omnibus clause in Pennsylvania

1977Co., 85 N.H. 471 , 160 A. 482 ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Nodlere, 69 F. [2d] 955.

1977Co., 85 N.H. 471 , 160 A. 482 ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Nodlere, 69 F. [2d] 955.

1988Co. v. Neary, 366 Pa.Super. at 139-40 , 530 A.2d at 931 : Under an omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy which designates as insured any person using the insured vehicle with the permission of the owner, the permission necessary to elevate the user to the status of an additional insured may be express or implied....

1988Co. v. Neary, 366 Pa.Super. at 139-40 , 530 A.2d at 931 : Under an omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy which designates as insured any person using the insured vehicle with the permission of the owner, the permission necessary to elevate the user to the status of an additional insured may be express or implied....

1965The dissenting opinion in that case describes the reasoning of the majority as “pure semantics in derogation of my conception of the reasonable meaning and purpose of the omnibus clause.” Appellant relies on Volk v. Cacchione, 395 Pa. 636 , 150 A. 2d 849 (1959), and Beatty v. Hoff, 382 Pa. 173 , 114 A. 2d 173 (1955), although neither of these cases involved a specific exclusion from the permitted use.

1965The dissenting opinion in that case describes the reasoning of the majority as “pure semantics in derogation of my conception of the reasonable meaning and purpose of the omnibus clause.” Appellant relies on Volk v. Cacchione, 395 Pa. 636 , 150 A. 2d 849 (1959), and Beatty v. Hoff, 382 Pa. 173 , 114 A. 2d 173 (1955), although neither of these cases involved a specific exclusion from the permitted use.

2006Id.

2000Brower v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Company Ltd., 318 Pa. 440, 444 , 177 A. 826, 828 (1935); Conrad v. Duffin, 158 Pa. Super. 305, 309 , 44 A.2d 770, 772 (1945); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 206 , 224 A.2d 793, 796 (1966); Belas v. Melanovich, 247 Pa. Super. 313 , 372 A.2d 478 (1977); Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Neary, 366 Pa. Super. 135 , 530 A.2d 929 (1987); Adamski v. Miller, 434 Pa. Super. 355 , 643 A.2d 680 (1994), aff’d, 738 A.2d 1033 (Pa. Super 1999).

2000Brower v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Company Ltd., 318 Pa. 440, 444 , 177 A. 826, 828 (1935); Conrad v. Duffin, 158 Pa. Super. 305, 309 , 44 A.2d 770, 772 (1945); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 206 , 224 A.2d 793, 796 (1966); Belas v. Melanovich, 247 Pa. Super. 313 , 372 A.2d 478 (1977); Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Neary, 366 Pa. Super. 135 , 530 A.2d 929 (1987); Adamski v. Miller, 434 Pa. Super. 355 , 643 A.2d 680 (1994), aff’d, 738 A.2d 1033 (Pa. Super 1999).

2000Brower v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Company Ltd., 318 Pa. 440, 444 , 177 A. 826, 828 (1935); Conrad v. Duffin, 158 Pa. Super. 305, 309 , 44 A.2d 770, 772 (1945); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 206 , 224 A.2d 793, 796 (1966); Belas v. Melanovich, 247 Pa. Super. 313 , 372 A.2d 478 (1977); Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Neary, 366 Pa. Super. 135 , 530 A.2d 929 (1987); Adamski v. Miller, 434 Pa. Super. 355 , 643 A.2d 680 (1994), aff’d, 738 A.2d 1033 (Pa. Super 1999).

2000Brower v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Company Ltd., 318 Pa. 440, 444 , 177 A. 826, 828 (1935); Conrad v. Duffin, 158 Pa. Super. 305, 309 , 44 A.2d 770, 772 (1945); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 206 , 224 A.2d 793, 796 (1966); Belas v. Melanovich, 247 Pa. Super. 313 , 372 A.2d 478 (1977); Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Neary, 366 Pa. Super. 135 , 530 A.2d 929 (1987); Adamski v. Miller, 434 Pa. Super. 355 , 643 A.2d 680 (1994), aff’d, 738 A.2d 1033 (Pa. Super 1999).

2000Brower v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Company Ltd., 318 Pa. 440, 444 , 177 A. 826, 828 (1935); Conrad v. Duffin, 158 Pa. Super. 305, 309 , 44 A.2d 770, 772 (1945); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 206 , 224 A.2d 793, 796 (1966); Belas v. Melanovich, 247 Pa. Super. 313 , 372 A.2d 478 (1977); Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Neary, 366 Pa. Super. 135 , 530 A.2d 929 (1987); Adamski v. Miller, 434 Pa. Super. 355 , 643 A.2d 680 (1994), aff’d, 738 A.2d 1033 (Pa. Super 1999).

2000Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Cummings, 438 Pa. Super. 586 , 652 A.2d 1338 (1994); Gift v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 1998 WL 164997 (E.D.

2000Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Cummings, 438 Pa. Super. 586 , 652 A.2d 1338 (1994); Gift v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 1998 WL 164997 (E.D.

1994Co. of America, 402 Pa. *361 473, 167 A.2d 703 (1961) (holding that for purposes of an omnibus clause in an automobile policy, permission given to a driver by the insured may be either express or implied).

1994Co. of America, 402 Pa. 473 , 167 A.2d 703 (1961) (holding that for purposes of an omnibus clause in an automobile policy, permission given to a driver by the insured may be either express or implied).

1986Co., 313 Pa.Super. 404 , 459 A.2d 1292 (1983), the argument that defendant insurer is es-topped from raising the defense of non-permission because the insurer failed to warn him of the limitation makes no sense as applied to this case.

