omnibus clause in North Carolina

1967Bailey v. Insurance Co., supra; Fehl v. Surety Co., 260 N.C. 440 , 133 S.E. 2d 68 ; Hawley v. Insurance Co., supra. The testimony of Benson was to the effect that Perdue, at about noon, asked for permission to use the car “for 15 or 20 minutes to run up to see if his truck was ready,” and Benson told him he could use the car but “to come back at one o’clock because I had to go to work.” The accident occurred ten hours after the expiration of the time limit thus expressly imposed, assuming this testimony to be true.

1967Bailey v. Insurance Co., supra; Fehl v. Surety Co., 260 N.C. 440 , 133 S.E. 2d 68 ; Hawley v. Insurance Co., supra. The testimony of Benson was to the effect that Perdue, at about noon, asked for permission to use the car “for 15 or 20 minutes to run up to see if his truck was ready,” and Benson told him he could use the car but “to come back at one o’clock because I had to go to work.” The accident occurred ten hours after the expiration of the time limit thus expressly imposed, assuming this testimony to be true.

1986An analysis of the case law interpreting the reach of this statute reveals that at least three classes of persons using an insured automobile must be covered by the omnibus clause: (1) persons named in the insurance policy (“the person named therein”), (2) “original per-mittees” — persons using a vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, and (3) other persons in lawful possession including “second permittees” — third parties using a vehicle with the permission of an “original permittee.” See Belasco v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 73 N.C.

1986App. 413 , 326 S.E. 2d 109 , disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 596 , 332 S.E. 2d 177 (1985) and cases cited therein.

1986Wilson v. Indemnity Corp., 272 N.C. 183, 190 , 158 S.E.2d 1 , 7 (1967).

1986Likewise, in Wilson v. Indemnity Co., 272 N.C. 183 , 158 S.E.2d 1 , this Court found that a bailee's use of the insured vehicle was outside the scope of the owner's permission where the owner gave bailee permission to drive the automobile down the road to a service station so long as the bailee returned the automobile within the hour, and the bailee was involved in a collision nearly twelve hours later.

1986Wilson v. Indemnity Corp., 272 N.C. 183, 190 , 158 S.E.2d 1 , 7 (1967).

1986Likewise, in Wilson v. Indemnity Co., 272 N.C. 183 , 158 S.E.2d 1 , this Court found that a bailee's use of the insured vehicle was outside the scope of the owner's permission where the owner gave bailee permission to drive the automobile down the road to a service station so long as the bailee returned the automobile within the hour, and the bailee was involved in a collision nearly twelve hours later.

1986Packer v. Travelers Insurance Co., 28 N.C.

1986App. 413 , 326 S.E. 2d 109 , disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 596 , 332 S.E. 2d 177 (1985) and cases cited therein.

1986App. 413 , 326 S.E. 2d 109 , disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 596 , 332 S.E. 2d 177 (1985) and cases cited therein.

1980In Caison v. Insurance Co., 36 N.C.

1972The omnibus clause is contained in Section a, Item III, “Definition of Insured”: “With respect to the insurance — for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word ‘insured’ includes the named insured and, if the named insured is an individual, his spouse if a resident of the same household, and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or such spouse or with the permission of either.” In Underwood v. Liability Co.,

1972The omnibus clause is contained in Section a, Item III, “Definition of Insured”: “With respect to the insurance — for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word ‘insured’ includes the named insured and, if the named insured is an individual, his spouse if a resident of the same household, and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or such spouse or with the permission of either.” In Underwood v. Liability Co.,

1972The omnibus clause is contained in Section a, Item III, “Definition of Insured”: “With respect to the insurance — for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word ‘insured’ includes the named insured and, if the named insured is an individual, his spouse if a resident of the same household, and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or such spouse or with the permission of either.” In Underwood v. Liability Co.,

1969North Carolina has interpreted the omnibus clause in automobile liability insurance policies “according to the ‘moderate’ rule.” Bailey v. Insurance Co., supra. Torres v. Smith, 269 N.C. 546 , 153 S.E. 2d 129 ; Rhiner v. Insurance Co., 272 N.C. 737 , 158 S.E. 2d 891 .

1969North Carolina has interpreted the omnibus clause in automobile liability insurance policies “according to the ‘moderate’ rule.” Bailey v. Insurance Co., supra. Torres v. Smith, 269 N.C. 546 , 153 S.E. 2d 129 ; Rhiner v. Insurance Co., 272 N.C. 737 , 158 S.E. 2d 891 .

1969North Carolina has interpreted the omnibus clause in automobile liability insurance policies “according to the ‘moderate’ rule.” Bailey v. Insurance Co., supra. Torres v. Smith, 269 N.C. 546 , 153 S.E. 2d 129 ; Rhiner v. Insurance Co., 272 N.C. 737 , 158 S.E. 2d 891 .

1969North Carolina has interpreted the omnibus clause in automobile liability insurance policies “according to the ‘moderate’ rule.” Bailey v. Insurance Co., supra. Torres v. Smith, 269 N.C. 546 , 153 S.E. 2d 129 ; Rhiner v. Insurance Co., 272 N.C. 737 , 158 S.E. 2d 891 .

1968Hawley v. Insurance Co., supra. In the case of Bailey v. Insurance Co., 265 N.C. 675 , 144 S.E. 2d 898 , the Court in considering permission as used in an omnibus clause of a liability insurance policy, stated: “ ‘Where express permission is relied upon it must' be of an affirmative character, directly and distinctly stated, clear and outspoken, and not merely implied or left to inference.

1968Hawley v. Insurance Co., supra. In the case of Bailey v. Insurance Co., 265 N.C. 675 , 144 S.E. 2d 898 , the Court in considering permission as used in an omnibus clause of a liability insurance policy, stated: “ ‘Where express permission is relied upon it must' be of an affirmative character, directly and distinctly stated, clear and outspoken, and not merely implied or left to inference.

1967Co. v. Certain Underwriters (Lloyds), 34 Ill. 2d 424 , 216 N.E. 2d 665 , the Lloyds’ policy provided that an insured, other than the named insured, if “also covered by other valid and collectible insurance, * * * shall not be indemnified under this policy.” The Illinois Court, citing the above statement in Appleman, held that such exclusionary *351 clause was not set in operation by the existence of another policy containing an “excess” clause.

1967Co. v. Certain Underwriters (Lloyds), 34 Ill. 2d 424 , 216 N.E. 2d 665 , the Lloyds’ policy provided that an insured, other than the named insured, if “also covered by other valid and collectible insurance, * * * shall not be indemnified under this policy.” The Illinois Court, citing the above statement in Appleman, held that such exclusionary *351 clause was not set in operation by the existence of another policy containing an “excess” clause.

1962Hooper v. Casualty Co., 233 N.C. 154, 158 , *384 63 S.E. 2d 128 .

1962Hooper v. Casualty Co., 233 N.C. 154, 158 , *384 63 S.E. 2d 128 .