55 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2019Co. 185 N.J. at 412 .1 It "concluded that the permittee's 'deviation from the purpose 1 The rule states that 'if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a A-5393-16T4 12 for which she borrowed the vehicle did not annul the protection afforded her and the injured plaintiffs by the omnibus clause of [the] policy.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Matits, 33 N.J. at 497 ). 2006The Rutgers policy issued to Stephen appears to contain the same language as the policy the Court interpreted in Rutgers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Collins, 158 N.J. 542, 548 , 730 A.2d 833 (1999) to provide coverage in accordance with “the omnibus clause of the policy required by N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1” and the “initial permission rule” adopted in Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 33 N.J. 488 , 166 A.2d 345 (1960). | 3 | 12 |
Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Zullogreen2 sentences2012After discussing the history of the Financial Responsibility Law requiring that persons registering their automobiles must prove financial responsibility either in the form of insurance or by paying an additional registration fee, the Supreme Court of this State decided that the policy behind this law was to be assured of “having financially responsible persons available to meet the claims of persons wrongfully injured in automobile accidents.” [Zullo, supra, 48 N.J. at 371 , 225 A.2d 570 ], Limiting an omnibus clause which in any way obstructed this policy would be declared invalid. 2012After discussing the history of the Financial Responsibility Law requiring that persons registering their automobiles must prove financial responsibility either in the form of insurance or by paying an additional registration fee, the Supreme Court of this State decided that the policy behind this law was to be assured of “having financially responsible persons available to meet the claims of persons wrongfully injured in automobile accidents.” [Zullo, supra, 48 N.J. at 371 , 225 A.2d 570 ], Limiting an omnibus clause which in any way obstructed this policy would be declared invalid. | 1 | 6 |
Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.green2 sentences1997The standard omnibus clause of the policy in that case covered "the named insured, her spouse, and `any person while using the automobile [...] provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or such spouse or with the permission of either.'" Id. at 544 , 264 A. 2d 38 . 1997The standard omnibus clause of the policy in that case covered “the named insured, her spouse, and ‘any person while using the automobile [...] provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or such spouse or with the permission of either.’ ” Id, at 544, 264 A.2d 38 . | 1 | 4 |
Schuncke v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences2005Four years later, in Small v. Schuncke, 42 N.J. 407 , 201 A.2d 56 (1964), we extended the initial permission rule to provide coverage for a subsequent permittee using the vehicle beyond the original permission. 2005Four years later, in Small v. Schuncke, 42 N.J. 407 , 201 A.2d 56 (1964), we extended the initial permission rule to provide coverage for a subsequent permittee using the vehicle beyond the original permission. | 1 | 3 |
Bellafronte v. General Motors Corporationgreen2 sentences1997"Use" explicitly denotes "something other or more comprehensive than either maintenance or operation." Bellafronte, supra, 151 N.J. 1997“Use” explicitly denotes “something other or more comprehensive than either maintenance or operation.” Bellafronte, supra, 151 N.J.Super. at 382 , 376 A.2d 1294 ; see Indemnity Ins. | 1 | 3 |
Halifko v. Cities Service Oil Co.green2 sentences1992Oil Co., 510 F. Supp. 1131, 1136-37 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd o.b. mem., 676 F. 2d 685 (3d Cir.1982): Sound policy considerations weigh strongly against construing an omnibus clause to cover the owner of a loading platform on which a named insured is injured solely due to an unsafe condition on the premises. 1983The risk insured against should be limited to negligence in loading or unloading the automotive vehicle, including preliminary and subsequent measures proximate in time related to its loading or unloading. [ Id. at 185] We find equally persuasive the rationale used by Judge Debevoise in Halifko v. Cities Service Oil Co., 510 F. Supp. at 1136-1137 , supra, where he observed: Sound policy considerations weigh strongly against construing an omnibus clause to cover the owner of a loading platform on which a named insured is injured solely due to an unsafe condition on the premises. | 1 | 2 |
