76 West Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2025 27 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Losh v. McKenziegreen2 sentences2024Va. 762, 768-70 , 277 S.E.2d 606, 611 (1981) (listing the most frequently raised grounds for habeas relief). 5 At the omnibus hearing, the petitioner withdrew his three mental incompetency claims. 3 stated his belief that “in a case like this, which essentially when you see the video comes across as a quasi-execution, the likelihood of mercy is very small.” So, trial counsel testified, “[g]iven the circumstances that we had and the evidence that we received and the fact that all the other charges would be dismissed, [the plea agreement] was without question the best, and I believe the only via 2022As we noted in Losh, an omnibus hearing represents a habeas petitioner’s opportunity to “raise any collateral issues which have not previously been fully and fairly litigated.” 166 W. | 5 | 23 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2024After holding an omnibus hearing, the circuit court granted Mr. Miller habeas relief as to ineffective assistance of trial counsel, finding that Lafler represented a change in the law favorable to Mr. Miller that could be applied retroactively as an exception to res judicata, but found that the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel claim was barred as having been fully litigated and decided in the 2002 habeas action.12 Superintendent Frame appeals that order. 8 194 W. 2022Moreover, [i]n cases involving a criminal conviction based upon a guilty plea, the prejudice requirement of the two-part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 1 During the omnibus hearing, petitioner testified that he did not strike the victim and that he was taking the fall for his brother. 5 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and State v. Miller, 194 W. | 4 | 8 |
Tex S. v. Karen Pszczolokowski, Wardengreen2 sentences2022Because petitioner raises no specific argument in regard to the circuit court’s denial of his claims of consecutive sentences for the same transaction, illegal detention prior to arraignment, erroneous information in pre-sentence report, excessive amount or denial of bail, and improper venue, the circuit court’s order denying relief in regard to these claims is affirmed. 2 Indeed, we have routinely explained that “the primary purpose of an omnibus hearing is grounded in providing the Court with evidence from ‘the most significant witness, the trial attorney,’ in order to give that individual ‘ 2021Further, and significantly, at the omnibus hearing the petitioner offered no evidence whatsoever on this (or any other) issue, relying wholly on his oral argument 28 which could most kindly be described as discursive and in fact was largely 28 Although the petitioner was sworn at the outset of the omnibus hearing, his lengthy statement was not subject to cross-examination and thus did not constitute evidence sufficient to carry the petitioner’s burden of proof. 33 incomprehensible. 29 Thus, the circuit court was left to determine whether ineffective assistance of counsel was apparent on the fa | 2 | 4 |
Gibson v. Dalegreen2 sentences2024Pt. 1, Gibson v. Dale, 173 W. 2015Va. 681, 688 , 319 S.E.2d 806, 813 (1984) ([T]he post-conviction habeas corpus statute leaves the decision of whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing . . . in large part to the sound discretion of the court before which the writ is made returnable.”). 1 In response to the petitioner’s argument that an omnibus hearing was necessary, the majority reasons that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by deciding the petition for habeas corpus without an omnibus hearing because (1) “[i]n an extensive twenty-eight page order the circuit court painstakingly addressed each and every claim for | 2 | 3 |
Universal Underwriters Insurance v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2022Va. 606, 611-12 , 408 S.E.2d 358, 363-64 (1991) (“[T]he legislature’s enactment of the omnibus clause [West Virginia Code 33-6-31(a)] evinces an unmistakable intent to maximize insurance coverage for the greater protection of the public and that effectuation of such intent requires a broad interpretation of the statute.”). 2005Co. v. Taylor, 185 W.Va. 606 , 408 S.E.2d 358 (1991), this Court stated: The purpose of an omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy, as this Court recognized in syllabus point 1 of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 154 W.Va. 448 , 175 S.E.2d 478 (1970), is "to extend coverage, in proper circumstances, to any person using the insured vehicle, and to afford greater protection to the public generally. . . ." Consistent with that purpose, we have recognized that the omnibus clause "is remedial in nature and must be construed liberally so as to provide in | 2 | 3 |
State ex rel. Farmer v. Trentgreen2 sentences2021Va. 231, 234 , 523 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1999) (“It is indisputable that it is within a trial court’s sound discretion to deny a habeas corpus petition without appointing counsel or conducting an omnibus hearing.”). 2020Va. 231, 234 , 523 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1999) (“It is indisputable that it is within a trial court’s sound discretion to deny a habeas corpus petition without appointing counsel or conducting an omnibus hearing.”). | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Waldron v. Scottgreen2 sentences2016Waldron v. Scott, 222 W.Va. 122, 127 , 663 S.E.2d 576, 581 (2008). 8 “The primary purpose of an omnibus hearing is grounded in providing the [c]ourt with evidence from ‘the most significant witness, the trial attorney,’ in order to give that individual ‘the opportunity to explain the motive and reason behind his or her trial behavior.’” Tex S. v. Pszczolkowski, 236 W.Va. 245, 253-54 , 778 S.E.2d 694, 702-03 (2015)(quoting State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 15 , 459 S.E.2d 114, 126 (1995)). 8 properly obtained a Miranda9 waiver from the petitioner. 2016Waldron v. Scott, 222 W.Va. 122, 127 , 663 S.E.2d 576, 581 (2008). 8 “The primary purpose of an omnibus hearing is grounded in providing the [c]ourt with evidence from ‘the most significant witness, the trial attorney,’ in order to give that individual ‘the opportunity to explain the motive and reason behind his or her trial behavior.’” Tex S. v. Pszczolkowski, 236 W.Va. 245, 253-54 , 778 S.E.2d 694, 702-03 (2015)(quoting State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 15 , 459 S.E.2d 114, 126 (1995)). 8 properly obtained a Miranda9 waiver from the petitioner. | 2 | 2 |
