omnibus hearing in Washington

2020Dent, 123 Wn.2d at 480 .

2018Dent, 123 Wn.2d at 480 .

2020While CrR 4.7 does not define the term “disclose,” its general usage, the policies underlying the discovery rules, and CrR 4.7’s provisions “indicate that ‘disclose’ includes 11 No. 78856-6-I/12 making copies of certain kinds of evidence.” State v. Boyd, 160 Wn.2d 424, 433 , 158 P.3d 54 (2007).

2010See CrR 4.7(a); Grenning, 169 Wash.2d at 53, 56-57 , 234 P.3d 169 ; Boyd, 160 Wash.2d at 431-32 , 158 P.3d 54 .

2020Id. at 125-27 .

2020Id. at 126 .

2003NOTES [1] Because we vacate the second degree felony murder conviction on different grounds, we do not address Hughes's argument that insufficient evidence supported finding that he knew he was facilitating second degree murder. [2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (before a custodial interrogation takes place, the police must warn the person of the right to remain silent, that any statement may be used as evidence against the person and that the person has a right to have an attorney). [3] CrR 3.5(a) provides: "When a statement of the accused is to be o

2003NOTES [1] Because we vacate the second degree felony murder conviction on different grounds, we do not address Hughes's argument that insufficient evidence supported finding that he knew he was facilitating second degree murder. [2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (before a custodial interrogation takes place, the police must warn the person of the right to remain silent, that any statement may be used as evidence against the person and that the person has a right to have an attorney). [3] CrR 3.5(a) provides: "When a statement of the accused is to be o

2024Absent clear intent to the contrary, we “give words in a contract their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning.” Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 504 , 115 P.3d 262 (2005).

2024Absent clear intent to the contrary, we “give words in a contract their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning.” Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 504 , 115 P.3d 262 (2005).

2024Absent clear intent to the contrary, we “give words in a contract their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning.” Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 504 , 115 P.3d 262 (2005).

2024Absent clear intent to the contrary, we “give words in a contract their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning.” Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 504 , 115 P.3d 262 (2005).

2020While CrR 4.7 does not define the term “disclose,” its general usage, the policies underlying the discovery rules, and CrR 4.7’s provisions “indicate that ‘disclose’ includes 11 No. 78856-6-I/12 making copies of certain kinds of evidence.” State v. Boyd, 160 Wn.2d 424, 433 , 158 P.3d 54 (2007).

2010See CrR 4.7(a); Grenning, 169 Wash.2d at 53, 56-57 , 234 P.3d 169 ; Boyd, 160 Wash.2d at 431-32 , 158 P.3d 54 .

2016App. 709, 717-18 , 578 P.2d 43 (1978); State v. Acosta, 34 Wn.

2012App. 387 , 661 P.2d 602 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 101 Wn.2d 612 , 683 P.2d 1069 (1984), touch on the subject of impeaching a defendant with pretrial or opening statements. ¶31 In both Dault and Acosta, our courts held that defense counsel’s statements made at an omnibus hearing were attributable to the defendant as “quasi-admissions” and could be used as prior inconsistent statements for purposes of impeachment if the defendant testified.

2007State v. Neidigh, 78 Wash.App. 71, 78 , 895 P.2d 423 (1995). ¶ 37 Mr. O'Donnell relies on CrR 4.7(a)(1) which states that the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant "the following material and information within the prosecuting attorney's possession or control no later than the omnibus hearing: . . . (vi) any record or prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting attorney of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial." "The prosecuting attorney's obligation under this section is limited to material and in

2007App. 71, 78 , 895 P.2d 423 (1995). ¶37 Mr. O’Donnell relies on CrR 4.7(a)(1), which states that the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant “the following material and information within the prosecuting attorney’s possession or control no later than the omnibus hearing: . . . (vi) any record or prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting attorney of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial.” “The prosecuting attorney’s obligation under this section is limited to material and information within the knowl

2007State v. Neidigh, 78 Wash.App. 71, 78 , 895 P.2d 423 (1995). ¶ 37 Mr. O'Donnell relies on CrR 4.7(a)(1) which states that the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant "the following material and information within the prosecuting attorney's possession or control no later than the omnibus hearing: . . . (vi) any record or prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting attorney of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial." "The prosecuting attorney's obligation under this section is limited to material and in

2007App. 71, 78 , 895 P.2d 423 (1995). ¶37 Mr. O’Donnell relies on CrR 4.7(a)(1), which states that the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant “the following material and information within the prosecuting attorney’s possession or control no later than the omnibus hearing: . . . (vi) any record or prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting attorney of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial.” “The prosecuting attorney’s obligation under this section is limited to material and information within the knowl

2003State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118,132 , 942 P.2d 363 (1997) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 , 84 S. Ct. 1489 , 12 L.