Belas v. Melanovichgreen2 sentences1989These reported decisions require some connection between the named insured’s conduct and the operation of the car by the third person. “[T]he critical question will always be whether the named insured said or did something that warranted the belief that the ensuing use was with his consent.” Belas v. Melanovich, 247 Pa.Super. 313, 324 , 372 A.2d 478, 484 (1977). 1989These reported decisions require some connection between the named insured’s conduct and the operation of the car by the third person. “[T]he critical question will always be whether the named insured said or did something that warranted the belief that the ensuing use was with his consent.” Belas v. Melanovich, 247 Pa.Super. 313, 324 , 372 A.2d 478, 484 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Volk v. Cacchionegreen2 sentences1989We agree with the able opinion of the Court below that the evidence was insufficient to sustain plaintiffs burden of proving that [the son] was the person who was insured by defendant, or to warrant the submission to the jury of the question of implied permissive use allegedly granted by [the named insured] to [the son’s friend] for his pleasure trip the night (and morning) of the accident. [ 395 Pa. at 642 , 150 A.2d at 852 (emphasis in original).] Equally on point is the recent federal district court decision in Motorists Mut. 1989We agree with the able opinion of the Court below that the evidence was insufficient to sustain plaintiffs burden of proving that [the son] was the person who was insured by defendant, or to warrant the submission to the jury of the question of implied permissive use allegedly granted by [the named insured] to [the son’s friend] for his pleasure trip the night (and morning) of the accident. [ 395 Pa. at 642 , 150 A.2d at 852 (emphasis in original).] Equally on point is the recent federal district court decision in Motorists Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Tooker v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co.green1 sentence1983Co., 128 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Lewandowski v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co.green1 sentence1980It is hoped, however, that the appellate courts will take this opportunity to reexamine the Buzzone application of the 1934 Restatement as it relates to the facts of the present case. [ 149 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
Denham v. Bedfordgreen2 sentences1979Super. 133, 138 (App.Div. 1979) (every automobile policy offered as proof of financial responsibility in this State is deemed to contain the broad omnibus clause required by N.J.S.A. 39:6-46(a), the Motor Vehicle-Security Responsibility Law); Denham v. Bedford, 82 Mich. App. 107 , 266 N.W. 2d 682, 686 (Ct.App. 1977) (prejudgment interest statute becomes a part of the insurance contract). *365 On the other hand the plaintiffs too were laboring under certain strictures. 1979Super. 133, 138 (App.Div. 1979) (every automobile policy offered as proof of financial responsibility in this State is deemed to contain the broad omnibus clause required by N.J.S.A. 39:6-46(a), the Motor Vehicle-Security Responsibility Law); Denham v. Bedford, 82 Mich. App. 107 , 266 N.W. 2d 682, 686 (Ct.App. 1977) (prejudgment interest statute becomes a part of the insurance contract). *365 On the other hand the plaintiffs too were laboring under certain strictures. | 1 | 1 |
| Baesler v. Globe Indemnity Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kish v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. New Horizons, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Zuvich v. Ballaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schultz v. Kroschgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Motor Club Fire & Casualty Co. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance
green
2 sentences2003Accordingly, the Court held that the son’s conduct neither vitiated the insured’s consent to his use of the car, nor “deprive[d] him of the protection afforded by the omnibus clause of [the insured’s] insurance policy.” Id. at 439 , 375 A.2d 639 . 2003Accordingly, the Court held that the son’s conduct neither vitiated the insured’s consent to his use of the car, nor “deprive[d] him of the protection afforded by the omnibus clause of [the insured’s] insurance policy.” Id. at 439 , 375 A.2d 639 . | 3 | 1995–2003 |
Rutgers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Collins
green
2 sentences2006The Rutgers policy issued to Stephen appears to contain the same language as the policy the Court interpreted in Rutgers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Collins, 158 N.J. 542, 548 , 730 A.2d 833 (1999) to provide coverage in accordance with “the omnibus clause of the policy required by N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1” and the “initial permission rule” adopted in Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 33 N.J. 488 , 166 A.2d 345 (1960). 2006The Rutgers policy issued to Stephen appears to contain the same language as the policy the Court interpreted in Rutgers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Collins, 158 N.J. 542, 548 , 730 A.2d 833 (1999) to provide coverage in accordance with “the omnibus clause of the policy required by N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1” and the “initial permission rule” adopted in Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 33 N.J. 488 , 166 A.2d 345 (1960). | 2 | 1999–2006 |
Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1993Plaintiff Cosmopolitan insured tortfeasors Essex News and, under the omnibus clause, its employee McCollum, when operating owned, non-owned and hired vehicles used in the business of Essex News. 28 N.J. at 556 , 147 A. 2d 529 . 1993Plaintiff Cosmopolitan insured tortfeasors Essex News and, under the omnibus clause, its employee McCollum, when operating owned, non-owned and hired vehicles used in the business of Essex News. 28 N.J. at 556 , 147 A. 2d 529 . | 2 | 1962–1993 |
