core principle in New Mexico

2026See id.; Dominguez, 2007-NMSC-060, ¶ 13 .

2022Nichols v. Anderson, 1939-NMSC-028 , ¶ 9, 43 N.M. 296 , 92 P.2d 781 (“The principle is firmly established that contracts only in partial restraint of any particular trade or employment, if founded upon a sufficient consideration, are valid and enforceable if the restraint be confined within limits that are no larger and wider than the protection of the party with whom the contract is made may reasonably require.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {18} Southwest has provided only a conclusory argument to support its claim that the district court erred in concluding that the 2013

2022Nichols v. Anderson, 1939-NMSC-028 , ¶ 9, 43 N.M. 296 , 92 P.2d 781 (“The principle is firmly established that contracts only in partial restraint of any particular trade or employment, if founded upon a sufficient consideration, are valid and enforceable if the restraint be confined within limits that are no larger and wider than the protection of the party with whom the contract is made may reasonably require.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {18} Southwest has provided only a conclusory argument to support its claim that the district court erred in concluding that the 2013

2007Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 , 124 S.Ct. at 1365-66 . {29} At the core of the analysis is the objective purpose of the interrogation; what Justice Thomas called “the function served by the interrogation.” Davis, 547 U.S. at -, 126 S.Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also State v. Ybarra, 111 N.M. 234, 236-38 , 804 P.2d 1053, 1055-57 (1990) (holding that questioning by emergency room nurse about circumstances of a shooting was an “interrogation”); State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 29 , 131 N.M. 1 , 33 P.3d 1 (noting that “interrogation” is someti

2007Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 , 124 S.Ct. at 1365-66 . {29} At the core of the analysis is the objective purpose of the interrogation; what Justice Thomas called “the function served by the interrogation.” Davis, 547 U.S. at -, 126 S.Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also State v. Ybarra, 111 N.M. 234, 236-38 , 804 P.2d 1053, 1055-57 (1990) (holding that questioning by emergency room nurse about circumstances of a shooting was an “interrogation”); State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 29 , 131 N.M. 1 , 33 P.3d 1 (noting that “interrogation” is someti

2007Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 , 124 S.Ct. at 1365-66 . {29} At the core of the analysis is the objective purpose of the interrogation; what Justice Thomas called “the function served by the interrogation.” Davis, 547 U.S. at -, 126 S.Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also State v. Ybarra, 111 N.M. 234, 236-38 , 804 P.2d 1053, 1055-57 (1990) (holding that questioning by emergency room nurse about circumstances of a shooting was an “interrogation”); State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 29 , 131 N.M. 1 , 33 P.3d 1 (noting that “interrogation” is someti

2007Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 , 124 S.Ct. at 1365-66 . {29} At the core of the analysis is the objective purpose of the interrogation; what Justice Thomas called “the function served by the interrogation.” Davis, 547 U.S. at -, 126 S.Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also State v. Ybarra, 111 N.M. 234, 236-38 , 804 P.2d 1053, 1055-57 (1990) (holding that questioning by emergency room nurse about circumstances of a shooting was an “interrogation”); State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 29 , 131 N.M. 1 , 33 P.3d 1 (noting that “interrogation” is someti

2006Id.; State v. Stampley, 1999-NMSC-027, ¶ 34 , 127 N.M. 426 , 982 P.2d 477 (“The jury alone is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and determines the weight afforded to testimony.”). {24} Our analysis of the record, transcript, and briefs indicates that the district judge proceeded in an appropriate manner.

2006Id.; State v. Stampley, 1999-NMSC-027, ¶ 34 , 127 N.M. 426 , 982 P.2d 477 (“The jury alone is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and determines the weight afforded to testimony.”). {24} Our analysis of the record, transcript, and briefs indicates that the district judge proceeded in an appropriate manner.

2006We conclude this factor weighs in favor of retroactive application, particularly in light of a core principle underlying the Beavers decision that similarly situated parties be treated equally. 118 N.M. at 402 , 881 P.2d at 1387 .

2006We conclude this factor weighs in favor of retroactive application, particularly in light of a core principle underlying the Beavers decision that similarly situated parties be treated equally. 118 N.M. at 402 , 881 P.2d at 1387 .

2001In upholding the Pennsylvania statute against a due process challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the statute did not alter the "maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty." Thus, in the Supreme Court's view it simply limited the court's "discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." Id., 477 U.S. at 87-88 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 . {23} As I have noted before, the core principle of Apprendi is that any fact-finding which affects the length of a def

2001In upholding the Pennsylvania statute against a due process challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the statute did not alter the "maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty." Thus, in the Supreme Court's view it simply limited the court's "discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." Id., 477 U.S. at 87-88 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 . {23} As I have noted before, the core principle of Apprendi is that any fact-finding which affects the length of a def

2001In upholding the Pennsylvania statute against a due process challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the statute did not alter the "maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty." Thus, in the Supreme Court's view it simply limited the court's "discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." Id., 477 U.S. at 87-88 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 . {23} As I have noted before, the core principle of Apprendi is that any fact-finding which affects the length of a def

2001In upholding the Pennsylvania statute against a due process challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the statute did not alter the "maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty." Thus, in the Supreme Court's view it simply limited the court's "discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." Id., 477 U.S. at 87-88 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 . {23} As I have noted before, the core principle of Apprendi is that any fact-finding which affects the length of a def

1997That core is expressed in Restatement Second Section 122, as follows: “A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.” The local law rules encompassed by Section 122 are essentially the same as those described as procedural in a well-known formulation by the United States Supreme Court in a different context. “[P]rocedure [is] the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redres

1997That core is expressed in Restatement Second Section 122, as follows: “A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.” The local law rules encompassed by Section 122 are essentially the same as those described as procedural in a well-known formulation by the United States Supreme Court in a different context. “[P]rocedure [is] the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redres

1989In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 , 95 S.Ct. 1029 , 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975), the Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution prohibit imposition of liability upon a television station for accurately reporting a statement in an official public record.

1989In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 , 95 S.Ct. 1029 , 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975), the Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution prohibit imposition of liability upon a television station for accurately reporting a statement in an official public record.