core claim in Massachusetts

2015“Whether a particular statement is ‘testimonial’ lies at the core of this analysis.” Irene, supra, citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-824 (2006).

2015See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-824 (2006).

2019Co., 443 Mass. 634, 640-641 (2005), the court stated that "two fundamental elements are widely recognized as comprising the core of a claim of judicial estoppel.

2013“Rather, the doctrine is properly invoked whenever a ‘party is seeking to use the judicial process in an inconsistent way that courts should not tolerate.’ ” DiBenedetto, supra, quoting Otis, supra. “[T]wo fundamental elements are widely recognized as comprising the core of a claim of judicial estoppel.

2024Rather, the core inquiry focuses on noticeable and meaningful lapses of attentiveness so significant throughout the trial that "the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results." Ragin, 820 F.3d at 620 , quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). ii.

2023Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 Jurimetrics 177 , 204 (2006).[10] -------------------------------------------- [9] In her testimony, Dr. Price labeled the three stages of memory as "encoding, storage, and retrieval." It appears from her testimony, however, that "encoding" is at least roughly a synonym for "acquisition," and "retention" is similarly synonymous with "storage." At least generally, Dr. Price's testimony paralleled-while expanding significantly - on the analysis in Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352,369 (2015). [10] Arce suggests two primary w

2021Just as but-for causation does, the substantial contributing factor test embodies a core principle of tort law: only those who meaningfully contributed to a person's harm should be liable for it.2 See Wainwright v. Jackson, 291 Mass. 100, 102 (1935). 2 Semantics further proves the point.

2020It must involve a total and not merely a partial breach." Coviello, 76 Mass. 14 App. Ct. at 609, quoting Bucciero v. Drinkwater, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 551, 555 (1982). "[T]wo fundamental elements are widely recognized as comprising the core of a claim of judicial estoppel.

2013Fisher v. Lint, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 367 (2007) (“The availability of an absolute privilege . . . depends on whether the procedural safeguards during the . . . proceedings adequately minimize the risk that defamation or other tortious conduct will occur”).

2012Like Buster and Darius , this is not a case in which the plaintiffs have affirmatively and directly placed client communications at issue, such as by bringing a legal malpractice action, see Zabin v. Picciotto, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 141, 157 (2008), or asserting an advice-of-counsel defense, see Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 2006 WL 307911 (Mass.Super. 2006; Gants, J.) [ 20 Mass. L.

2012See Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1118 (1st Cir. 1993).

2006Gerald contends that having received the benefits of the receiver’s report and recommendation regarding the distribution of assets (particularly without pursuing an interlocutory appeal), it would be unfair now to allow her to seek further relief with respect to her claims. “ ‘Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding that is contrary to a position it had previously asserted in another proceeding.’ Blanchette v. School Comm. of Westwood, 427 Mass. 176, 184 (1998). . . . [T]wo fundamental elements are widely recognized as

2003See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958); United States v. United States Dist.

2001Co., 24 Mass.App.Ct. 34, 36 (1987), rev. den. 400 Mass. 1101 (1987), quoting Home Owners Fed.

1999HI “The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded the house itself.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).

1987Co., 354 Mass. 448, 455 (1968), it was held that “one not a party to the first action may use a judgment in that action defensively against a party who was a plaintiff in the first action on the issues which the judgment decided.” The core inquiry is whether the issue on which preclusion is sought has been “the product of full litigation and careful decision.” Ibid.

1987Co., 354 Mass. 448, 455 (1968), it was held that “one not a party to the first action may use a judgment in that action defensively against a party who was a plaintiff in the first action on the issues which the judgment decided.” The core inquiry is whether the issue on which preclusion is sought has been “the product of full litigation and careful decision.” Ibid.

1982Compare Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. at 471 (improper discrediting of defense experts by argument of matter not in evidence); State v. Scarlett, 118 N.H. 904, 905-906 (1978) (flourishing blood stained bedspread not in evidence to establish link with child molester); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 650 (labeling defendant as a “hitman”).

1982Compare Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. at 471 (improper discrediting of defense experts by argument of matter not in evidence); State v. Scarlett, 118 N.H. 904, 905-906 (1978) (flourishing blood stained bedspread not in evidence to establish link with child molester); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 650 (labeling defendant as a “hitman”).

1982Compare Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. at 471 (improper discrediting of defense experts by argument of matter not in evidence); State v. Scarlett, 118 N.H. 904, 905-906 (1978) (flourishing blood stained bedspread not in evidence to establish link with child molester); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 650 (labeling defendant as a “hitman”).