core requirement in Connecticut

2005This satisfied everyone, and defense counsel specifically requested that the court make no further inquiry, stating “we’ll waive any inquiry by the court into the specifics of that relationship.” “Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution .... [T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Centeno, 259 Conn. 75, 81 , 787 A.2d 537 (2002).

2005This satisfied everyone, and defense counsel specifically requested that the court make no further inquiry, stating “we’ll waive any inquiry by the court into the specifics of that relationship.” “Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution .... [T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Centeno, 259 Conn. 75, 81 , 787 A.2d 537 (2002).

1995B Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. 24 See State v. Rodri guez, 210 Conn. 315, 324-25 , 554 A.2d 1080 (1989); State v. Brigandi, 186 Conn. 521, 542 , 442 A.2d 927 (1982).

1995B Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. 24 See State v. Rodri guez, 210 Conn. 315, 324-25 , 554 A.2d 1080 (1989); State v. Brigandi, 186 Conn. 521, 542 , 442 A.2d 927 (1982).

2022We agree with the defendant that Connecticut’s consti- tution provides an express right to peremptory chal- lenges, which the federal constitution does not guaran- tee, and that ‘‘[j]ury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitu- tion of Connecticut, article first, § 8 . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rhodes, 248 Conn. 39, 46 , 726 A.2d 513 (1999).

2022We agree with the defendant that Connecticut’s consti- tution provides an express right to peremptory chal- lenges, which the federal constitution does not guaran- tee, and that ‘‘[j]ury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitu- tion of Connecticut, article first, § 8 . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rhodes, 248 Conn. 39, 46 , 726 A.2d 513 (1999).

1998Ed. 2d 776 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 , 87 S. Ct. 468 , 17 L.

1998Ed. 2d 776 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 , 87 S. Ct. 468 , 17 L.

2016Such compelling prejudice does not arise where the conflict concerns only minor or peripheral matters which are not at the core of the defense." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booth , 250 Conn. 611 , 621, 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S.Ct. 1568 , 146 L.Ed.2d 471 (2000). "[W]e will reverse a trial court's ruling on joinder only where the trial court commits an abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to one or more of the defendants." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 620 , 737 A.2d 404 .

2016Such compelling prejudice does not arise where the conflict concerns only minor or peripheral matters which are not at the core of the defense." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booth , 250 Conn. 611 , 621, 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S.Ct. 1568 , 146 L.Ed.2d 471 (2000). "[W]e will reverse a trial court's ruling on joinder only where the trial court commits an abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to one or more of the defendants." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 620 , 737 A.2d 404 .

2016Such compelling prejudice does not arise where the conflict concerns only minor or peripheral matters which are not at the core of the defense." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booth , 250 Conn. 611 , 621, 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S.Ct. 1568 , 146 L.Ed.2d 471 (2000). "[W]e will reverse a trial court's ruling on joinder only where the trial court commits an abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to one or more of the defendants." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 620 , 737 A.2d 404 .

2016Such compelling prejudice does not arise where the conflict concerns only minor or peripheral matters which are not at the core of the defense." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booth , 250 Conn. 611 , 621, 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S.Ct. 1568 , 146 L.Ed.2d 471 (2000). "[W]e will reverse a trial court's ruling on joinder only where the trial court commits an abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to one or more of the defendants." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 620 , 737 A.2d 404 .

2010Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. . . . [T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by apanel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roman, 262 Conn. 718, 725 , 817 A.2d 100 (2003).

2010Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. . . . [T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by apanel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roman, 262 Conn. 718, 725 , 817 A.2d 100 (2003).

2023Ed. 2d 384 (2021); United States v. Chambers, 878 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2017) (‘‘[t]he [D]istrict [C]ourt may consider uncharged, dis- missed, and even acquitted conduct at sentencing’’); United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2007) (‘‘[w]e are . . . satisfied that the core principle of Watts lives on and that the [D]istrict [C]ourt could constitutionally consider the acquitted conduct’’), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1297 , 128 S. Ct. 1736 , 170 L.

2023Ed. 2d 384 (2021); United States v. Chambers, 878 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2017) (‘‘[t]he [D]istrict [C]ourt may consider uncharged, dis- missed, and even acquitted conduct at sentencing’’); United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2007) (‘‘[w]e are . . . satisfied that the core principle of Watts lives on and that the [D]istrict [C]ourt could constitutionally consider the acquitted conduct’’), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1297 , 128 S. Ct. 1736 , 170 L.

2017The federal and state constitutions require juries to be "composed of individuals able to decide the case solely on the evidence and apply the law in accordance with the court's instructions ...." State v. Griffin , 251 Conn. 671 , 691-92, 741 A.2d 913 (1999).

2017The federal and state constitutions require juries to be "composed of individuals able to decide the case solely on the evidence and apply the law in accordance with the court's instructions ...." State v. Griffin , 251 Conn. 671 , 691-92, 741 A.2d 913 (1999).

2016Such compelling prejudice does not arise where the conflict concerns only minor or peripheral matters which are not at the core of the defense." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booth , 250 Conn. 611 , 621, 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S.Ct. 1568 , 146 L.Ed.2d 471 (2000). "[W]e will reverse a trial court's ruling on joinder only where the trial court commits an abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to one or more of the defendants." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 620 , 737 A.2d 404 .

