omnibus clause in Florida

2001Finding "no doubt as to the meaning of the insurance contract or as to the proper interpretation of the omnibus clause or the exclusionary clause," we held that since the only disputes in the case were factual, "the declaratory judgment statute was improperly invoked." Id. at 550-51 .

1996The term “omnibus insured” was also used in Prygrocki v. Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 407 So.2d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), decision approved, 422 So.2d 814 (Fla.1982), to refer to a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle and entitled to the personal injury protection coverage of the policy insuring the motor vehicle.

1974Fla. 1967, 193 So.2d 435 ). [4] The cross-employee exception to the omnibus clause in the USF & G policy was in language identical to the policy involved in the case of General Insurance Company of America v. Reid, Fla.App. 1968, 216 So.2d 41 .

1974Fla. 1967, 193 So.2d 435 ). [4] The cross-employee exception to the omnibus clause in the USF & G policy was in language identical to the policy involved in the case of General Insurance Company of America v. Reid, Fla.App. 1968, 216 So.2d 41 .

1974There could be no coverage under the policy for Schwalm as to the claim which Snelling made against him, because Schwalm simply was not an insured under the policy, i.e., he was not the named insured nor was he an omnibus insured under the omnibus clause because of the "cross-employee exception". [4] The trial court felt that our decision in Allison v. Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Company, Fla.App. 1969, 222 So.2d 254 , supported his ruling, but it does not.

1970Co., 2nd Cir.1953, 208 F.2d 731 ; Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 6th Cir.1955, 228 F.2d 365 ; American Surety Co. of New York v. Canal Insurance Co., 4th Cir.1958, 258 F.2d 934 ; Atlantic National Insurance Co. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, Dist.Ct.S.D.Fla. 1962, 211 F. Supp. 878 .

1970Co., 2nd Cir.1953, 208 F.2d 731 ; Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 6th Cir.1955, 228 F.2d 365 ; American Surety Co. of New York v. Canal Insurance Co., 4th Cir.1958, 258 F.2d 934 ; Atlantic National Insurance Co. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, Dist.Ct.S.D.Fla. 1962, 211 F. Supp. 878 .

1970Co., 2nd Cir.1953, 208 F.2d 731 ; Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 6th Cir.1955, 228 F.2d 365 ; American Surety Co. of New York v. Canal Insurance Co., 4th Cir.1958, 258 F.2d 934 ; Atlantic National Insurance Co. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, Dist.Ct.S.D.Fla. 1962, 211 F. Supp. 878 .

1970Co., 2nd Cir.1953, 208 F.2d 731 ; Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 6th Cir.1955, 228 F.2d 365 ; American Surety Co. of New York v. Canal Insurance Co., 4th Cir.1958, 258 F.2d 934 ; Atlantic National Insurance Co. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, Dist.Ct.S.D.Fla. 1962, 211 F. Supp. 878 .

1966Co. of N.Y., 33 N.J. 507 , 166 A.2d 355 (1960) the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: "Under the omnibus clause of its insurance contract, Metropolitan agreed to cover `any person while using the automobile * * * provided the actual use is with * * * [the named Insured's] permission.' The clause says nothing about operation of the vehicle.

1966Co. of N.Y., 33 N.J. 507 , 166 A.2d 355 (1960) the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: "Under the omnibus clause of its insurance contract, Metropolitan agreed to cover `any person while using the automobile * * * provided the actual use is with * * * [the named Insured's] permission.' The clause says nothing about operation of the vehicle.

1960One of these cases is Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369 , 125 A. 866, 869 , 41 A.L.R. 500 , decided before the adoption in Connecticut of a financial responsibility law requiring a policy with an omnibus clause.

1960One of these cases is Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369 , 125 A. 866, 869 , 41 A.L.R. 500 , decided before the adoption in Connecticut of a financial responsibility law requiring a policy with an omnibus clause.

1960The driver was held to be an assured under the omnibus clause in the insurance policy since he was using the truck with the owner's permission. "[I]f the original taking by the user is with the named insured's consent, every act of the user subsequent thereto while he is driving the vehicle is with the named insured's permission so far as the omnibus clause is concerned, assuming there is no termination of permission; a deviation from the permission is immaterial; the only essential thing is that permission be given in the first instance; the rule is based on the theory that the insurance cont

1960The driver was held to be an assured under the omnibus clause in the insurance policy since he was using the truck with the owner's permission. "[I]f the original taking by the user is with the named insured's consent, every act of the user subsequent thereto while he is driving the vehicle is with the named insured's permission so far as the omnibus clause is concerned, assuming there is no termination of permission; a deviation from the permission is immaterial; the only essential thing is that permission be given in the first instance; the rule is based on the theory that the insurance cont

1960Also without regard to a financial responsibility statute and construing the omnibus clause merely as a voluntary contract, the court concluded, in Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., 1928, 157 Tenn. 301 , 8 S.W.2d 473, 477 , 72 A.L.R. 1368 , that if — "[T]he automobile covered by the policy is delivered to another for use, with the permission of the owner or insured, his subsequent use of it is with the permission of the insured, within the meaning of the policy, regardless of whether the automobile is driven to a place or for a purpose not within the contemplation of the insured when he parte

1960Also without regard to a financial responsibility statute and construing the omnibus clause merely as a voluntary contract, the court concluded, in Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., 1928, 157 Tenn. 301 , 8 S.W.2d 473, 477 , 72 A.L.R. 1368 , that if — "[T]he automobile covered by the policy is delivered to another for use, with the permission of the owner or insured, his subsequent use of it is with the permission of the insured, within the meaning of the policy, regardless of whether the automobile is driven to a place or for a purpose not within the contemplation of the insured when he parte