INDEMNITY INS. CO., ETC. v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1975Co. of New York, supra, the omnibus clause included "any person while using the automobile * * * provided the actual use of the automobile is with * * * permission" of the named insured. 1975In the latter case the court enunciated the rule that "coverage under an omnibus clause like the one before us depends upon whether the use, as distinct from the operation, of the automobile is a permitted one." Id., 33 N.J. at 514-515. *371 In the case at hand, the clause reads: * * * any other person using such automobile with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission * * *. | 2 | 1973–1975 |
Grenada Bank v. Lester
green
2 sentences1969The court said: "In stating that the defendant would be responsible under the omnibus clause of the policy for the negligent act or acts of the passenger, Don Bolton, which might be established on the trial of the case as a proximate cause of the injury and damage to plaintiff, we are agreeing with the contention of counsel for plaintiff that Don Bolton at the time was `using' the motor vehicle under the liberal interpretation required of such clauses in an insurance policy, Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 230 La. 867 , 89 So. 2 d 373; Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Machinery, Inc., 1957The plaintiff cites Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 230 La. 867 , 89 So. 2 d 373, 376 ( Sup. Ct. 1956) for the statement: "It thus becomes evident that the meaning given to the unqualified word `insured' in the omnibus clause does not necessarily apply in, and can hardly extend to, the exclusion clause, and that any attempt to construe the use of the word in one clause by reference to the other clause obscures and confuses, rather than clarifies, the meaning of both the word and the clause." In effect, the plaintiff contends that the word "insured" in paragraphs (d) and (e) is | 2 | 1957–1969 |
Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.
green
2 sentences1969The court said: "In stating that the defendant would be responsible under the omnibus clause of the policy for the negligent act or acts of the passenger, Don Bolton, which might be established on the trial of the case as a proximate cause of the injury and damage to plaintiff, we are agreeing with the contention of counsel for plaintiff that Don Bolton at the time was `using' the motor vehicle under the liberal interpretation required of such clauses in an insurance policy, Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 230 La. 867 , 89 So. 2 d 373; Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Machinery, Inc., 1957The plaintiff cites Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 230 La. 867 , 89 So. 2 d 373, 376 ( Sup. Ct. 1956) for the statement: "It thus becomes evident that the meaning given to the unqualified word `insured' in the omnibus clause does not necessarily apply in, and can hardly extend to, the exclusion clause, and that any attempt to construe the use of the word in one clause by reference to the other clause obscures and confuses, rather than clarifies, the meaning of both the word and the clause." In effect, the plaintiff contends that the word "insured" in paragraphs (d) and (e) is | 2 | 1957–1969 |
Costanzo v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences1962Co., 30 N.J. 262 (1959), whose facts he found to be very similar to those of this appeal, *408 and concluded that Baker was an additional insured under the omnibus clause of the Allstate policy. 1960Co., 30 N.J. 262 (1959), construing an identical omnibus clause. | 2 | 1960–1962 |
INDEMNITY, ETC., OF NA v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of NY
neutral
2 sentences1962"Expressed more explicitly, I resolve that a non-ownership clause with an excess coverage provision as embodied in the plaintiff's policy does not constitute other valid and collectible insurance within the import and meaning of a primary policy with an omnibus clause." The American Surety Company case has been cited with approval in Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Company v. Continental Casualty Company, 28 N.J. 554 (1959); Indemnity, etc., of N.A. v. Metropolitan, etc. of New York, 53 N.J. 1959The trial judge was of the opinion that "* * * the language of the omnibus clause does not require plaintiffs to establish that the named insured had expressly or impliedly given Acerra [the driver when the accident occurred] permission to drive or operate her automobile; all that they must show is that the actual or particular use, i.e., the purpose for which it was being employed by Acerra at the time of the accident, was with the permission of the named insured * * *." ( 53 N.J. | 2 | 1959–1962 |
Proformance Insurance v. Jones
green
2 sentences2019Co. 185 N.J. at 412 .1 It "concluded that the permittee's 'deviation from the purpose 1 The rule states that 'if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a A-5393-16T4 12 for which she borrowed the vehicle did not annul the protection afforded her and the injured plaintiffs by the omnibus clause of [the] policy.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Matits, 33 N.J. at 497 ). 2019Co. 185 N.J. at 412 .1 It "concluded that the permittee's 'deviation from the purpose 1 The rule states that 'if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a A-5393-16T4 12 for which she borrowed the vehicle did not annul the protection afforded her and the injured plaintiffs by the omnibus clause of [the] policy.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Matits, 33 N.J. at 497 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Smithbower v. NAVISTAR INTERN.
