core principle in Texas

2026“The core principle underlying error-preservation requirements is that the trial court should be given the opportunity to correct potential errors before the case proceeds on appeal.” Majeed v. Hussain, No. 03-08-00679-CV, 2010 WL 4137472 , at *3 (Tex. App.— Austin Oct. 22, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Tex. 1999)). 2021 WL 3085844 , at *3 (emphasis added).

2025“The core principle underlying error- preservation requirements is that the trial court should be given the opportunity to correct potential errors before the case proceeds on appeal.” Majeed v. Hussain, No. 03-08-00679-CV, 2010 WL 4137472 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 22, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Tex. 1999)).

2026“At the core of the privilege is the notion that the communications are ‘made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services.’” Franklin Ctr., 675 S.W.3d at 280 (quoting Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. 1996)). “[T]he attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage clients to provide counsel with ‘full and frank’ disclosures so that the resulting legal advice is accurate and helpful, ‘thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.’” Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)

2026“At the core of the privilege is the notion that the communications are ‘made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services.’” Franklin Ctr., 675 S.W.3d at 280 (quoting Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. 1996)). “[T]he attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage clients to provide counsel with ‘full and frank’ disclosures so that the resulting legal advice is accurate and helpful, ‘thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.’” Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)

2026“At the core of the privilege is the notion that the communications are ‘made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services.’” Franklin Ctr., 675 S.W.3d at 280 (quoting Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. 1996)). “[T]he attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage clients to provide counsel with ‘full and frank’ disclosures so that the resulting legal advice is accurate and helpful, ‘thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.’” Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)

2026“At the core of the privilege is the notion that the communications are ‘made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services.’” Franklin Ctr., 675 S.W.3d at 280 (quoting Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. 1996)). “[T]he attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage clients to provide counsel with ‘full and frank’ disclosures so that the resulting legal advice is accurate and helpful, ‘thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.’” Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)

2023State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim.

2022State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim.

2007See, e.g., Robinson v. State , 174 S.W.3d 320, 331 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd); Jordan v. State , 139 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2007See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 320, 331 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d); Jordan v. State, 139 S.W.3d 723 , 726 5 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2007See, e.g., Robinson v. State , 174 S.W.3d 320, 331 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd); Jordan v. State , 139 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2007See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 320, 331 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d); Jordan v. State, 139 S.W.3d 723 , 726 5 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2024See Apache, 627 S.W.3d at 335 & n.28 (emphasis removed) (citing Alamo Heights ISD, 544 S.W.3d at 782–83, 790). 1.

2024See Apache Corp. v. Davis, 627 S.W.3d 324 , 335 & n.28 (Tex. 2021) (emphasis removed) (citing Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 782–83, 790); see also id. at 337 (“More importantly, determining but-for causation cannot be a matter of weighing—or worse, counting—factors that may be helpful in analyzing circumstantial evidence in some situations.”).

2019Id.; Goad v. State, 354 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim.

2019Id.; Goad v. State, 354 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim.

2015Indeed, the core principle behind legislative immunity is to enable our “representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal.” Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373-74 (emphasis added).

2015Indeed, the core principle behind legislative immunity is to enable our “representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal.” Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373-74 (emphasis added).

2015As courts have recognized, the “level of intimidation against a local legislator arising from the threat of a criminal proceeding is at least as great as the threat from a civil suit,” so “the privilege or immunity enjoyed by local legislators should be extended to criminal proceedings.” State v. Holton, 997 A.2d 828, 845, 856 (Md.

2015As courts have recognized, the “level of intimidation against a local legislator arising 14 from the threat of a criminal proceeding is at least as great as the threat from a civil suit,” so “the privilege or immunity enjoyed by local legislators should be extended to criminal proceedings.” State v. Holton, 997 A.2d 828, 845, 856 (Md.

2014First, the trial court concluded that the non-compete agreement is unenforceable because its duration is not “definite.” See Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 777 (Tex. 2011) (holding that “[t]he hallmark of enforcement is whether or not the covenant is reasonable” and stating that “the statute’s core inquiry is whether the covenant” contains reasonable limitations).

2013See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2011) (requiring that, in addition to being part of otherwise enforceable agreement, covenant not to compete must contain reasonable limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained in order to be enforceable); see also Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 777 (Tex.2011) (holding that “[t]he hallmark of enforcement is whether or not the covenant is reasonable” and *920 stating that “the statute’s core inquiry is whether the covenant” contains reasonable limitations).

2013See also Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 451-52 (Tex. 2006) (recognizing that the factors generally parse the core principle "that a superseding cause ordinarily involves the intervention of an unforeseen, independent force from a third party, causing injury different from that which might have been expected at the time of the original negligent act,” and that not all factors are relevant in each case).

2013See also Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448 , 451–52 (Tex. 2006) (recognizing that the factors generally parse the core principle ―that a superseding cause ordinarily involves the intervention of an unforeseen, independent force from a third party, causing injury different from that which might have been expected at the time of the original negligent act,‖ and that not all factors are relevant in each case).

2007Clayton v. Richards , 47 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).

2002Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).

1999The core principle of the Act is that the public is entitled to all information "collected, assembled, or maintained by a governmental body." Holmes v. Morales , 924 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. 1996); Act § 552.002(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999).

1999The core principle of the Act is that the public is entitled to all information “collected, assembled, or maintained by a governmental body.” Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.1996); Act § 552.002(a)(1) (West Supp.1999).

2021“The core principle underlying error- preservation requirements is that the trial court should be given the opportunity to correct potential errors before the case proceeds on appeal.” Garden Ridge, 504 S.W.3d at 435 (quoting Liberty Mut.

2018Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. 2012) (appellate court may not consider unpreserved or waived issue); Garden Ridge, L.P. v. Clear Lake Ctr., L.P., 504 S.W.3d 428, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The core principle underlying error-preservation requirements is that the trial court should be given the opportunity to correct potential errors before the case proceeds on appeal” (internal quotations omitted)). 3 The trial court signed its final judgment on June 20, 2016.

2018Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. 2012) (appellate court may not consider unpreserved or waived issue); Garden Ridge, L.P. v. Clear Lake Ctr., L.P., 504 S.W.3d 428, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The core principle underlying error-preservation requirements is that the trial court should be given the opportunity to correct potential errors before the case proceeds on appeal” (internal quotations omitted)). 3 The trial court signed its final judgment on June 20, 2016.

2016By-Prod-nets, 405 F.2d at 1273 (which notes the consequential damages principle “is necessarily a somewhat flabby standard which has taken on meaning only through developing case law.”).

2015See Paciwest, 266 S.W.3d at 567 ; see also Rose Core, 2015 WL 1004344 , at *4. 3.

2015See Paciwest, 266 S.W.3d at 567 ; see also Rose Core, 2015 WL 1004344 , at *3; Rodriguez, 2013 WL 4682194 , at *2.

2014The trial court found that the time limitation contained in the non- compete agreement was “three (3) years.” However, the trial court also found that the limitation “does not go into effect until after the member redeems, sells, or otherwise disposes of his interest in Down Time.” In addition, the trial court found that Down Time had conceded in its pleadings that “it is unclear when Mr. Elps’ . . . ownership interest will 6 conclude.” The trial court observed that Down Time’s regulations do “not contain any provisions that would provide for any acquired sale, redemption, or disposition of an