Burr v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2024In Burr, the SCAWV reasoned that “[t]he purpose of an omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy being to extend coverage, in proper circumstances, to any person using the insured vehicle, and to afford greater protection to the public generally, such clause should be given a liberal construction so as to afford coverage thereunder.” 178 W. 1991Having concluded that the legislature’s enactment of the omnibus clause evinces an unmistakable intent to maximize insurance coverage for the greater protection of the public and that effectuation of such intent requires a broad interpretation *612 of the statute, it necessarily follows that the “initial permission” rule rather than the “minor deviation” rule best comports with and aids in the accomplishment of this “policy of liberalizing coverage.” Id. 178 W.Va. at 404 , 359 S.E.2d at 632 . | 1 | 3 |
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance v. Acordgreen2 sentences2000See Syl. pt. 2, id. (“Consistent with the omnibus clause of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a) (1992), an insurer may properly deny liability coverage where the express terms of an automobile insurance policy provide that in order for liability coverage to exist, a driver, who is not otherwise insured under the policy, must have received the named insured’s permission to use the automobile, and said driver lacked tire express or implied permission of the named insured prior to using the vehicle.”). 2000See Syl. pt. 2, id. ("Consistent with the omnibus clause of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a) (1992), an insurer may properly deny liability coverage where the express terms of an automobile insurance policy provide that in order for liability coverage to exist, a driver, who is not otherwise insured under the policy, must have received the named insured's permission to use the automobile, and said driver lacked the express or implied permission of the named insured prior to using the vehicle."). | 1 | 2 |
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualtygreen1 sentence2025Ass’n v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas., 891 P.2d 538, 541 (N. M. 1995) (holding that coverage under the omnibus clause “extends to any subsequent permittee operating an insured vehicle as long as the named insured has given his or her initial permission to use the vehicle”); Stone, 478 S.E.2d at 886 . 19 that it had possession and control of it and could consent to Mr. Cooper’s use or occupancy of it so as to entitle Mr. Cooper to UIM coverage. | 1 | 1 |
Keystone Insurance v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.green2 sentences2025That the non-owned vehicle in which Mr. Cooper was riding when he was injured by an underinsured motorist was insured for liability under the policy issued to Pison did not give Pison an interest in the vehicle such 22 See id. 23 See id. at 279 (“In short, in order to bring the omnibus clause into play, the policy here in controversy required consent by the named insured. 2025That the non-owned vehicle in which Mr. Cooper was riding when he was injured by an underinsured motorist was insured for liability under the policy issued to Pison did not give Pison an interest in the vehicle such 22 See id. 23 See id. at 279 (“In short, in order to bring the omnibus clause into play, the policy here in controversy required consent by the named insured. | 1 | 1 |
Roe v. Flores-Ortegagreen1 sentence2024Undermining the credibility of petitioner’s stated desire to appeal, the circuit court found it relevant that there was “no record of the [p]etitioner having written directly to the Court regarding his desire to appeal and [his attorney’s] alleged refusal to do so, as the [p]etitioner had previously done when he was unsatisfied with his court-appointed representation.” Further, the court advised petitioner of his right to appeal at the conclusion of his revocation hearing, and petitioner waited over three years to raise this issue in a petition for habeas corpus, which impairs his self-serving | 1 | 1 |
State v. Honakergreen1 sentence2022See State v. Honaker, 193 W. | 1 | 1 |
| Riffe v. Armstronggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Edward Charles L.green | 1 | 1 |
| Powell v. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2025An omnibus hearing was held on August 7, 2023, and on September 20, 2023, the circuit court issued an order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that the petitioner failed to meet the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).5 We review the circuit court’s order “and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. 2022Moreover, [i]n cases involving a criminal conviction based upon a guilty plea, the prejudice requirement of the two-part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 1 During the omnibus hearing, petitioner testified that he did not strike the victim and that he was taking the fall for his brother. 5 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and State v. Miller, 194 W. | 5 | 2018–2025 |