neutral
2 sentences2001Corp., 265 N.J.Super. 119, 124 , 625 A. 2d 586 (App.Div.1993), the critical inquiry for determining whether a defendant is an additional insured under the omnibus clause is "whether the acts of negligence alleged against [Sears] were part of the use of the vehicle when the injury occurred. " (Emphasis added) We find no merit in the arguments that coverage provided in compulsory automobile insurance should be extended to cover liability of persons other than the owner or operator for maintenance negligently performed by others on the covered automobile at some time prior to the happening of an 2001Corp., 265 N.J.Super. 119, 124 , 625 A. 2d 586 (App.Div.1993), the critical inquiry for determining whether a defendant is an additional insured under the omnibus clause is "whether the acts of negligence alleged against [Sears] were part of the use of the vehicle when the injury occurred. " (Emphasis added) We find no merit in the arguments that coverage provided in compulsory automobile insurance should be extended to cover liability of persons other than the owner or operator for maintenance negligently performed by others on the covered automobile at some time prior to the happening of an | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Scott v. Salerno
green
2 sentences1999Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J.Super. 437, 445 , 688 A. 2d 614 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 409 , 694 A. 2d 194 (1997); Parkway Iron & Metal Co. v. New Jersey Mfrs. 1999Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J.Super. 437, 445 , 688 A. 2d 614 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 409 , 694 A. 2d 194 (1997); Parkway Iron & Metal Co. v. New Jersey Mfrs. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Ryan v. LCS, INC.
neutral
2 sentences1999Justice Mountain described the concept thus: [T]he policy describing coverage as to non-owned vehicles is broader than that of the omnibus clause.... [W]hether a driver reasonably believes he has permission to operate a particular automobile depends upon the driver's subjective state of mind, examined in light of his social milieu and affected, doubtless, by *838 the mores of a peer group with whom he associates. [ Zurich, supra, 62 N.J. at 183 , 299 A. 2d 704 (Mountain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] We thus held in Ryan v. LCS, Inc., 311 N.J.Super. 618 , 710 A. 2d 1050 (App 1999Justice Mountain described the concept thus: [T]he policy describing coverage as to non-owned vehicles is broader than that of the omnibus clause.... [W]hether a driver reasonably believes he has permission to operate a particular automobile depends upon the driver's subjective state of mind, examined in light of his social milieu and affected, doubtless, by *838 the mores of a peer group with whom he associates. [ Zurich, supra, 62 N.J. at 183 , 299 A. 2d 704 (Mountain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] We thus held in Ryan v. LCS, Inc., 311 N.J.Super. 618 , 710 A. 2d 1050 (App | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Ryan v. LCS, INC.
green
2 sentences1999Justice Mountain described the concept thus: [T]he policy describing coverage as to non-owned vehicles is broader than that of the omnibus clause.... [W]hether a driver reasonably believes he has permission to operate a particular automobile depends upon the driver's subjective state of mind, examined in light of his social milieu and affected, doubtless, by *838 the mores of a peer group with whom he associates. [ Zurich, supra, 62 N.J. at 183 , 299 A. 2d 704 (Mountain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] We thus held in Ryan v. LCS, Inc., 311 N.J.Super. 618 , 710 A. 2d 1050 (App 1999Justice Mountain described the concept thus: [T]he policy describing coverage as to non-owned vehicles is broader than that of the omnibus clause.... [W]hether a driver reasonably believes he has permission to operate a particular automobile depends upon the driver's subjective state of mind, examined in light of his social milieu and affected, doubtless, by *838 the mores of a peer group with whom he associates. [ Zurich, supra, 62 N.J. at 183 , 299 A. 2d 704 (Mountain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] We thus held in Ryan v. LCS, Inc., 311 N.J.Super. 618 , 710 A. 2d 1050 (App | 1 | 1999–1999 |
CHEZ SEZ, VIII., INC. v. Poritz
green
2 sentences1999Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J.Super. 437, 445 , 688 A. 2d 614 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 409 , 694 A. 2d 194 (1997); Parkway Iron & Metal Co. v. New Jersey Mfrs. 1999Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J.Super. 437, 445 , 688 A.2d 614 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 409 , 694 A.2d 194 (1997); Parkway Iron & Metal Co. v. New Jersey Mfrs. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Zurich American Insurance
green
