omnibus hearing in Minnesota

2024“Determinations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to the [district] court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989). 1 In district court, Smith conceded that if the taillight was not visible, then the stop was lawful. 4 As a preliminary matter, we clarify the scope of our review of the record.

2016“Determinations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to the trial court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989).

2026“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43 (quotation omitted).

2026See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43 (explaining that reasonable suspicion must be “based on specific, articulable facts” that allow the officer “to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity”); see also Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393 (stating that, under the reasonable-suspicion standard, the officer must articulate a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity”).

1986Under this standard, a stop is valid if: the police who made the stop are able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that they had a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular persons stopped of criminal activity.” In applying this standard, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances and should remember that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make “inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 62

1986An automobile stop is valid if the police who made the stop are able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that they had a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular persons stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (quoted by State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1983); Berge v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730 (Minn.1985)).

2016See State v. Pederson-Maxwell, 619 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn. App. 2000) (“In order for constitutional challenges to the admission of evidence to be timely, objections to such evidence must be raised at the omnibus hearing.”) Accordingly, the arguments are not reviewable on direct appeal.

2014Expose Did Not Waive His Objection to N.M.’s Testimony As a threshold issue, the state argues that Expose waived the privilege issue on appeal because he failed to object to N.M.’s testimony in a timely fashion under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.01, subdivision 2. 2 We reject this assertion because, unlike a constitutional challenge to the admission of evidence, which must be raised at an omnibus hearing to be timely, see State v. Pederson-Maxwell, 619 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn.App.2000), Expose raised an evidentiary objection based on privilege.

2016In addition, “[d]eterminations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to the trial court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989) (citing State v. Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. 1984)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989). 4 Under Minn. Stat. § 626.16 , “[w]hen the officer conducts the search the officer must give a copy of the warrant . . . to the person in whose possession the premises or the property or things taken were found.” Minor and technical defects in the execution of a s

2015In addition, “determinations of credibility of witnesses at the omnibus hearing are left to the [district] court, and those determinations will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. App. 1989) (citing State v. Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. 1984)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989).

2014Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 550-51 , 141 N.W.2d 3, 11 (1965); see also State v. Pederson–Maxwell, 619 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that “[i]n order for constitutional challenges to the admission of evidence to be timely, objections to such evidence must be raised at the omnibus hearing” in the form of a pretrial motion to suppress); State v. Brunes, 373 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that defendant waived his constitutional objection to admission of evidence by failing to raise the issue at the omnibus hearing), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1985).

1996See State v. Brunes, 373 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn.App.1985) (declining to address the propriety of an unannounced nighttime search because the defendant first raised it after the omnibus hearing and, thus, deprived the state of an opportunity to present evidence), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1985); see also State v. Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn.1984) (treating the issue of falsity or reckless disregard as a question of fact). *57 Lieberg next asserts the police quoted a 1988 memorandum recounting a statement made by his probation officer, who described Lieberg as an “accident waiting to hap

1995After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, appellant Neil Hjelmstad waived his right to a jury trial and entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn.1980), based on police reports and the transcript from an Omnibus hearing.

1995At the conclusion of the omnibus hearing, the district court denied the respondent’s motion to suppress his statements to his father, finding that “[n]o Miranda [w]aming was required, and the defendant’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination were not violated.” On November 1, 1993, in a plea agreement pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn.1980), the state dismissed the theft charge, and the parties submitted the charge of receiving stolen property to the court.

2024See State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995) (“The officer must be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and 6 objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.”).

2016At the omnibus hearing, one of the arresting officers testified that she did not have criteria to identify the patrons who were asked to produce identification, “It was basically just the first person I came up to in the bar.” Id. at 392 .

2024State v. Rud, 359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984).

2014For example, in State v. Rud, the question presented was whether a defendant, accused of criminal sexual conduct, could compel the alleged child victims and other potential child witnesses to testify at the defendant’s omnibus hearing. 359 N.W.2d at 575 .

2024See Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d at 56 .

2014P. 10.01 (requiring that "issues ... that can be determined without trial ... must be made before trial” or be considered waived); State v. Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn.App.1996) (holding that defendant waived probable-cause issues by failing to raise them at the omnibus hearing).

2014See State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349 , 356–57 (Minn. App. 2002).

2014See Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d at 356-357 (holding that a motion to reopen an omnibus hearing is within the district court’s discretion, and its decision to deny appellant’s motion was not in error in that case); see also State v. Menth, No. !05-1547, 2006 WL 1984730 , at *2 (Minn. App. July 18, 2006) (stating that “we review a district court’s decision not to reopen an omnibus hearing under an abuse-of-discretion standard”).

2016The supreme court said, “Th[is] case is thus distinguishable from State v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1977), where, although there was some indication in the record that the officer may have observed what might be termed ‘an evasive maneuver’ by the driver, the officer was totally unable to articulate at the omnibus hearing why he became suspicious of the vehicle.” Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 827 .

1995The case is thus distinguishable from State v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.1977), where, although there was some indication in the record that the officer may have observed what might be termed “an evasive maneuver” by the driver, the officer was totally unable to articulate at the omnibus hearing why he became suspicious of the vehicle.

2015The supreme court reasoned that “the focus of the omnibus hearing was on other issues relating to the taking of the confession” and that “[i]t was not until the prosecutor received the defendant’s omnibus hearing brief, filed simultaneously with the state’s brief, that the prosecutor could know that the defense was making an issue of the adequacy of the warning given defendant.” Id.