2016Such compelling prejudice does not arise where the conflict concerns only minor or peripheral matters which are not at the core of the defense." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Booth , 250 Conn. 611 , 621, 737 A.2d 404 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1060 , 120 S.Ct. 1568 , 146 L.Ed.2d 471 (2000). "[W]e will reverse a trial court's ruling on joinder only where the trial court commits an abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to one or more of the defendants." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 620 , 737 A.2d 404 .

2016The decision of the trial court is therefore reversible on appeal only if there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 435 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001). ‘‘Potential juror bias is considered akin to other mis- conduct that similarly might affect a juror’s impartiality, thus potentially violating a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Con- necticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, 299 Co

2016The decision of the trial court is therefore reversible on appeal only if there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 435 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001). ‘‘Potential juror bias is considered akin to other mis- conduct that similarly might affect a juror’s impartiality, thus potentially violating a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Con- necticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, 299 Co

2016The decision of the trial court is therefore reversible on appeal only if there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 435 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001). ‘‘Potential juror bias is considered akin to other mis- conduct that similarly might affect a juror’s impartiality, thus potentially violating a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Con- necticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, 299 Co

2016The decision of the trial court is therefore reversible on appeal only if there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 435 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001). ‘‘Potential juror bias is considered akin to other mis- conduct that similarly might affect a juror’s impartiality, thus potentially violating a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Con- necticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, 299 Co

2014In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, 140 Conn. App. 393 , 417–18, 59 A.3d 293 , cert. granted on other grounds, 308 Conn. 919 , 62 A.3d 1133 (2013). 5 Ralls testified as follows: ‘‘The Court: So, Ms. Ralls, this is what was reported to me, and correct me if I’m wrong, okay?

2014In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, 140 Conn. App. 393 , 417–18, 59 A.3d 293 , cert. granted on other grounds, 308 Conn. 919 , 62 A.3d 1133 (2013). 5 Ralls testified as follows: ‘‘The Court: So, Ms. Ralls, this is what was reported to me, and correct me if I’m wrong, okay?

2012“The test for the trial court is whether substantial injustice is likely to result unless a separate trial be accorded. . . . [W]e will reverse a trial court’s ruling on joinder only where the trial court commits an abuse of discretion that results in manifest prejudice to one or more of the defendants.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533, 575-76 , 747 A.2d 487 (2000). 14 “The test for antagonistic defenses provides: When . . . the jury can reasonably accept the core of the defense offered by either defendant only if it rejects the core of the d

2009As noted in State v. Johnson, 288 Conn. 236 , 951 A.2d 1257 (2008): “As a preliminary matter, we note the settled principle that [j]nry impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. ...

2009As noted in State v. Johnson, 288 Conn. 236 , 951 A.2d 1257 (2008): “As a preliminary matter, we note the settled principle that [j]nry impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. ...

2007The modern jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court. . . . [Article first, § 8, and the sixth amendment require] that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an . . . unprejudiced jury . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson F., 77 Conn. App. 405, 422 , 823 A.2d 406 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 905 , 831 A.2d 254 (2003).

2007The modem jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instmctions on the law by the court. . . . [Article first, § 8, and the sixth amendment require] that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an . . . unprejudiced jury . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson F., 77 Conn. App. 405, 422 , 823 A.2d 406 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 905 , 831 A.2d 254 (2003).

2007The modern jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court. . . . [Article first, § 8, and the sixth amendment require] that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an . . . unprejudiced jury . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson F., 77 Conn. App. 405, 422 , 823 A.2d 406 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 905 , 831 A.2d 254 (2003).

2007The modem jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instmctions on the law by the court. . . . [Article first, § 8, and the sixth amendment require] that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an . . . unprejudiced jury . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson F., 77 Conn. App. 405, 422 , 823 A.2d 406 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 905 , 831 A.2d 254 (2003).

2007The defendant’s claim is that the juror’s impartiality was tainted by his claimed prior knowledge of the defendant. “[I]n State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213, 247 , 849 A.2d 648 (2004) (en banc), [our Supreme Court] held that the traditional juror misconduct inquiry set forth in State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502 , 668 A.2d 1288 (1995) (en banc), is inapplicable to situations in which the allegations are that a venire panel has been tainted prior to voir dire.

2007The defendant’s claim is that the juror’s impartiality was tainted by his claimed prior knowledge of the defendant. “[I]n State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213, 247 , 849 A.2d 648 (2004) (en banc), [our Supreme Court] held that the traditional juror misconduct inquiry set forth in State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502 , 668 A.2d 1288 (1995) (en banc), is inapplicable to situations in which the allegations are that a venire panel has been tainted prior to voir dire.

2007The modern jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court. . . . [Article first, § 8, and the sixth amendment require] that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an . . . unprejudiced jury . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson F., 77 Conn. App. 405, 422 , 823 A.2d 406 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 905 , 831 A.2d 254 (2003).

2007The modern jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court. . . . [Article first, § 8, and the sixth amendment require] that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an . . . unprejudiced jury . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson F., 77 Conn. App. 405, 422 , 823 A.2d 406 , cert. denied, 265 Conn. 905 , 831 A.2d 254 (2003).

2007“Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution [of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution] .... [T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by apanel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Necaise, 97 Conn. App. 214, 222 , 904 A.2d 245 (2006).

2007“Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution [of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution] .... [T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by apanel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Necaise, 97 Conn. App. 214, 222 , 904 A.2d 245 (2006).

2005The modem jury . . . determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments. . . . [These] rules . . . assure that the jury will decide the case free from external influences . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Portee, 55 Conn. App. 544, 565-66 , 740 A.2d 868 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 920 , 744 A.2d 439 (2000).