * “Applying this line of logic to the facts in this case, in the event of the destruction or injury to the roadster in question, the loss would surely have been the loss of Fenlon, and not the loss of the grocery company. ’ ’ (The judgment of the Trial Court directing a verdict for the Insurance Company was *565 affirmed.) Whitney v. Employers’ Indemnity Corp., 200 Iowa 25 , 202 N. W. 236, 239 , 41 A. L.

1952If it was not the owner, then of course the omnibus clause (L) would not operate, and there would be no basis for the operation of clause (e). * * * “Applying this line of logic to the facts in this case, in the event of the destruction or injury to the roadster in question, the loss would surely have been the loss of Fenlon, and not the loss of the grocery company. ’ ’ (The judgment of the Trial Court directing a verdict for the Insurance Company was *565 affirmed.) Whitney v. Employers’ Indemnity Corp., 200 Iowa 25 , 202 N. W. 236, 239 , 41 A. L.