2003Broadaway, 133 Wash.2d at 132 , 942 P.2d 363 . [5] It is unchallenged that the detectives advised Hughes of his Miranda rights. [6] Hughes said, "Like I said I'm the only person that was there alone with Dave.

2003State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118,132 , 942 P.2d 363 (1997) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 , 84 S. Ct. 1489 , 12 L.

2003Broadaway, 133 Wash.2d at 132 , 942 P.2d 363 . [5] It is unchallenged that the detectives advised Hughes of his Miranda rights. [6] Hughes said, "Like I said I'm the only person that was there alone with Dave.

2002Bernhard, 45 Wn.

2002Bernhard, 45 Wash.App. at 593 , 726 P.2d 991 .

1998We have held that one of the principles underlying CrR 4.7 is to “afford opportunity for effective cross-examination,” State v. Yates, 111 Wn.2d 793, 797 , 765 P.2d 291 (1988) (quoting Criminal Rules Task Force, Washington Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure 77 (West 1971)).

1998We have held that one of the principles underlying CrR 4.7 is to “afford opportunity for effective cross-examination,” State v. Yates, 111 Wn.2d 793, 797 , 765 P.2d 291 (1988) (quoting Criminal Rules Task Force, Washington Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure 77 (West 1971)).

1965This case is distinguishable from McKee v. Garrison, 37 Wn.2d 37 , 221 P.2d 514 (1950).

1965This case is distinguishable from McKee v. Garrison, 37 Wn.2d 37 , 221 P.2d 514 (1950).

2026State v. Fanger, 34 Wn.

2021App. 2d 501 , 517, 408 P.3d 362 (2017) (holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the knowledge element where it admitted a 10 No. 53255-7-II scheduling order with the date of the omnibus hearing and the defendant’s signature).1 “‘I forgot’ is not a defense to the crime of bail jumping.” Carver, 122 Wn.

2020Id. 10 No. 79225-3-I/11 Under CrR 4.7(a)(1), the State must provide the defendant, prior to the omnibus hearing, any recorded statements of the defendant and any documents it plans to rely on at trial.

2020Bryant, 89 Wn.

2018App. 329, 352 , 383 P.3d 592 (2016)(quoting State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903 , 365 P.3d 746 (2016)). 3 State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 207 P.3d 439 (2009). 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 3 No. 75763-6-1/4 requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required."5 Phipps claims the State failed to present evidence that he had been "released by a court order." At trial, the court admitted the October 1st order resetting the omnibus hearing.

2018App. 329, 352 , 383 P.3d 592 (2016)(quoting State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903 , 365 P.3d 746 (2016)). 3 State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 207 P.3d 439 (2009). 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 3 No. 75763-6-1/4 requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required."5 Phipps claims the State failed to present evidence that he had been "released by a court order." At trial, the court admitted the October 1st order resetting the omnibus hearing.

2018App. 329, 352 , 383 P.3d 592 (2016)(quoting State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903 , 365 P.3d 746 (2016)). 3 State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 207 P.3d 439 (2009). 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 3 No. 75763-6-1/4 requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required."5 Phipps claims the State failed to present evidence that he had been "released by a court order." At trial, the court admitted the October 1st order resetting the omnibus hearing.

2018App. 329, 352 , 383 P.3d 592 (2016)(quoting State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903 , 365 P.3d 746 (2016)). 3 State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 207 P.3d 439 (2009). 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 3 No. 75763-6-1/4 requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required."5 Phipps claims the State failed to present evidence that he had been "released by a court order." At trial, the court admitted the October 1st order resetting the omnibus hearing.

2018App. 329, 352 , 383 P.3d 592 (2016)(quoting State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903 , 365 P.3d 746 (2016)). 3 State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 207 P.3d 439 (2009). 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 3 No. 75763-6-1/4 requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required."5 Phipps claims the State failed to present evidence that he had been "released by a court order." At trial, the court admitted the October 1st order resetting the omnibus hearing.

2018App. 329, 352 , 383 P.3d 592 (2016)(quoting State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903 , 365 P.3d 746 (2016)). 3 State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 207 P.3d 439 (2009). 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 3 No. 75763-6-1/4 requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required."5 Phipps claims the State failed to present evidence that he had been "released by a court order." At trial, the court admitted the October 1st order resetting the omnibus hearing.

2018App. 329, 352 , 383 P.3d 592 (2016)(quoting State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903 , 365 P.3d 746 (2016)). 3 State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209, 214 , 207 P.3d 439 (2009). 4 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 3 No. 75763-6-1/4 requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required."5 Phipps claims the State failed to present evidence that he had been "released by a court order." At trial, the court admitted the October 1st order resetting the omnibus hearing.