core principle in Michigan

2024A core principle of due process holds that parents have a constitutionally protected right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” In re Sanders, 495 Mich 2 The parties debate whether that 16-month delay rendered the document signed on May 3, 2022, inoperative under MCL 700.5103, which states that, “[b]y a properly executed power of attorney, a parent or guardian of a minor . . . may delegate to another person, for a period not exceeding 180 days, any of the parent’s or guardian’s powers regarding care, custody, or property of the minor child . . . .” U

2020As Justice Gorsuch stated, the core principle underlying the nondelegation doctrine—and one that is enshrined in our own Constitution, Const 1963, art 3, § 2—is that the Legislature simply may not “ ‘delegate . . . powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.’ ” Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), quoting Wayman v Southard, 23 US (10 Wheat) 1, 42-43; 6 L Ed 253 (1825).

2017We, of course, are not those jurors, and harmlessness review does not require or invite us to be; what matters is the reliability of their verdict, not our own agreement with it. 30 Did 30 See, e.g., People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 221 ; 551 NW2d 891 (1996) (discussed approvingly in Lukity, and explaining, inter alia, that “courts analyzing preserved error in terms of their view regarding whether the defendant is guilty have been wrong,” as “[t]he defendant’s right to a fair trial by jury requires that preserved error be reviewed in terms of its effect on the factfinder”).

2017We, of course, are not those jurors, and harmlessness review does not require or invite us to be; what matters is the reliability of their verdict, not our own agreement with it. 30 Did 30 See, e.g., People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 221 ; 551 NW2d 891 (1996) (discussed approvingly in Lukity, and explaining, inter alia, that “courts analyzing preserved error in terms of their view regarding whether the defendant is guilty have been wrong,” as “[t]he defendant’s right to a fair trial by jury requires that preserved error be reviewed in terms of its effect on the factfinder”).

2014But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express terms, decided it . . . .[25] To this end, the Framers of the Constitution drafted, and the people ratified, the Supremacy Clause, which states the core principle of preemption: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 23 Travelers Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co, 465 Mich 185, 205 ; 631 NW2d 733 (2001). 24 MCR 2.116(G)(5). 25 McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US

2014Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”28 Preemption “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent . . . .”29 Congress can preempt state law either explicitly or implicitly.30 “[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively”31 or when “it actually 26 US Const, art VI, cl 2. 27 Cooley, Constitutional Law (1880), p 32. 28 Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 516 ; 112 S Ct 2608 ; 120 L Ed 2d 407 (1992), quoting Rice

2014Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”28 Preemption “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent . . . .”29 Congress can preempt state law either explicitly or implicitly.30 “[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively”31 or when “it actually 26 US Const, art VI, cl 2. 27 Cooley, Constitutional Law (1880), p 32. 28 Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 516 ; 112 S Ct 2608 ; 120 L Ed 2d 407 (1992), quoting Rice

2014Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”28 Preemption “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent . . . .”29 Congress can preempt state law either explicitly or implicitly.30 “[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively”31 or when “it actually 26 US Const, art VI, cl 2. 27 Cooley, Constitutional Law (1880), p 32. 28 Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 516 ; 112 S Ct 2608 ; 120 L Ed 2d 407 (1992), quoting Rice

2014Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”28 Preemption “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent . . . .”29 Congress can preempt state law either explicitly or implicitly.30 “[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively”31 or when “it actually 26 US Const, art VI, cl 2. 27 Cooley, Constitutional Law (1880), p 32. 28 Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 516 ; 112 S Ct 2608 ; 120 L Ed 2d 407 (1992), quoting Rice

2014Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”28 Preemption “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent . . . .”29 Congress can preempt state law either explicitly or implicitly.30 “[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively”31 or when “it actually 26 US Const, art VI, cl 2. 27 Cooley, Constitutional Law (1880), p 32. 28 Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 516 ; 112 S Ct 2608 ; 120 L Ed 2d 407 (1992), quoting Rice

2014Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”28 Preemption “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent . . . .”29 Congress can preempt state law either explicitly or implicitly.30 “[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively”31 or when “it actually 26 US Const, art VI, cl 2. 27 Cooley, Constitutional Law (1880), p 32. 28 Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 516 ; 112 S Ct 2608 ; 120 L Ed 2d 407 (1992), quoting Rice

2014But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express terms, decided it . . . .[25] To this end, the Framers of the Constitution drafted, and the people ratified, the Supremacy Clause, which states the core principle of preemption: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 23 Travelers Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co, 465 Mich 185, 205 ; 631 NW2d 733 (2001). 24 MCR 2.116(G)(5). 25 McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US

2014But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express terms, decided it . . . .[25] To this end, the Framers of the Constitution drafted, and the people ratified, the Supremacy Clause, which states the core principle of preemption: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 23 Travelers Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co, 465 Mich 185, 205 ; 631 NW2d 733 (2001). 24 MCR 2.116(G)(5). 25 McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US