Samuel Anstey v. David Ballard, Warden
green
2 sentences2020In Syllabus Point 3 of Anstey v. Ballard, 237 W. 2019The contention that he should have a new omnibus hearing is DENIED.” It is from the circuit court’s January 25, 2018, order that petitioner now appeals. 2 In Syllabus Point one of Anstey v. Ballard, 237 W. | 3 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2020In addition to the standards set forth above, we have found that “[w]here a counsel’s performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occurrences involving strategy, tactics and arguable courses of action, his conduct will be deemed effectively assistive of his client’s interests, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the defense of an accused.” Syllabus point 21, State v. Thomas, 157 W. 2019Va. 640 , 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). 6 First, petitioner argues that he “received ineffective assistance of counsel at the pre-trial stages of the proceedings resulting in the unknowing and unintelligent plea of guilty to the first- [d]egree [m]urder.”3 On appeal, petitioner alleges that trial counsel placed “undue pressure” upon him to accept the plea agreement, and that they “did not offer [him] an option of exercising his right to a jury trial.” At the omnibus hearing, petitioner testified that he “had no choice” but to enter the plea if he ever “wanted to go home again.” Indeed, in light of th | 3 | 2015–2020 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2005Co. v. Taylor, 185 W.Va. 606 , 408 S.E.2d 358 (1991), this Court stated: The purpose of an omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy, as this Court recognized in syllabus point 1 of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 154 W.Va. 448 , 175 S.E.2d 478 (1970), is "to extend coverage, in proper circumstances, to any person using the insured vehicle, and to afford greater protection to the public generally. . . ." Consistent with that purpose, we have recognized that the omnibus clause "is remedial in nature and must be construed liberally so as to provide in 2005Co. v. Taylor, 185 W.Va. 606 , 408 S.E.2d 358 (1991), this Court stated: The purpose of an omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy, as this Court recognized in syllabus point 1 of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 154 W.Va. 448 , 175 S.E.2d 478 (1970), is "to extend coverage, in proper circumstances, to any person using the insured vehicle, and to afford greater protection to the public generally. . . ." Consistent with that purpose, we have recognized that the omnibus clause "is remedial in nature and must be construed liberally so as to provide in | 3 | 1987–2005 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2021In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 15 where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87 . 2014On appeal, petitioner raises eight claims that were rejected by the circuit court in its order: (1) that the circuit court erred in refusing petitioner’s subpoena requests and in not ruling on discovery issues prior to the omnibus hearing; (2) that Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), was violated; (3) that the imposition of a life sentence pursuant to the recidivist statute was unconstitutional; (4) that the State was impermissibly allowed to present the name and nature of petitioner’s prior offenses despite his offer to stipulate to the previous offenses; (5) that a jury instruction on int | 2 | 2014–2021 |
Kennedy v. Frazier
green
2 sentences2019The circuit court explained that “[a] habeas corpus proceeding is designed to address constitutional issues and is not designed to provide a [p]etitioner an opportunity, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, to second guess trial counsel and to retry, as a bench trial, the underlying criminal case.” The circuit court a guilty plea and the record supports the conclusion that a jury could convict him.” Id. at 10 , 357 S.E.2d at 43 . 4 In Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W.Va. 762, 768-70 , 277 S.E.2d 606, 611-12 (1981), we compiled a non-exclusive list of potential grounds that a circuit court should addres 2019The circuit court explained that “[a] habeas corpus proceeding is designed to address constitutional issues and is not designed to provide a [p]etitioner an opportunity, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, to second guess trial counsel and to retry, as a bench trial, the underlying criminal case.” The circuit court a guilty plea and the record supports the conclusion that a jury could convict him.” Id. at 10 , 357 S.E.2d at 43 . 4 In Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W.Va. 762, 768-70 , 277 S.E.2d 606, 611-12 (1981), we compiled a non-exclusive list of potential grounds that a circuit court should addres | 2 | 2015–2019 |
State v. Green
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Collins v. New York Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1970This was concurred in by our Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. American Casualty Company, 150 W.Va. 435 , 146 S.E.2d 842 , when it quoted with approval from Collins v. New York Casualty Company, 140 W.Va. 1 , 82 S.E.2d 288 , the following: “Because the purpose of an omnibus clause in an automobile public liability insurance policy is not to limit the insurer’s liability, but to provide additional coverage, the clause is designed to protect not only those entrusted with the use of the automobile, but the public in general, and therefore the provisions of the clause shou 1970This was concurred in by our Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. American Casualty Company, 150 W.Va. 435 , 146 S.E.2d 842 , when it quoted with approval from Collins v. New York Casualty Company, 140 W.Va. 1 , 82 S.E.2d 288 , the following: “Because the purpose of an omnibus clause in an automobile public liability insurance policy is not to limit the insurer’s liability, but to provide additional coverage, the clause is designed to protect not only those entrusted with the use of the automobile, but the public in general, and therefore the provisions of the clause shou | 2 | 1963–1970 |