1986Co., 313 Pa.Super. 404 , 459 A.2d 1292 (1983), the argument that defendant insurer is es-topped from raising the defense of non-permission because the insurer failed to warn him of the limitation makes no sense as applied to this case.

1981S.A. 39:6-46(a) coverage issued to an insured must extend to “any other person using or responsible for the use of any such motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of the insured ...” The case of Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board, 117 N.J.Super. 5 , 283 A.2d 350 (1971) involved a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the validity of an exclusionary clause in an automobile liability policy and its effect on the omnibus clause of the policy.

1981S.A. 39:6-46(a) coverage issued to an insured must extend to “any other person using or responsible for the use of any such motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of the insured ...” The case of Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board, 117 N.J.Super. 5 , 283 A.2d 350 (1971) involved a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the validity of an exclusionary clause in an automobile liability policy and its effect on the omnibus clause of the policy.

1977If the disease is, in fact, “dermatitis,” there is no substantial evidence in the record to satisfy the statutory requirement that the incidence- of dermatitis is substantially greater among those engaged in the kind of work she did than it is among the general public. 4 See Imperial Food Products v. Tomarelli, 28 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 150 , 367 A.2d 732 (1977).

1977If the disease is, in fact, “dermatitis,” there is no substantial evidence in the record to satisfy the statutory requirement that the incidence- of dermatitis is substantially greater among those engaged in the kind of work she did than it is among the general public. 4 See Imperial Food Products v. Tomarelli, 28 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 150 , 367 A.2d 732 (1977).

1967Co., 273 F. 2d 53 (8th Cir.); West v. McNamara, 159 Ohio St. 187 , 111 N.E. 2d 909 ; Hamm v. Camerota, 48 Wash. 2d 34 , 290 P. 2d 713 ; 160 A.L.R. p. 1195 et seq.; 5 A.L.R. 2d 666 .” (Emphasis supplied) Appellant argues, however, that the holding in Bailey results only from the fact that the daughter had never consented to the boyfriend’s use of the car; that if the boyfriend in Bailey had received permission from the daughter, who had free use of the automobile, he would have been an additional insured under the omnibus clause, despite the absence of any direct contact between him and the nam

1967Co., 273 F. 2d 53 (8th Cir.); West v. McNamara, 159 Ohio St. 187 , 111 N.E. 2d 909 ; Hamm v. Camerota, 48 Wash. 2d 34 , 290 P. 2d 713 ; 160 A.L.R. p. 1195 et seq.; 5 A.L.R. 2d 666 .” (Emphasis supplied) Appellant argues, however, that the holding in Bailey results only from the fact that the daughter had never consented to the boyfriend’s use of the car; that if the boyfriend in Bailey had received permission from the daughter, who had free use of the automobile, he would have been an additional insured under the omnibus clause, despite the absence of any direct contact between him and the nam

1967Hooper v. Casualty Co., 233 N.C. 154, 158 , 63 S.E. 2d 128 .

1967Hooper v. Casualty Co., 233 N.C. 154, 158 , 63 S.E. 2d 128 .

1967Co., 273 F. 2d 53 (8th Cir.); West v. McNamara, 159 Ohio St. 187 , 111 N.E. 2d 909 ; Hamm v. Camerota, 48 Wash. 2d 34 , 290 P. 2d 713 ; 160 A.L.R. p. 1195 et seq.; 5 A.L.R. 2d 666 .” (Emphasis supplied) Appellant argues, however, that the holding in Bailey results only from the fact that the daughter had never consented to the boyfriend’s use of the car; that if the boyfriend in Bailey had received permission from the daughter, who had free use of the automobile, he would have been an additional insured under the omnibus clause, despite the absence of any direct contact between him and the nam

1967The court further stated: “One reasonably may believe that the use and operation of the [first brother’s] automobile by [the third brother] without the knowledge, consent, or permission of [the first brother], and with only the consent of the [second brother], who, at the time of the accident, was not a passenger in and had neither possession nor control of the antomobile, did not make [the third brother] an additional insured within the meaning of the omnibus clause of the policy.” 273 F. 2d at 56 .

1967The leading case in North Carolina which considers the omnibus clause is Hawley v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, 257 N.C. 381 , 126 S.E. 2d 161 (1962).

1967The leading case in North Carolina which considers the omnibus clause is Hawley v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, 257 N.C. 381 , 126 S.E. 2d 161 (1962).

1965Appellee relies heavily on Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Metropolitan Casualty Company of New York, 33 N.J. 507 , 166 A. 2d 355 (1960), which holds that “use” as distinguished from “operation” determines the question of coverage under an omnibus clause like the one before us and permitted recovery although the operation was by one specifically excluded by the named insured.

1965Appellee relies heavily on Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Metropolitan Casualty Company of New York, 33 N.J. 507 , 166 A. 2d 355 (1960), which holds that “use” as distinguished from “operation” determines the question of coverage under an omnibus clause like the one before us and permitted recovery although the operation was by one specifically excluded by the named insured.

1965The dissenting opinion in that case describes the reasoning of the majority as “pure semantics in derogation of my conception of the reasonable meaning and purpose of the omnibus clause.” Appellant relies on Volk v. Cacchione, 395 Pa. 636 , 150 A. 2d 849 (1959), and Beatty v. Hoff, 382 Pa. 173 , 114 A. 2d 173 (1955), although neither of these cases involved a specific exclusion from the permitted use.

1965The dissenting opinion in that case describes the reasoning of the majority as “pure semantics in derogation of my conception of the reasonable meaning and purpose of the omnibus clause.” Appellant relies on Volk v. Cacchione, 395 Pa. 636 , 150 A. 2d 849 (1959), and Beatty v. Hoff, 382 Pa. 173 , 114 A. 2d 173 (1955), although neither of these cases involved a specific exclusion from the permitted use.