core defense in District of Columbia

2016See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Johnson, 770 A.2d 130, 150 (Md. 2001). 4 The underlying facts are discussed in greater detail in Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md., supra note 3, 770 A.2d at 134-37 , and Johnson II, supra, 103 A.3d at 195-97 . 5 See In re Weekes, 990 A.2d 470, 474 (D.C. 2010). 4 that an attorney who is disbarred notify all clients in any pending matters of his disbarment and advise such clients to seek legal advice elsewhere.

2016See Butts v. United States, 822 A.2d 407, 418 (D.C. 2003) (limiting liability on the basis of proximate cause when an “intervening cause ... was so unforeseeable that the actor’s negligent conduct, though still a substantial causative factor, should not result in the actor’s liability”); Paroline v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 1720 , 188 L.Ed.2d 714 (2014) (“[P]roximate cause is more restrictive than a requirement of factual cause alone.”).

2016See Butts v. United States, 822 A.2d 407, 418 (D.C. 2003) (limiting liability on the basis of proximate cause when an “intervening cause . . . was so unforeseeable that the actor’s negligent conduct, though still a substantial causative factor, should not result in the actor’s liability”); Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 , 1720 28 (2014) (“[P]roximate cause is more restrictive than a requirement of factual cause alone.”).

2016See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Johnson, 770 A.2d 130, 150 (Md. 2001). 4 The underlying facts are discussed in greater detail in Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md., supra note 3, 770 A.2d at 134-37 , and Johnson II, supra, 103 A.3d at 195-97 . 5 See In re Weekes, 990 A.2d 470, 474 (D.C. 2010). 4 that an attorney who is disbarred notify all clients in any pending matters of his disbarment and advise such clients to seek legal advice elsewhere.

2016See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Johnson, 770 A.2d 130, 150 (Md. 2001). 4 The underlying facts are discussed in greater detail in Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md., supra note 3, 770 A.2d at 134-37 , and Johnson II, supra, 103 A.3d at 195-97 . 5 See In re Weekes, 990 A.2d 470, 474 (D.C. 2010). 4 that an attorney who is disbarred notify all clients in any pending matters of his disbarment and advise such clients to seek legal advice elsewhere.

2016See Dunn, 408 A.2d at 993 .

2016See Butts v. United States, 822 A.2d 407, 418 (D.C. 2003) (limiting liability on the basis of proximate cause when an “intervening cause ... was so unforeseeable that the actor’s negligent conduct, though still a substantial causative factor, should not result in the actor’s liability”); Paroline v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 1720 , 188 L.Ed.2d 714 (2014) (“[P]roximate cause is more restrictive than a requirement of factual cause alone.”).

2016See Butts v. United States, 822 A.2d 407, 418 (D.C. 2003) (limiting liability on the basis of proximate cause when an “intervening cause . . . was so unforeseeable that the actor’s negligent conduct, though still a substantial causative factor, should not result in the actor’s liability”); Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 , 1720 28 (2014) (“[P]roximate cause is more restrictive than a requirement of factual cause alone.”).

2016See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Johnson, 770 A.2d 130, 150 (Md. 2001). 4 The underlying facts are discussed in greater detail in Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md., supra note 3, 770 A.2d at 134-37 , and Johnson II, supra, 103 A.3d at 195-97 . 5 See In re Weekes, 990 A.2d 470, 474 (D.C. 2010). 4 that an attorney who is disbarred notify all clients in any pending matters of his disbarment and advise such clients to seek legal advice elsewhere.

2016See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Johnson, 770 A.2d 130, 150 (Md. 2001). 4 The underlying facts are discussed in greater detail in Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md., supra note 3, 770 A.2d at 134-37 , and Johnson II, supra, 103 A.3d at 195-97 . 5 See In re Weekes, 990 A.2d 470, 474 (D.C. 2010). 4 that an attorney who is disbarred notify all clients in any pending matters of his disbarment and advise such clients to seek legal advice elsewhere.