2 sentences1999Justice Mountain described the concept thus: [T]he policy describing coverage as to non-owned vehicles is broader than that of the omnibus clause.... [W]hether a driver reasonably believes he has permission to operate a particular automobile depends upon the driver's subjective state of mind, examined in light of his social milieu and affected, doubtless, by *838 the mores of a peer group with whom he associates. [ Zurich, supra, 62 N.J. at 183 , 299 A. 2d 704 (Mountain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] We thus held in Ryan v. LCS, Inc., 311 N.J.Super. 618 , 710 A. 2d 1050 (App 1999Justice Mountain described the concept thus: [T]he policy describing coverage as to non-owned vehicles is broader than that of the omnibus clause.... [W]hether a driver reasonably believes he has permission to operate a particular automobile depends upon the driver's subjective state of mind, examined in light of his social milieu and affected, doubtless, by *838 the mores of a peer group with whom he associates. [ Zurich, supra, 62 N.J. at 183 , 299 A. 2d 704 (Mountain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] We thus held in Ryan v. LCS, Inc., 311 N.J.Super. 618 , 710 A. 2d 1050 (App | 1 | 1999–1999 |
American Surety Co. of NY v. American Indem. Co.
green
2 sentences1993Id. at 350 , 72 A. 2d 798 . 1993Id. at 350 , 72 A. 2d 798 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Cenno v. W. VIRGINIA PAPER & PULP CO.
green
2 sentences1993We reversed the trial court's ruling that defendants were additional insureds under the omnibus clause of the plaintiff's employer's insurance policy, concluding that defendants' negligence was not related to plaintiff's use of the covered vehicle. "[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether the acts of negligence charged to defendants were a part of the overall loading or unloading operation so that, in the commission of the negligent acts charged, defendants can be said to have been using the vehicle and thereby became additional insureds under the policy." Id. at 45 , 262 A. 2d 223 . 1993We reversed the trial court's ruling that defendants were additional insureds under the omnibus clause of the plaintiff's employer's insurance policy, concluding that defendants' negligence was not related to plaintiff's use of the covered vehicle. "[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether the acts of negligence charged to defendants were a part of the overall loading or unloading operation so that, in the commission of the negligent acts charged, defendants can be said to have been using the vehicle and thereby became additional insureds under the policy." Id. at 45 , 262 A. 2d 223 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Government of Virgin Islands v. Gani
green
1 sentence1992Oil Co., 510 F. Supp. 1131, 1136-37 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd o.b. mem., 676 F. 2d 685 (3d Cir.1982): Sound policy considerations weigh strongly against construing an omnibus clause to cover the owner of a loading platform on which a named insured is injured solely due to an unsafe condition on the premises. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hall v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
green
2 sentences1979Co., 107 Ohio App. 13 , 155 N.E. 2d 462 (Ct. App. 1957), the court held that the act of towing a jeep was a "use" of that jeep within the meaning of the omnibus clause, and granted coverage to the operator of the towing vehicle in a suit by an individual who had been squeezed between the jeep and the towing vehicle while waiting to attach a tow line between them. 1979Co., 107 Ohio App. 13 , 155 N.E. 2d 462 (Ct. App. 1957), the court held that the act of towing a jeep was a "use" of that jeep within the meaning of the omnibus clause, and granted coverage to the operator of the towing vehicle in a suit by an individual who had been squeezed between the jeep and the towing vehicle while waiting to attach a tow line between them. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Metz v. Universal Underwriters Insurance green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Motor Club Fire & Cas. Co. v. NJ Mfrs. Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Capece v. Allstate Ins. green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| LeFelt v. Nasarow green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Willis v. Security Insurance Group green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Gronquist v. Transit Casualty Company green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Patterson v. State green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Eberhart v. Seaboard Air-Line Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Shaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Small v. Schuncke neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Mancuso v. Rothenberg green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Cit. Casualty v. Zambrano Trucking green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Trotter v. Union Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Saffore v. Atlantic Casualty Insurance green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Nicholas v. Independence Indemnity Co. neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Baesler v. Globe Indemnity Co. neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co. green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Zurn green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Brooklyn Watch-Case Co. v. Leach neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Cronan v. Travelers Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Maryland Casualty Co. v. New Jersey Manufacturers (Casualty) Insurance green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.