State v. Sugg
green
1 sentence2025The remarks in question described “the murder as being in cold blood . . . the [p]etitioner as having ice water in his veins . . . [that] the [p]etitioner loved no one . . . that Osama Bin Laden may have been a loving son, and . . . the [p]etitioner as a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” The court found these statements to be prejudicial but isolated, and they did not “rise to the level of being improper . . . mislead the jury . . . or divert the jury’s attention.” The court also ruled that the prosecutor’s remarks were not so damaging that they required reversal under Syllabus Point 6 of State v. Su | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mathena v. Haines
green
1 sentence2025Pt. 1, in part, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Stone v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2025Ass’n v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas., 891 P.2d 538, 541 (N. M. 1995) (holding that coverage under the omnibus clause “extends to any subsequent permittee operating an insured vehicle as long as the named insured has given his or her initial permission to use the vehicle”); Stone, 478 S.E.2d at 886 . 19 that it had possession and control of it and could consent to Mr. Cooper’s use or occupancy of it so as to entitle Mr. Cooper to UIM coverage. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Nicholson
green
1 sentence2024Some analysis needed to be done in the face of signs that the circumstances surrounding the “recantations” should be viewed with at least some suspicion. (b) Inherent Unreliability of Recantation Evidence We have had little opportunity to discuss “recantation” evidence, but in the context of the Frazier factors it has been viewed as impeachment evidence of a witness’s own prior statement.40 Where a recanting witness was a key witness for the state, we found in State v. Stewart that that type of impeachment evidence may be sufficient to meet the criteria of the fifth Frazier factor, provided th | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Renewed Investigation of the State Police Crime Laboratory, Serology Division
green
2 sentences2022In 1991, the circuit court appointed petitioner counsel and held an omnibus hearing 1 “Zain III” refers to In re Renewed Investigation of State Police Crime Lab’y, Serology Div., 219 W. 2022Va. 408 , 633 S.E.2d 762 (2006). 1 on one of petitioner’s habeas petitions, which it ultimately denied. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. James
green
1 sentence2022It is beyond cavil that the facts presented at the omnibus hearing in this case “suggest[] that a plea agreement exited.” See id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Justice v. Hedrick green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| McCoy v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Thomas v. Leverette green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Moss green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Smith v. Hedrick
green
1 sentence2021Petitioner further argues that none of the fourteen issues set forth in the first habeas petition were adjudicated prior to the August 2, 2016, omnibus hearing because our December 6, 2006, order granting his first habeas appeal was not a decision on the merits pursuant to the Syllabus of Smith v. Hedrick, 181 W. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence2021Second, this Court has clarified that “[t]he right to be present is not a right to be present at every moment, but a right to be present at all ‘critical stages’ in a criminal proceeding.” State v. Brown, 210 W. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State Ex Rel. Shelton v. Painter
green
1 sentence2021Va. 578 , 655 S.E.2d 794 (2007), found comments made by counsel could prejudice a Defendant with regard to the mercy phase, the Court was silent on Counsel’s failure to comment. 3 At this omnibus hearing, the Special Prosecutor objected to his letter being entered into the record and noted that he had moved off his position in the letter. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Gannett Co. v. DePasquale green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Markley v. Coleman green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State of West Virginia v. Darnell Carlton Bouie green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| White v. Haines green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State, Department of Health & Human Resources Ex Rel. Robert Michael B. v. Robert Morris N. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State ex rel. Bailey v. Legursky neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Frazier green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| David Ballard v. Brian Bush Ferguson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Peyatt green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State Ex Rel. Smith v. McBride green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Louk green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Louk green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Hallauer v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Allstate Insurance v. Jensen green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| INDEMNITY INS. CO., ETC. v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Tomasetti v. Maryland Casualty Co. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.