2014In its brief, the state addressed the Miranda issues “on which defense counsel’s questioning at the omnibus hearing had focused.” Id. at 296 .

1993See State v. Florence, 306 Minn. 442, 460 , 239 N.W.2d 892, 903 (1976) (“trial judge’s function at the omnibus hearing does not extend to an assessment of the relative credibility of conflicting testimony”).

1993See State v. Florence, 306 Minn. 442, 460 , 239 N.W.2d 892, 903 (1976) (“trial judge’s function at the omnibus hearing does not extend to an assessment of the relative credibility of conflicting testimony”).

2026See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43 (explaining that reasonable suspicion must be “based on specific, articulable facts” that allow the officer “to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity”); see also Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393 (stating that, under the reasonable-suspicion standard, the officer must articulate a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity”).

2011The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2026State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 448 (Minn. 1997) (citing Minn. R.

2026State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 448 (Minn. 1997) (citing Minn. R.

2025See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663 (1979) (“To insist neither upon an appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular automobile nor upon some other substantial and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches.”) (quotation omitted). 9 Here, the police officer testified at the omnibus hearing that he sought to confirm whether the sign in Engel’s window was a temporary registration tag.

1983See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297 , 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975).

2015“When this court reviews a trial court’s order following an omnibus hearing, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause as they relate to searches and seizures ‘should be reviewed de novo on appeal.’” State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382-83 (Minn. 1998)) “The question of the legality of the arrest turns not on the reasonableness or practicality of obtaining a warrant, but on the reasonableness of the arrest.” State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. 1997).

2007When this court reviews a trial court’s order following an omnibus hearing, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause as they relate to searches and seizures “should be reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382-83 (Minn.1998).

2015“When this court reviews a trial court’s order following an omnibus hearing, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause as they relate to searches and seizures ‘should be reviewed de novo on appeal.’” State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382-83 (Minn. 1998)) “The question of the legality of the arrest turns not on the reasonableness or practicality of obtaining a warrant, but on the reasonableness of the arrest.” State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. 1997).

1999Without reference to MRPC 4.2 the trial court determined that the knowledge of the County Attorney’s office and the IRS agents that appellant was represented by counsel was imputed to the remaining investigators executing the search warrant under the “collective knowledge theory” articulated in State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn.1997).

2014Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 550-51 , 141 N.W.2d 3, 11 (1965); see also State v. Pederson–Maxwell, 619 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that “[i]n order for constitutional challenges to the admission of evidence to be timely, objections to such evidence must be raised at the omnibus hearing” in the form of a pretrial motion to suppress); State v. Brunes, 373 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that defendant waived his constitutional objection to admission of evidence by failing to raise the issue at the omnibus hearing), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1985).

2014Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 550-51 , 141 N.W.2d 3, 11 (1965); see also State v. Pederson–Maxwell, 619 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that “[i]n order for constitutional challenges to the admission of evidence to be timely, objections to such evidence must be raised at the omnibus hearing” in the form of a pretrial motion to suppress); State v. Brunes, 373 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that defendant waived his constitutional objection to admission of evidence by failing to raise the issue at the omnibus hearing), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1985).

2008We have said that “[t]he appropriate procedure under the Rules of Evidence is for the prosecutor to request a hearing outside the jury’s presence, preferably before trial at the omnibus hearing, on the matter of whether any defense witness, including the defendant, may be impeached by prior convictions.” Wenberg, 289 N.W.2d at 504-05 (emphasis added).

2008We have said that "[t]he appropriate procedure under the Rules of Evidence is for the prosecutor to request a hearing outside the jury's presence, preferably before trial at the omnibus hearing, on the matter of whether any defense witness, including the defendant, may be impeached by prior convictions." Wenberg, 289 N.W.2d at 504-05 (emphasis added).

2007We concluded that such a remand was necessary in the “interests of justice,” notwithstanding our holding in Garza v. State that the state may waive “an argument that would otherwise support an order denying a motion to suppress evidence if the argument requires a factual record and the state failed to develop that record at the omnibus hearing.” Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 255 -56 (citing Garza, 632 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn.2001)).

2003See Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn.2001).

2006See State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. 1989) (in general, defendant who does not raise an issue in district court waives right to raise issue on appeal); Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 1982) (appellate court can consider constitutional issues not raised to district court when required in interest of justice, when parties had adequate briefing time, and when issues implied at trial).

2001State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn.1989).

2005Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592 . 3 In the present case, the state argues that Scales is inapplicable because at the omnibus hearing Inman did not dispute the validity of the Miranda warning or his subsequent statement.

2002In State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.1994), this court mandated that police record all custodial interrogations, including the Miranda warning, or risk suppression of the evidence obtained.

1977In State v. Luciow, 308 Minn. 6 , 240 N. W. 2d 833 (1976), this court held that the defendant’s prima-facie showing of material misrepresentation entitled him to challenge the validity of a facially sufficient affidavit at the omnibus hearing sanctioned by Rule 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

1977In State v. Luciow, 308 Minn. 6 , 240 N. W. 2d 833 (1976), this court held that the defendant’s prima-facie showing of material misrepresentation entitled him to challenge the validity of a facially sufficient affidavit at the omnibus hearing sanctioned by Rule 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2004“A stop is lawful if the officer is able to articulate at the revocation hearing (or at the omnibus hearing in a criminal prosecution) that he had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular persons stopped of criminal activity.” Id. (quotation omitted).

1986ANALYSIS “An automobile stop is valid if the police who made the stop are able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that they had a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular persons stopped of criminal activity.’ ” State v. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)); see also Berge v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn.1985).