11 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lawton v. Steelegreen2 sentences2022It naturally follows that actions taken by other non-legislative state actors, whether elected officials or unelected bureaucrats, may run afoul of a citizen’s right to the fruits of his own labor when they arbitrarily interfere with occupations, professions, or the operation of business. ¶ 28 The core principle behind the fruits of their labor clause is that government “‘may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.’” Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 296 2022It naturally follows that actions taken by other non-legislative state actors, whether elected officials or unelected bureaucrats, may run afoul of a citizen’s right to the fruits of his own labor when they arbitrarily interfere with occupations, professions, or the operation of business. ¶ 28 The core principle behind the fruits of their labor clause is that government “‘may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.’” Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 296 | 2 | 2 |
Cheek v. City of Charlottegreen2 sentences2022It naturally follows that actions taken by other non-legislative state actors, whether elected officials or unelected bureaucrats, may run afoul of a citizen’s right to the fruits of his own labor when they arbitrarily interfere with occupations, professions, or the operation of business. ¶ 28 The core principle behind the fruits of their labor clause is that government “‘may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.’” Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 296 2022It naturally follows that actions taken by other non-legislative state actors, whether elected officials or unelected bureaucrats, may run afoul of a citizen’s right to the fruits of his own labor when they arbitrarily interfere with occupations, professions, or the operation of business. ¶ 28 The core principle behind the fruits of their labor clause is that government “‘may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.’” Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 296 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hurleygreen2 sentences2020App. 680, 684 , 637 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2006) (“Stipulations do not require affirmative statements and silence may be deemed assent in some circumstances, particularly if the defendant had an opportunity to object, yet failed to do so.” (citing Alexander, 359 N.C. at 828-29 , 616 S.E.2d at 917-18 )).3 Stated differently, because “the record reveals the complete 3 We also note, as the Supreme Court did in Bennett, that the core inquiry in a Batson challenge is “whether the prosecutor is excluding people from a jury because of their race,” Bennett, 374 N.C. at 596 n.4, 843 S.E.2d at 234 n.4 (emphas 2020App. 680, 684 , 637 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2006) (“Stipulations do not require affirmative statements and silence may be deemed assent in some circumstances, particularly if the defendant had an opportunity to object, yet failed to do so.” (citing Alexander, 359 N.C. at 828-29 , 616 S.E.2d at 917-18 )).3 Stated differently, because “the record reveals the complete 3 We also note, as the Supreme Court did in Bennett, that the core inquiry in a Batson challenge is “whether the prosecutor is excluding people from a jury because of their race,” Bennett, 374 N.C. at 596 n.4, 843 S.E.2d at 234 n.4 (emphas | 2 | 2 |
Corum v. University of North Carolinagreen1 sentence2025Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Evansgreen2 sentences2017See id.; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14 ; Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 ; Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 . 2017See id.) Evans, 514 U.S. at 14 ; Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 ; Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 . | 1 | 1 |
Malicki v. Doegreen1 sentence2015See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347 , 364 (Fla.2002) ("The core inquiry in determining whether the Church Defendants are liable will focus on whether they reasonably should have foreseen the risk of harm to third parties. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Alexander
green
2 sentences2020App. 680, 684 , 637 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2006) (“Stipulations do not require affirmative statements and silence may be deemed assent in some circumstances, particularly if the defendant had an opportunity to object, yet failed to do so.” (citing Alexander, 359 N.C. at 828-29 , 616 S.E.2d at 917-18 )).3 Stated differently, because “the record reveals the complete 3 We also note, as the Supreme Court did in Bennett, that the core inquiry in a Batson challenge is “whether the prosecutor is excluding people from a jury because of their race,” Bennett, 374 N.C. at 596 n.4, 843 S.E.2d at 234 n.4 (emphas 2020App. 680, 684 , 637 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2006) (“Stipulations do not require affirmative statements and silence may be deemed assent in some circumstances, particularly if the defendant had an opportunity to object, yet failed to do so.” (citing Alexander, 359 N.C. at 828-29 , 616 S.E.2d at 917-18 )).3 Stated differently, because “the record reveals the complete 3 We also note, as the Supreme Court did in Bennett, that the core inquiry in a Batson challenge is “whether the prosecutor is excluding people from a jury because of their race,” Bennett, 374 N.C. at 596 n.4, 843 S.E.2d at 234 n.4 (emphas | 2 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Phipps
green
2 sentences1999The Court went on to state that “[w]hereas an indigent defendant’s access to the ‘basic tools of an adequate defense’ is a core requirement of a fundamentally fair trial, the need for an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert assistance is not.” Id. at 450 , 418 S.E.2d at 190 . 1993Under the facts of that case, we concluded: “Whereas an indigent defendant’s access to the ‘basic tools of an adequate defense’ is a core requirement of a fundamentally fair trial, the need for an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert assistance is not.” Phipps, 331 N.C. at 450 , 418 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 , 84 L. | 2 | 1993–1999 |
Kass v. . Hedgpeth
neutral
2 sentences1953If you so find from the evidence and by its greater weight, you will answer the second issue ‘Yes.’ If you fail to so find, you will answer it ‘No.’ ” The core of this instruction is lifted bodily out of its context in Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405 , 38 S.E. 2d 164 , and is without relevancy to the pleadings, the testimony, and the issues in the instant action. 1953If you so find from the evidence and by its greater weight, you will answer the second issue ‘Yes.’ If you fail to so find, you will answer it ‘No.’ ” The core of this instruction is lifted bodily out of its context in Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405 , 38 S.E. 2d 164 , and is without relevancy to the pleadings, the testimony, and the issues in the instant action. | 2 | 1953–1953 |
Illinois v. Krull
green
2 sentences2017See id.; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14 ; Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 ; Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 . 2017See id.) Evans, 514 U.S. at 14 ; Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 ; Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2017See id.; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14 ; Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 ; Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 . 2017See id.) Evans, 514 U.S. at 14 ; Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 ; Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Brooks v. State
green
1 sentence1999The Court went on to state that “[w]hereas an indigent defendant’s access to the ‘basic tools of an adequate defense’ is a core requirement of a fundamentally fair trial, the need for an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert assistance is not.” Id. at 450 , 418 S.E.2d at 190 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Ballard
green
2 sentences1999On the other hand, our Supreme Court in State v. Ballard, 333 N.C. 515 , 428 S.E.2d 178 (1993) held that the trial court is constitutionally required to grant an indigent defendant an ex parte hearing to establish the need for a psychiatric expert. 1999On the other hand, our Supreme Court in State v. Ballard, 333 N.C. 515 , 428 S.E.2d 178 (1993) held that the trial court is constitutionally required to grant an indigent defendant an ex parte hearing to establish the need for a psychiatric expert. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Ake v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences1993Under the facts of that case, we concluded: “Whereas an indigent defendant’s access to the ‘basic tools of an adequate defense’ is a core requirement of a fundamentally fair trial, the need for an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert assistance is not.” Phipps, 331 N.C. at 450 , 418 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 , 84 L. 1993Under the facts of that case, we concluded: “Whereas an indigent defendant’s access to the ‘basic tools of an adequate defense’ is a core requirement of a fundamentally fair trial, the need for an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert assistance is not.” Phipps, 331 N.C. at 450 , 418 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 , 84 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.