2015Rather, the defendant must act 2 Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1102 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Wilson- Bey, 903 A.2d at 834 ). 3 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (explaining that ―all these definitions [of an ―accessory‖] have nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result [the crime committed by the principal offender] would follow upon the accessory‘s conduct; and that they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the [principal‘s] venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it s

2015Rather, the defendant must act 2 Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1102 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Wilson- Bey, 903 A.2d at 834 ). 3 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (explaining that ―all these definitions [of an ―accessory‖] have nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result [the crime committed by the principal offender] would follow upon the accessory‘s conduct; and that they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the [principal‘s] venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it s

2015Rather, the defendant must act 2 Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1102 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Wilson- Bey, 903 A.2d at 834 ). 3 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (explaining that ―all these definitions [of an ―accessory‖] have nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result [the crime committed by the principal offender] would follow upon the accessory‘s conduct; and that they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the [principal‘s] venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it s

2015Rather, the defendant must act 2 Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1102 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Wilson- Bey, 903 A.2d at 834 ). 3 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (explaining that ―all these definitions [of an ―accessory‖] have nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result [the crime committed by the principal offender] would follow upon the accessory‘s conduct; and that they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the [principal‘s] venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it s

2015Sitting en banc, we declared in Wilson-Bey that it is a ―requirement [for aiding and abetting liability] that the accomplice be shown to have intended that the principal succeed in committing the charged offense.‖ 1 We elaborated, in a subsequent decision, that this court has ―adopted the doctrine that ‗in order for a person to be held accountable for the specific intent of another under an aiding and abetting theory of principal liability, the aider or abettor must have knowingly aided the other person with the intent that the other person commit the 1 Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 81

2015Rather, the defendant must act 2 Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1102 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Wilson- Bey, 903 A.2d at 834 ). 3 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (explaining that ―all these definitions [of an ―accessory‖] have nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result [the crime committed by the principal offender] would follow upon the accessory‘s conduct; and that they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the [principal‘s] venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it s

2009See Newman I, supra, 705 A.2d at 257-58 (holding that the error of excluding the extrinsic evidence was of "constitutional magnitude violating [appellant’s] Sixth Amendment right” because the evidence went "to the core of the defense”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). .

2009See Newman I, supra, 705 A.2d at 257-58 (holding that the error of excluding the extrinsic evidence was of "constitutional magnitude violating [appellant's] Sixth Amendment right" because the evidence went "to the core of the defense") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [4] A reasonable juror could have questioned LaTonya's credibility if he credited Lynette's recantation of her testimony that she saw Mr. Hunter fire the gun on October 6, 2004. [5] Lynette testified that Ms. Cashwell had shown her a gun in the closet of Ms. Cashwell's apartment.

2006See in re Bowser, 771 A.2d 1002, 1011 (D.C.2001) (adopting Board’s finding that recitals “carefully qualified with the words ‘at this time’ or [] otherwise expressed in the present tense .... [are] plainly insufficient”).

1997The attempt to impeach Hungerford with extrinsic evidence of bias, which was cut off entirely, went to "the core of the defense." Stack v. United States, 519 A.2d 147, 151 (D.C.1986).

1997The attempt to impeach Hungerford with extrinsic evidence of bias, which was cut off entirely, went to “the core of the defense.” Stack v. United States, 519 A.2d 147, 151 (D.C.1986).

1986See Lawrence, supra, 482 A.2d at 377 ; Goldman, supra, 473 A.2d at 857-58 ; Springer, supra, 388 A.2d at 855-56 .

1986See Lawrence, supra, 482 A.2d at 377 ; Goldman, supra, 473 A.2d at 857-58 ; Springer, supra, 388 A.2d at 855-56 .

1985See In re Application of Matthews, 462 A.2d at 174; Florida Board of Bar Examiners; In re Eimers, 358 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla.1978) (per curiam); Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 415 , 165 A. 211, 213 (1933).

1985See In re Application of Matthews, 462 A.2d at 174; Florida Board of Bar Examiners; In re Eimers, 358 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla.1978) (per curiam); Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 415 , 165 A. 211, 213 (1933).

1985See In re Application of Matthews, 462 A.2d at 174; Florida Board of Bar Examiners; In re Eimers, 358 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla.1978) (per curiam); Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 415 , 165 A. 211, 213 (1933).

1985See In re Application of Matthews, 462 A.2d at 174; Florida Board of Bar Examiners; In re Eimers, 358 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla.1978) (per curiam); Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 415 , 165 A. 211, 213 (1933).